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Collective management organisations (CMOs), also know as collecting societies, are 
natural monopolies and they occupy dominant positions, with anticompetitive 
tendencies if not regulated, in the copyright management and licensing market. 
Regulation regimes must thus set efficiency, transparency and accountability standards 
for CMOs. In achieving these standards, competition law aims to address specific 
concerns through the regulation of CMOs’ capacity to limit copyright owners’ 
economic rights, discriminate against them in terms of membership, and fix excessive 
and discriminatory royalty rates for users. CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa are 
subject to copyright-sector specific regulation. Nigeria and South Africa have 
competition legislations, which applies in principle, but has so far not been applied to 
CMOs in practice.  
Undertaken as desk and library based study, the thesis examines the regulation 
of CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa. It determines if the regulation in both countries 
empower the relevant copyright regulatory agency to address the competition-related 
concerns in regards to CMOs and whether there is need to apply competition law to 
CMOs in both countries. The thesis explores the copyright and competition law 
interface. It argues that, although adopting different methodologies, both fields pursue 
the similar goal  of promoting creativity by enhancing dynamic competition in 
copyright markets which underscores the regulation of CMOs. It concludes that 
whereas competition law does not need to be applied to CMOs in Nigeria, there is need 
to apply it to CMOs in South Africa because unlike its Nigerian counterpart, there are 
observable gaps in the South African copyright regime in the treatment of the 
competition-related concerns of CMOs. 
At the time of writing this thesis, both Nigeria and South Africa are reviewing 
their copyright legislation. CMOs regulation is a major issue being considered in the 
process. The thesis will be indispensable, the author hopes, in determining the form 
and content of CMOs regulation in both countries. Further, there is scarcity of literature 
in Nigeria and South Africa on the copyright and competition law interface relating to 
CMOs regulation. The thesis will fill this gap and form an invaluable resource for 
further research; a useful guide for copyright and competition law regulators and 
enforcers; and a rich reference material for academics, judges and policy makers in 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Objective and relevance of the research 
In both Nigeria and South Africa, collective management organisations (CMOs)1 
operate in the copyright management market, that is their relationship with copyright 
owners, and the licensing market, that is their relationship with copyright users. The 
rights acquired by CMOs and their capacity to solve the problems of transaction costs, 
associated with copyright licensing, by deploying economies of scale and scope make 
them natural monopolies in both markets.  
From an economic perspective, the term natural monopoly connotes a market 
in which high infrastructure or transaction costs, among others, in relation to the size 
the market, confers a firm with the largest supply capacity an overwhelming advantage 
over potential competitors.2 This usually happens in markets where large capital costs 
create economics of scale vis-à-vis the size of the given market. Simply put, the notion 
of natural monopoly describes a market in which only one firm can endure through 
competition as a result of the costs associated with the demand and supply structure of 
the market.3 Further, a natural monopoly may manifest as a de facto or de jure 
monopoly.4 A de facto monopoly may be described as a firm that gained dominance in 
a given market owing to there being only a few or no competitors or because of the 
high demand for its goods or services and its capacity to meet the demand. Such 
monopoly is not created by governmental intervention, but by market forces.5 This 
distinguishes a de facto monopoly from a de jure monopoly, which is a monopoly 
																																								 																				
1 Collective management organisations (CMOs) have been referred to differently as collecting 
societies, collective rights management organisations, copyright collective societies, among others. 
Whatever the term used, they refer to the same entities as briefly defined in 2.2 below. The Nigerian 
and South African legal regimes for collective management adopt the terms “collecting societies”. 
However, the term CMO is generally adopted here because it is more widely utilised in the scholarship 
on the subject. However, for ease of reference and for purpose of emphasis, the terms CMO and 
collecting societies would be used interchangeably in the course of the thesis. 
2 J Perloff Macroeconomics (2012) 394. 
3 S Ghosh ‘Decoding and recoding natural monopoly, deregulation, and intellectual property’ (2008) 4 
University of Illinois Law Review 1125-1184. 
4 RA Ghosh ‘An economic basis for open standards’ (2005) available at 






created by the government and statutorily prevented from competition.6 De jure 
monopoly is usually conferred on public utility firms and as shown in the course of this 
work, CMOs exist in some countries as de jure monopolies. The concept of natural 
monopoly will be better appreciated in 2.3.4 below where the CMOs’ competition 
concerns are discussed. 
For now, it should be noted that within the context of collective management 
of copyright and related rights, the notion of natural or de facto monopoly does not 
indicate the non-existence of other CMOs or other firms (such as online rights 
aggregators) within a given copyright management and licensing market for the same 
class of copyright. The natural monopoly concept only justifies the need for regulation, 
and determines the shape of the regulatory framework, in order to prevent the CMOs 
from limiting competition in collective management and licensing market.  
Standard economics suggests the need for government intervention in the form 
of regulation of natural monopolies in order to promote efficiency in the given market.7 
The need to pursue public policy goals and outcomes such as ‘income distribution, 
essential services, cross-subsidization and taxation’ by regulation is another important 
reason advanced by standard economics for the regulation of natural monopolies.8 
However, there are scholars who believe that regulation of natural monopolies can 
itself lead to inefficiencies in the market as it is difficult sometimes to adopt a more 
effective regulatory approach. To these scholars, every market (through the forces of 
price, demand and supply) has the capacity to regulate itself and prevent the market 
failures that government supervision is meant to achieve.9 Within the context of 
collective management, this thesis contends in 2.4.3 below that given the nature of the 
collective management and licensing market, it is important to subject CMOs, which 
are monopolies, to regulation to ensure efficiency and the promotion of creativity and 
social welfare. The competition concerns raised by CMOs monopolistic nature and the 
																																								 																				
6 Ibid. 
7 RD Tollison and RE Wagner ‘The logic of natural monopoly regulation’ (1991) 17(4) Eastern 
Economic Journal 483-490; BWF Depooter ‘Regulation of Natural Monopoly’ (1999) available at 
https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/5400-regulation-of-natural-monopoly.pdf, accessed 
on 5 March 2019; PL Joskow ‘Regulation of natural monopolies’ (2005) available at 
https://economics.mit.edu/files/1180, accessed 5 March 2019. 
8 Joskow Ibid. 	
9 H Ergas ‘Why Johnny can't regulate: the case of natural monopoly’ (2013) 20(1) Agenda: A Journal 




approach that competition law adopts in addressing these concerns are also highlighted 
in 2.4.3 below. 
Indeed, as will be shown in the course of this thesis, CMOs, as natural 
monopolies, have been judicially accepted from a competition law perspective as 
‘necessary evils’ because of their functions within the copyright management and 
licensing market. Thus, within the context of collective management, the question is 
not so much as to whether or not CMOs should be allowed to exist as natural 
monopolies. The emphasis is on regulating the exercise of their monopoly so that they 
do not limit competition within the copyright management and licensing markets.  
As natural monopolies, CMOs occupy a dominant position in the copyright 
management and licensing market which, if not curtailed, may be abused to the 
detriment of copyright owners and users. To prevent such abuse, CMOs have been 
subjected to different forms of regulatory frameworks which have been developed in 
different countries. While some countries adopt copyright-sector specific regulatory 
frameworks, others adopt a dual-sector framework of copyright law on the one hand, 
and competition law on the other hand. The Nigerian and South African regulatory 
frameworks are copyright-sector specific. Whatever the approach adopted, the main 
objective of regulating CMOs is to prevent them from abusing their monopoly by 
subjecting them to efficiency, transparency and accountability standards in their 
relationship with copyright owners, users, and among themselves. In pursuit of this 
objective, competition law seeks to address specific competition concerns such as the 
abuse of market dominance, excessive pricing (royalties), unreasonable restraint on 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights, refusal to license, refusal to accept copyright 
owners as members, discrimination between copyright owners and discrimination 
between users, among others in the copyright markets. To this end, CMOs are 
scrutinised under the rules against restrictive agreements, abuse of market dominance 
and merger control. On the other hand, copyright-sector specific regulations protect the 
interest of copyright owners and users from the conduct of CMOs within the copyright 
system by subjecting CMOs to defined modes of operation.  
Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine the regulation of CMOs in 
Nigeria and South Africa to determine if the regulatory frameworks in both countries 
empower the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory bodies to address the 




will determine if there is a need to also apply competition law to CMOs in both 
countries. 
 This research is very important for several reasons. First, copyright 
sector-specific regulatory frameworks and competition law may substitute or 
complement each other in regulating CMOs. They may substitute each other depending 
on the specific conducts of CMOs in focus: conduct regarded as anti-competitive such 
as abuse of dominance in a given collective management and licensing market, or 
copyright-related conducts such as licensing claims and procedures. On the other hand, 
they may complement each other if the focus is on a specific conduct, such as royalty 
setting, sanctioned by copyright but which raises competition concerns. The foregoing 
raises questions as to how copyright and/or competition law may be applied to CMOs 
and the merits and demerits of each legal framework in the regulation of CMOs, as 
discussed in 2.5 below.10  
Secondly, Nigeria and South Africa are in the process of reviewing their 
respective copyright legislation and the regulation of CMOs is one of the main issues 
being considered in the process. Thus, the outcome of this research will be a valuable 
resource in the determination of what the regulatory framework for CMOs in both 
countries should address. Secondly, literature preponderates on the intersection 
between copyright sector-specific regulation and competition law on the regulation of 
CMOs from a European Union (EU) and other active competition law jurisdictions, 
such as USA. However, there is a huge literature gap in Nigeria and South Africa in 
this regard. Therefore, the research strives to fill this gap and provide useful guidance 
for copyright and competition law enforcers when determining whether or not to 
exclude or exempt CMOs from the application of the competition laws in Nigeria and 
																																								 																				
10	For a general Discussion on the sector-specific regulation defense under competition law and related 
issues, see P Congedo ‘The “regulatory authority dixit” defence in European competition law 
enforcement’ (2014) MPRA Paper No. 60239 available at https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/60239/1/MPRA_paper_60239.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2019; RD Nair et al ‘The inter-
relationships between regulation and competition enforcement in the South African liquid fuels 
industry’ (2015) 26(1) Journal of Energy in Southern Africa 11-19; A de Streel ‘The Relationship 
between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: The case of electronic communications’ 
(2008) available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2d16/db27d8d021ff051e653cfd039549664b8453.pdf, accessed on 1 
March 2019; M Hellwig ‘Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries’ 
(2008) available at 





South Africa. Also, it will form an indispensable resource for further research in this 
area in Nigeria and South Africa. 
Finally, the research does not intend to examine the level of compliance with 
the regulatory frameworks for CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa. Such examination 
would require some empirical study, which is beyond the scope of the research. 	
 
1.2 Research questions 
The overarching questions this thesis seeks to resolve are whether the current regulation 
regime for CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa empowers the relevant copyright sector-
specific regulatory bodies to address the CMOs’ competition concerns in the copyright 
management and licensing markets in both countries; and if not, whether there is a need 
to apply competition law in regulating CMOs in both countries. These issues 
underscore the main objective of the thesis as highlighted in 1.1 above.  
To effectively address these issues, it is important to first examine the 
justification for the emergence and continued existence of CMOs as natural monopolies 
in the copyright management and licensing markets, the functions performed by CMOs 
and the rationale for regulating CMOs. In this regard, particular focus will be on the 
different forms of regulatory frameworks for CMOs, the main objective of regulating 
CMOs and the specific CMOs’ competition concerns within the copyright management 
and licensing markets will be determined. Secondly, the current regulation of CMOs in 
Nigeria and South Africa will be examined with the aim of determining how, if at all, 
CMOs’ competition concerns have been addressed by the regulatory frameworks. 
Thirdly, the thesis will examine competition in the collective management’s landscape 
and how competition law has been applied to address the specific CMOs’ competition 
concerns. It will then determine, if necessary, whether competition law should be 
applied to CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa. 
 In summary, to resolve the overarching issues, the following specific questions 
will be addressed in this thesis: 
 
a. How and why has collective management of copyright and related rights, and 
the regulation thereof, developed into its current forms? 
b. What, if any, are the key competition concerns that arise out of the dominant 




c. Does the Nigerian copyright sector-specific regulatory framework for CMOs 
empower the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory body to address the 
CMO’s competition concerns in the copyright management and licensing 
market in Nigeria? 
d. Does the South African copyright sector-specific regulatory framework for 
CMOs empower the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory bodies to 
address the CMO’s competition concerns in the copyright management and 
licensing markets in South Africa? 
e. How does competition law address the key CMOs’ competition concerns in the 
copyright management and licensing markets? 
1.3 Research methodology 
As gleaned from the research objectives and questions at 1.1 and 1.2, this thesis 
primarily sets out to determine if the copyright sector-specific regulatory framework 
for CMOs in South Africa and Nigeria empower the relevant copyright regulatory 
bodies to address the competition concerns of CMOs in the copyright management and 
licensing market in both countries; and whether there is a need to resort to competition 
law in regulating CMOs. To this end, the research adopts a doctrinal methodology. It 
is undertaken by way of desk and library-based study. The research examines primary 
legal sources including relevant South African and Nigerian statutes and regulations; 
judicial authorities; relevant government policy statements from both countries; and 
relevant international copyright instruments. 
To address the overarching issues, the thesis will also discuss the interface of 
copyright and competition law and how it impacts on the regulation of CMOs in 
Nigeria and South Africa. Relevant judicial authorities on this issue are lacking in 
South Africa and Nigeria. To appreciate the issues, the thesis relies on case law from 
India, especially as it relates to the broad discourse of the interface between copyright 
and competition law undertaken in chapter five of the thesis. The choice of India is 
informed, firstly, by the fact that it is a developing country like Nigeria and South 
Africa; and secondly by the fact that it has a robust jurisprudence on the copyright-
competition law interface which Nigeria and South Africa can draw from when 
considering issues relating to the copyright-competition law interface. However, 
India’s jurisprudence is not robust enough to be relied upon when determining the 




of CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa. Further, the thesis briefly refers to the law and 
practice in Kenya within the context of the discussion at 3.5.4 on how to restructure 
collective management to resolve the regulatory challenge around number of CMOs 
per class of copyright in the Nigerian music industry. 
Thus, one has to look to other jurisdictions with established jurisprudence on 
the application of competition law in the regulation of CMOs. The Court of Justice of 
the European Union’s (CJEU) jurisprudence is important in this regard. The CJEU has 
developed a rich jurisprudence on the copyright-competition law interface and how this 
relates to the regulation of CMOs. The CJUE’s jurisprudence has been largely codified 
in the EU Directive on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and 
Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Use in the Internal 
Market, 2014, the relevant provisions of which will be relied upon in the course of this 
work. The USA is another important jurisdiction relied upon in the course of this work. 
The country has a long and established history, substantial case law and body of 
literature on the application of competition principles to CMOs. Indeed, competition 
principles formed the major source of regulating CMOs in the USA.  Competition law 
also shaped other frameworks, such as the consent decrees and the Musical Works 
Modernisation Act 2018, through which CMOs are regulated in the USA.  
It is important to note that, according to industry reports, the collective 
management and licensing market in the USA and most countries, such as France, the 
United Kingdom and Germany, under the jurisdiction of the CJEU are more developed 
than those of Nigeria and South Africa in terms of size of the markets and earnings of 
CMOs, among others.11 Thus, the initial reaction to reliance on the CJEU’s and USA’s 
jurisdiction to determine the research questions within the Nigerian and South African 
contexts would be that of circumspection. However, from a competition law 
perspective, there is no real difference in terms of the capacity of CMOs to occupy 
dominant positions, neither is there any distinction in terms of the competition concerns 
																																								 																				
11 See CISAC Global Collections Reports 2018 for 2017 Data (2018) available at 
https://www.cisac.org/CISAC-University/Library/Global-Collections-Reports/Global-Collections-
Report-2018, accessed on 1 March 2019; WIPO WIPO Studies on the Economic Contribution of the 
Copyright Industries: An Overview (2014). For South Africa, see A Pouris and R Inglesi-Lots The 
Economic Contribution of Copyright-based Industries in South Africa (WIPO Report, 2011). No such 
study on Nigeria yet, but see NCC ‘Medium term corporate plan and strategy (2012-2014)’ available at 
http://kyg.nigeriagovernance.org/Attachments/Organization/Mtss/158_MTSS_Nigerian%20Copyright




raised by CMOs, in the copyright management and licensing markets of the countries. 
And since there is a huge gap in both literature and case law on the application of 
competition law in the regulation of CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa, it is 
appropriate to resort to the established CJEU and USA jurisprudence on the subject for 
useful guide. This approach finds support in s1(3) of the South African Competition 
Act (SA Competition Act),12 which enables reliance on appropriate foreign and 
international law for the interpretation and application of the SA Competition Act.13 
The Nigerian Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2018 (Nigerian 
Competition Act) does not contain a section similar to s1(3) of the SA Competition 
Act. Nonetheless, reliance can still be placed on foreign jurisprudence as guide in 
interpreting relevant provisions of the Nigerian Competition Act. This is so because 
Nigerian courts usually refer to foreign case law, as persuasive authorities, especially 
where the foreign case law interpreted a statutory provision similar to the one being 
applied by the Nigerian court.14  
Finally, the thesis relies on relevant secondary sources such as academic 
literature, official reports of relevant studies, newspaper reports and online sources. 
There is paucity of literature and case law on CMOs in South Africa and Nigeria that 
have addressed the above questions. Thus, in answering the questions, this research 
draws substantially from the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 
Report on Copyright, Competition and Development, 2013 (Max Planck Report) 
mandated by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). The Max Planck 
Report was based largely on the case law and practice of the European Commission, 
the CJEU, and some national competition jurisdictions in other parts of the world, 
including the USA. It is the most extensive and authoritative study in this regard. 	
1.4. Summary of research context 
The following CMOs operate in Nigeria: Musical Collecting Society Nigeria (MCSN), 
Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON), Reproduction Rights Society of Nigeria 
																																								 																				
12 Competition Act, No 89 of 1998	
13 OECD Competition Law and Policy in South Africa (2003) 9-10 available at 
https://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Reports/South-Africa-Peer-Review.PDF, accessed on 15 
July 2018. 
14 Foreign case law is relied upon by Nigerian courts, when interpreting local statutes, as persuasive 
authorities. That is, they are relied as guide and not binding authorities. See Basinco Motors Ltd v 




(REPRONIG) and Audio-Visual Rights Society (AVRS) of Nigeria. They fall under 
the supervision of the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) pursuant to the Nigerian 
Copyright Act,15 the Copyright (Collective Management Organisations) Regulations, 
2007 (CMO Regulations) and the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).16  
The Nigerian Competition Act was assented to by the Nigerian President in 
February 2019. Before then, only some sectoral competition regulations existed in 
Nigeria.17 In terms of s164 of the Nigerian Competition Act, the existing sectoral 
competition regulations will now be read and applied in such a way as to bring them in 
conformity with the Nigerian Competition Act.  
It was argued elsewhere  that the UK Statute of Monopolies 1623 (the Statute),18 
is applicable in Nigeria as a statute of general application.19 Being a former British 
colony, the English common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application 
in force in England on 1 January 1900 were received in Nigeria subject to the express 
provision of any federal law.20 In the light of the enactment of the Nigerian Competition 
Act and for the following reasons, this argument is no longer sustainable. 
First, the Statute has been incrementally repealed in the UK. Section 5 thereof 
was first repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1868 followed by the repeal of ss10 
to 12 through the Patents, Designs and Trademarks Act 1883. The Administration of 
Justice Act 1965 repealed s8 of the Statute, while ss2 to 4 where repealed by the Statute 
Law (Repeals) Act 1969. Only ss6, 7 and 9 containing exceptions and s1 of the Statute 
are extant. Consequently, the repeals in respect of ss2 to 4 and 10 to 12 of the Statute 
are unenforceable in Nigeria since they were done pursuant to laws enacted after 1 
January 1900. Further, only ss1 to 4, 6, 7 and 9 of the Statute have not been repealed. 
As gleaned from ss1 to 4 thereof, the Statute – generally regarded as the maiden 
English patent legislation – was enacted to subject monopolies and letters of patents 
granted by the British Crown to the common law of England.21 However, by virtue of 
s6, the Statute excludes patents granted in respect of novel inventions. Section 9, which 
																																								 																				
15 Cap C28, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
16 Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.	
17 Nigerian Communication Act, 2003 and Nigerian Communication Act-Competition Practice 
Regulation, 2007; Investments and Securities Act, 2007. 
18 Chapter 3 21 Ja 1. 
19 B Sodipo ‘FDI and Nigeria’s IP landscape’ (2017) available at 
http://www.qmipri.qmul.ac.uk/docs/199218.pdf, accessed 11 July 2018. 
20 The Interpretation Act Cap I23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, s32(1). 





excludes ‘corporations, companies, or fellowships of any art, [...] or societies of 
merchants [...] erected for the maintenance, enlargement, or ordering of any trade or 
merchandise [...]’ from the Statute’s ambit, may be interpreted to mean exclusion of 
CMOs from application of the Statute. Flowing from the discussion in chapter 2 of this 
thesis, CMOs can be regarded as ‘corporations, companies, or fellowships of any art 
[...]’ for purpose of the Statute in the sense that they deal with works protected by 
copyright law (‘any art’) on behalf of copyright owners. However, in view of the 
enactment of the Nigerian Competition Act, it is submitted that ss1 to 4, 6, 7, and 9 of 
the Statute cannot be applied to competition related issues in Nigeria. This accords with 
the attitude of the Nigerian courts, which is to refrain from relying on English statutes 
in situations where local statutes have been enacted.22 
That being said, it is important to note that the application of the Nigerian 
Competition Act applies in principle to CMOs in Nigeria.23 However, its application in 
practice to CMOs will depend on whether the copyright sector-specific regulatory 
framework does not empower the NCC to address the competition concerns raised by 
CMO in the copyright management and licensing market in Nigeria, an issue this thesis 
aims to resolve. 
The current regulatory framework for CMOs in Nigeria have not been the focus 
of much academic research. Although the leading literature in this regard considers it 
as a ‘comprehensive legal framework’,24 it does not address the question whether the 
regulatory framework takes care of the CMOs’ competition law concerns discussed in 
this thesis. This said, the recent work by Olubiyi and Adam seems relevant in this 
context.25 While examining the adequacy of the regulatory framework for CMOs in 
Nigeria, the authors sought to ‘inquire into whether the regulatory regime in Nigeria is 
adequate for the purpose of ensuring efficiency in collective administration of 
copyright or whether it goes overboard by curtailing the freedom of [CMOs] beyond 
what is necessary’.26 In so doing, the authors recognised, among other issues, CMOs’ 
monopolistic nature and the impact on copyright owners and users as justification for 
regulating CMOs in Nigeria. However, they did not address the issue from the 
																																								 																				
22 Chigbu v Tonimas (2006) 9 NWLR 984 189. 
23 Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2018 (Nigerian Competition Act), s2. 
24 O Ola Copyright Collective Administration in Nigeria: Lessons for Africa (2013) 95. 
25 IA Olubiyi and KI Adams ‘An examination of the adequacy of the regulation of collecting societies 
in Nigeria (2017) 5 SAIPLJ 87-112. 




perspective of the copyright and competition law interface. Moreover, they left 
unanswered the specific question whether there is need for competition law in 
regulating CMOs in Nigeria. Indeed, the work did not identify major CMOs’ 
competition law concerns in Nigeria. 
	 In South Africa, the following CMOs exist: the new South African Music 
Performance Rights Association (SAMPRA – a merger of the old SAMPRA and 
Performers’ Organisation of South Africa Trust [POSA]); Southern African Music 
Rights Organisation (SAMRO); Dramatic, Artistic and Literary Rights Organisation 
(DALRO); Composers, Authors and Publishers Association (CAPASSO); Independent 
Music Performance Rights Association (IMPRA); Recording industry of South 
Africa’s Audio-visual (RAV); Christian Copyright Licensing International (CCLI); 
and Motion Picture Licensing Company (MPLC).  
 Here, the South African Copyright Act (SA Copyright Act),27 Performers’ 
Protection Act,28 Collecting Societies Regulations, 2006 (CS Regulations) and the 
Companies Act29 form the regulatory framework for CMOs. In principle, CMOs in 
South Africa also fall within the purview of the SA Competition Act.30 However, the 
Minister may exempt them from operation of the SA Competition Act where necessary 
applications are made.31 CMOs in South Africa are currently regulated in practice by 
the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) without recourse to the 
SA Competition Act. The extent to which the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection 
Act, CS Regulations and Companies Act empower the CIPC to address CMOs’ 
competition law concerns in South Africa has not been specifically examined by 
existing literature.32  
1.5 Research Structure 
This is a thesis of six chapters. This general introduction is the first. The second chapter 
lays the foundation of the thesis by discussing the general issues relating to collective 
management with particular focus on its justification; the impact of digitisation; basis 
																																								 																				
27	No 98 of 1978	
28	No 11 of 1968	
29	No. 71 of 2008	
30 Competition Act, No 89 of 1998 (SA Competition Act). 
31 SA Competition Act, s10(4). 
32 JJ Baloyi and T Pistorius ‘Collective Management in Africa’ in D Gervais (ed.) 3rd ed. Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2016) 369-424; Department of Trade and Industry 




for regulating CMOs and specific regulatory and competition concerns. The chapter 
also briefly examines the types of collective management, and the types of regulatory 
frameworks, among others.  
 Chapters three and four are country specific. Against the backdrop of the 
research questions, stated earlier in 1.2 above, they highlight and discuss the history of 
collective management, the existing CMOs, and the regulation of CMOs, among other 
issues in Nigeria and South Africa respectively.  
The regulation of CMOs by competition law is examined in chapter five. The 
chapter will begin by discussing in some detail the copyright and competition law 
interface. This is to form the foundation for analysing the link between copyright 
regulatory frameworks and competition law in the regulation of CMOs in the course of 
the chapter. The research questions highlighted in 1.2 above will be specifically 
answered in chapter six, which will also contain the recommendation and general 





CHAPTER TWO: COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Collective management of copyright and related rights (collective management) is a 
core ‘element of [the] economic activity within the copyright-based industries’.1 This 
is not to say there are no other means by which the economic activities within the 
industry would thrive.2 However, as will become apparent in the course of this chapter, 
collective management appears as an indispensable mechanism for this purpose.3 To 
recapitulate, the objective of this thesis is to examine the regulation of CMOs in Nigeria 
and South Africa to determine if the regulatory frameworks in both countries empower 
the relevant copyright regulatory bodies to address the competition concerns raised by 
CMOs’ conducts in the copyright management and licensing markets. The research 
will also determine if there is need to apply competition law to regulating CMOs in 
both countries.  
																																								 																				
1 KN Monyatsi Survey on the Status of Collective Management Organizations in ARIPO Member 
States (2015) 16. Note that there are several World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) studies 
which identified the existence of the copyright-based industries and their contribution to national 
economies. Generally, see WIPO WIPO Studies on the Economic Contribution of the Copyright 
Industries: An Overview (2014). For South Africa, see See A Pouris and R Inglesi-Lots The Economic 
Contribution of Copyright-based Industries in South Africa (WIPO Report, 2011). No such study on 
Nigeria yet, but see NCC ‘Medium term corporate plan and strategy (2012-2014)’ available at 
http://kyg.nigeriagovernance.org/Attachments/Organization/Mtss/158_MTSS_Nigerian%20Copyright
%20Commission%20(NCC).pdf, accessed on 3 March 2017 
2 A Katz ‘The potential demise of another natural monopoly: Rethinking the collective administration 
of performing rights’ (2005) 1(3) JCLE 541-593 (The potential demise 1); A Katz ‘The potential 
demise of another natural monopoly: new technologies and the administration of performing rights’ 
(2006) 2(2) JCLE 245-284 (The potential demise 2).  
3 R Towse ‘Managing copyrights in the cultural industries’ available at 
http://neumann.hec.ca/aimac2005/PDF_Text/Towse_Ruth.pdf, accessed on 6 March 2017; R Towse 
and C Handke ‘Regulating copyright collecting societies: current policy in Europe’ (2007) available at 
http://www.serci.org/2007/towsehandke.pdf, accessed on 6 March 2017; C Handke ‘The economics of 
collective copyright management’ (2013) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256178, accessed on 6 March 2017; MM 
Frabboni ‘The Changing Market for Music Licensing: A Redefinition of Collective Interests and 
Competitive Dynamics’ in A Flanagan and ML Montagnani (eds.) Intellectual Property Law: 
Economics and Social Justice Perspectives (2010) 144-162; J Schovsbo ‘The necessity to collectivize 
copyright – and the dangers thereof’ (2010) available at http://static-
curis.ku.dk/portal/files/20596531/The_Necessity_to_collectivize_copyright_SSRN.pdf, accessed on 6 
March 2017; D Gervais and A Maurushat ‘Fragmented copyright, fragmented management: proposals 




This chapter focuses on collective management generally. Among others, it 
discusses the role of CMOs. The goal here is to identify the legal, economic, and socio-
cultural functions that make CMOs indispensable within the copyright licensing 
framework. The chapter also examines the classification of collective management 
broadly before narrowing it down to the categorisation of CMOs in terms of the mode 
of rights acquisition. Further, the chapter discusses the justification for collective 
management, the impact of digitisation on collective management and the competition 
issues in collective management. The aim is to address major concerns raised by 
competition scholars about the continued existence of CMOs, and the preservation of 
their monopoly, within the collective management and licensing market in the digital 
era. The discussion will be better appreciated within the broad context of the interface 
between copyright law and competition law as it affects collective management. The 
interface between copyright and competition law is discussed in chapter five. For now, 
it should be noted that although adopting different approaches, both copyright and 
competition law can enhance creativity and social welfare. For this purpose, copyright 
law confers exclusive rights (often referred to as monopoly) on creators of copyright 
works over their creation, subject to certain exceptions that allow equitable access to 
the works by the public. On the other hand, competition law focuses on controlling the 
behaviour of dominant firms or monopolies within a defined market.	
The chapter ends by highlighting the rationale for regulating collective 
management, different regulatory approaches, regulatory issues and the discourse 
about the complementarity of copyright and competition law, or the substitution of one 
for the other, in regulating collective management. Overall, the discussion in this 
chapter is aimed at setting the tone for further engagement with the research questions 
of the thesis in chapters three, four and five below. 	
2.2 The roles of CMOs 
The meaning of collective management has been explained in a plethora of literature, 




management systems.4 Statutory and other definitions of CMOs exist.5 However, the 
meaning of collective management has been aptly presented by Ficsor, as follows:  
‘In the framework of [collective management], [copyright owners] authorise 
[CMOs] to monitor the use of their works, negotiate with prospective users, give them 
licenses against appropriate remuneration on the basis of a tariff system and under 
appropriate conditions, collect such remuneration, and distribute it among [copyright 
owners].’6  
Ficsor further asserts that although the foregoing may be regarded as a basic definition 
of collective management, ‘the collective nature of the management may, and 
frequently does also involve some other features corresponding to certain functions 
going beyond the collective exercise of rights in the strict sense’.7 
 Thus, the core objectives of collective management include monitoring of uses 
of copyright works by CMOs on behalf of copyright owners; negotiation with, and 
granting of copyright licenses to prospective users; collection of such royalties from 
copyright users; and distribution of the royalties to copyright owners on whose behalf 
the royalties were collected. In deserving cases, it also involves the institution of 
infringement claims by CMOs on copyright owners’ behalf.8 These objectives are 
regarded as the legal and economic functions of CMOs.  
As gleaned from Ficsor’s statement above, the evolving nature of collective 
management has brought about other roles for CMOs outside their core functions. 
These roles include their socio-cultural functions performed on the basis of solidarity,9 
																																								 																				
4 M Ficsor Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2002); U Uchtenhagen Copyright 
Collective Management in Music (2011); DJ Gervais ‘The landscape of collective management 
schemes’ (2011) 34(4) CJLA 423-449; T Koskinen-Olsson and N Lowe Educational Material on 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Module 1) (2012); DJ Gervais ‘Collective 
management of copyright and neighbouring rights in Canada: An international perspective’ (2002) 
1(2) CJLT 21-50; O Ola Copyright Collective Administration in Nigeria: Lessons for Africa (2013) 8. 
5 SA Copyright Act, s1; Performers Protection Act (SA), s1; Regulations on the Establishment of 
Collecting Society in the Music Industry, GN 517 in GG 28894 of 1 June 2006 (SA), Regulation 1; 
Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act 28 of 2013, ss3 and 15; Department of Trade and 
Investment (DTI) Copyright Review Commission Report (2011) 39; Nigerian Copyright Act, s39 (8). 
6 Ficsor op cit note 4 at 17. 
7 Ibid. 
8 A Adewopo ‘Developments in Collective Administration of Copyright, Licensing and Tariff Setting 
under Nigerian Copyright Law and Regulation’ in DCJ Dakas et al (eds.) Beyond Shenanigans: Jos 
Book of Readings on Critical Legal Issues (2016) 677-700. 
9 S Nerrisson ‘Social functions of collective management societies (CMS) provisory conclusions’ 
(2007) available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/3_nerisson_-_social_functions.pdf, accessed 
on 6 March 2017; J Street, et al ‘Collective management organisations, creativity and cultural 




manifested in the respective mandates from copyright owners to a particular CMO.10 
The solidarity, which is also expressed by reciprocal agreements among foreign sister 
CMOs, has several effects. It ensures that copyright owners are vested with requisite 
power in the market place. This enables them to collectively bargain with huge 
corporate users and government agencies. It also extends to the corridors of 
government. Through CMOs, copyright owners are able to influence government 
policies and legislation geared towards adequate copyright protection.11 Also, 
copyright owners are able to team up with relevant government agencies to curb piracy. 
Other socio-cultural functions of CMOs include events aimed at promoting and 
developing cultural creativity; creation of support funds for indigent copyright owners; 
establishment of annuity funds; amongst others.12  
To perform these functions, CMOs deduct a certain percentage from the amount 
of royalty collected. The percentage is determined by members’ mandate or legislation. 
This is important because CMOs are traditionally allowed to deduct only administrative 
costs from the royalties collected before distribution among its members. Thus, any 
deduction for any other purpose or activities must be sanctioned by its members or by 
relevant legislation. In practice, deductions for socio-cultural purposes are not more 
than 10% of collected royalties.13 Under the CISAC model reciprocal agreements, 
member CMOs are allowed to stipulate the right of contracting national CMOs to 
deduct 10% of royalties collected on behalf of the foreign CMO to undertake socio-
cultural activities locally.14   
In view of their capacity to afford copyright owners a strong bargaining 
platform with large copyright users and government and their socio-cultural functions 
highlighted above, CMOs may be mistaken for trade associations representing 
																																								 																				
10 M Kretschmer ‘Access and reward in the information society: regulating the collective management 
of copyright’ (2007) available at http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/3695/1/CollSoc07.pdf, accessed on 
7 March 2017. 
11 B Andersen, et al ‘Copyrights, Competition and Development: The case of the Music Industry’ 
(UNCTAD Discussion Paper No.145, 2000), 21. 
12 The Southern African Music Rights Society (SAMRO) undertakes anti-piracy activities in form of 
public enlightenment programmes. It also has a funeral benefit scheme and an annuity fund: SAMRO 
‘Integrated Report 2015’ available at 
http://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/Samro_IR_9175_FULL%20IR_4Nov_WEB_FINAL%20RE
PORT.pdf, accessed on 6 March 2017. Also, the Copyright Collecting Society of Nigeria (COSON) is 
involved in anti-piracy efforts in Nigeria: OA Olatunji, et al ‘Collective management of rights in 
musical works and sound recordings: a critique of the Copyright Society of Nigeria’ (2017) IIC 1-26. 





copyright owners.15 The Performing Musicians Association of Nigeria and the 
Recording Industry of South Africa are examples of copyright owners’ trade 
associations in Nigeria and South Africa respectively. However, CMOs vary from these 
trade associations because of the CMOs’ core functions identified above and also 
because unlike CMOs, copyright owners do not assign or license their copyright to 
their trade associations.16 CMOs may also be regarded as trustees. This is because 
copyright owners usually vest the CMOs with their rights the same way an owner of 
property vests a trustee with rights over the property under a trust.17   
 Even so, some forms of collective management exist in which CMOs do not 
perform all the principal objectives outlined above. Such forms are referred to as partial 
collective management.18  For instance, in the management of dramatic works, owners 
of copyright mandate CMOs to undertake collective bargaining and establishment of 
framework agreements with owners of theatres, monitor uses of their works, collect 
royalties and transfer it to the copyright owners. Such copyright owners retain the right 
to complete individual licensing agreements with the theatre owners on the basis of the 
framework agreements collectively bargained by the CMOs.19 Also, the collective 
element in a collective management may be reduced to a mere agency-type wherein 
copyright owners authorise a CMO to act as rights clearing house. Here, the CMO is 
only mandated to collect for and transfer royalties to the copyright owners. The 
copyright owners individually negotiate the royalties and licensing conditions with 
users of copyright works. Such system thrives where the copyright owners are mainly 
corporate rights owners like producers and publishers.20  
 There is another system where collective management relates only to the 
management of equitable remuneration rights. This is usually in cases where copyright 
has been reduced by statute to remuneration rights.21 They include instances of 
statutory or compulsory licences in form of resale rights, and copyright levies, among 
																																								 																				
15 IA Olubiyi and KI Adams ‘An examination of the adequacy of the regulation of collecting societies 
in Nigeria (2017) 5 SAIPLJ 87-112, 93. 
16 CARFAC v National Gallery of Canada [2014] 2 SCR 197-211 at at 208-209 paras 22, 23, and 24. 
17 CB Graber ‘Collective rights management, competition policy and cultural diversity: EU lawmaking 
at a crossroads’ (2012) 4(1) The WIPOJ 35-49; T Koskinen-Olsson and N Lowe Educational 
Materials on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Module 2) (2012) 22.  
18 Ficsor op cit note 4 at 18.  
19 Ibid.  





others. In such situations, the relevant statute usually prescribe remuneration for 
copyright owners through CMOs.   
2.3 Classification of collective management 
Gervais has identified several ways of classifying collective management.22 According 
to the author, collective management could be classified according to the legal basis 
upon which CMOs operate.23 In this sense, CMOs could operate as general-purpose 
organisations or for specific class of rights as provided for by the enabling law. 
Collective management may also be classified according to the field of activity.24 Here, 
CMOs’ field of operation includes music, print and publishing, audio-visual, visual 
arts, amongst other fields.25 Further, collective management could be classified 
according to the ways CMOs acquire rights; how they are structured, managed or their 
licensing practice; among others.26  
 This thesis first examines the classification according to the field of operation 
of CMOs to show the scope of operation of CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa. It then 
narrows down the discussion to the classification according to the manner of rights 
acquisition by CMOs because it will aid in the determination of the extent to which 
competition law can be applied within the context of collective management.  
Generally, and as shown in chapters three and four respectively, CMOs in 
Nigeria and South Africa are established under the following broad fields: music, 
print/publishing and visual arts, and audio-visual fields. A discussion of the economic 
contribution of the subsectors of the creative industry to the global economy in general, 
and the economy of South Africa and Nigeria in particular is, beyond the scope of the 
present discussion.27  It suffices to state that collective management appears more 
																																								 																				
22 Gervais ‘Collective management of copyright in Canada’ op cit note 4. 
23 Ibid  
24 Ibid. 
25	Generally, see T Koskinen-Olsson and N Lowe Educational Materials on Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights (Modules 2-6) (2012)	
26 Ibid. 
27 See also, EY Cultural Times – The First Global Map of Cultural and Creative Industries (2015) 
available at http://www.cisac.org/Cisac-University/Library/Studies-Guides/Cultural-Times-The-First-
Global-Map-of-Cultural-and-Creative-Industries, accessed on 7 March 2017; AS Rutschman 
‘Weapons of mass construction: the role of intellectual property in Nigeria’s film and music industries’ 
(2015) 29 EILR 673-704; NFVF South African Film Industry Economic Baseline Study Report (2013) 
6 available at http://nfvf.co.za/home/22/files/Baseline%20study.pdf, accessed on 7 March 2017;  E 





widespread in the music industry. A recent African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organisation (ARIPO) survey on CMOs in member states reveals that CMOs in the 
field of music collected the highest amount of royalties within the period covered by 
the survey.28 The same is true of royalty collection in Nigeria and South Africa.29 
 There are several CMOs operating globally in the field of music and they are 
linked by reciprocal agreements with each other. CMOs operating in the field of music 
possess varying repertoire composed of musical works and sound recordings (musical 
copyright). Some focus on public performance or mechanical rights separately,30 while 
others focus on both rights jointly.31 Such management may be for authors, composers 
and publishers on the one hand, and performers and/or producers on the other hand. 
Further, there are CMOs that administer copyright in the music industry for all 
copyright owners in the industry.32 It is also possible to find a general purpose CMO 
managing musical copyright with other copyright within the country.33 As will be 
shown in chapters three and four respectively, there are two CMOs in the Nigerian 
music industry, while that of South Africa has five.   
																																								 																				
traction-europe/, accessed on 7 March 2017; PASA ‘Annual Book Publishing Industry Survey 2016’ 
(January 2018) 4 available at http://www.publishsa.co.za/file/1519203677awr-
2016publishingindustrysurvey.pdf, accessed 4 April 2018; M Shosanya ‘Printing Industry is Dying, 
Cry Chartered Printers, Others’ Daily Trust Newspaper 12 April 2015 available at 
http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/business/20268-printing-industry-is-dying-cry-
chartered-printers-others, accessed 7 March 2017; C Okeke ‘Why Nigerians hardly appreciate works 
of arts’ Leadership Newspaper 2 March 2014 available at http://leadership.ng/style/350814/nigerians-
hardly-appreciate-works-art, accessed on 7 March 2017 
28 Monyatsi op cit note 1. 
29 T Okoroji ‘COSON extra-ordinary general meeting December 15, 2016, chairman address’ available 
at http://www.cosonng.com/coson-extra-ordinary-general-meeting-december-15-2016-chairmans-
address/, accessed on 6 March 2017; SAMRO ‘Integrated Report 2016’ 56 available at 
http://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/SAMRO_IR_10070__1Nov_V4e_LN_FinalWebDocument%
20%281%29.pdf, accessed on 14 September 2017; SAMRO ‘Integrated Report 2015’ 27 available at 
http://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/Samro_IR_9175_FULL%20IR_4Nov_WEB_FINAL%20RE
PORT.pdf, accessed on 6 March 2017.  
30 The American Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music 
Incorporated (BMI) are examples of collecting societies focusing on performing rights. Musical 
Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) of the United Kingdom (UK) and the Society of the 
Reproduction Rights of Authors, Composers and Editors in Canada (SODRAC) are mechanical rights 
collecting societies in UK and Canada respectively. 
31 PRS for Music in the UK (an alliance of Performing Rights Society and MCPS) administers 
performing and mechanical rights jointly. 
32 For instance, COSON and MCSN. 
33 The Copyright Society of Malawi (COSOMA) is an example of such collecting society: Copyright 




The nature of the printing and publishing market has made it inevitable for 
collective management to thrive.34 One of the major features of this market is 
widespread copying of literary works. CMOs in this field are generally known as 
Reprography Rights Organisations (RROs).35 Also, the growth in museums, arts 
galleries and digitisation of visual arts for multimedia uses led to the emergence of 
collective management in the visual arts field. CMOs manage both the primary rights 
(reproduction rights, broadcasting rights and rights of communication to the public) 
and resale rights (where available) for visual artists.36 Although collective management 
in the fields of printing/publishing and visual arts developed separately, it is not unusual 
to find an RRO administering the rights in both works jointly. This is the case in South 
Africa and Nigeria, as will become apparent in chapters three and four respectively. 
 Collective management in the audio-visual industry extends to exclusive rights 
such as performing rights. It may be limited to remuneration rights in the audio-visual 
field, depending on the particular national copyright law. Remuneration rights include 
private copying remuneration, rental remuneration or remuneration for broadcast 
retransmission via cable. In some countries, these rights are subject to mandatory 
collective management.37 Different CMOs operate within the audio-visual field. There 
are those mainly for creators, those for performers, those for producers, and those 
representing all copyright owners or a mix of them. General-purpose CMOs also 
manage rights in audio-visual works along with rights in other works.38 As discussed 
in the third and fourth chapters respectively, there is one audio-visual CMO in Nigeria, 
while South Africa has three.  
Regardless of the field of operation of a CMO, the application of competition 
law to regulate its conduct will depend largely on the manner of rights acquisition by 
the CMO. Here, CMOs can be categorised as organisations that manage the exclusive 
rights (reprographic, performance, or mechanical, rights among others) on the basis of 
the mandate voluntarily given by copyright owners; and CMOs operating on the basis 
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of a statutory power conferred on them to collect and distribute royalties on behalf of 
copyright owners in situations where copyright owners’ interest in a work has been 
limited to mere statutory rights as pointed out above. As shown in chapters three and 
four below, CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa can be classified as exclusive rights 
CMOs. 
In practice, while CMOs falling within the first class (exclusive rights CMOs) 
are usually subject to the full weight of competition law oversight – especially where 
the copyright sector-specific regulation does not address the competition concerns, the 
CMOs in the second class (remuneration rights CMOs) are usually regulated under the 
enabling statute. The rationale for this approach is not far-fetched. Exclusive rights 
CMOs readily fall within the notion of natural (or de facto) monopoly, while 
remuneration rights CMOs may be regarded as de jure monopolies. The concepts of 
natural, de facto and de jure monopoly have been defined in chapter one above.  
It suffices now to note that collective management in the USA offers an 
established example of the foregoing discussion. Here, performing rights CMOs – such 
as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and 
Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI) – are subject to consent decrees devised under 
US competition laws and administered by a royalty rate court. The rate court has 
powers to set licensing fees where the CMOs and users fail to reach an agreement. On 
the other hand, other CMOs administering remuneration rights are subject to the 
regulatory powers of the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) as defined by the US Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA) of 1995, the US Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),39 and the US Musical Works Modernisation Act, 
2018. 
2.4 Collective management and competition  
The point was made in chapter one above that CMOs are generally natural monopolies 
that should be regulated by a regulatory framework that addresses their competition 
related concerns. However, scholars have raised serious questions about the validity of 
the natural monopoly argument as basis for the continuous existence of CMOs and the 
need for their regulation in modern times especially given the rise of other rights 
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aggregation platforms made possible by digital technology. Simply put, the question is 
whether CMOs should still be allowed to exist in modern times. To resolve this 
question, it is important to examine the justification for the emergence of CMOs to 
determine if it still holds in the digital era. The development of digital technology and 
impacts on collective management will also be examined to determine if digitisation 
has eroded the CMO natural monopoly argument. Following this, specific CMO 
competition concerns will be briefly highlighted to put further discussion in the thesis 
in proper perspective. 
	
2.4.1 Justification for collective management 
Based on the exclusivity conferred on them by copyright law, copyright owners may 
choose to prevent third parties from using their works. They may also choose to grant 
third parties access to the works either freely or on agreed terms and conditions. 
Copyright owners may choose to exercise their exclusive rights personally or authorise 
another person to exercise the right on their behalf and for their benefit. This flows 
from the individualistic foundation of copyright.40 In this regard, copyright exclusivity 
is seen as an example of property rights,41 based on property rules: that is, ‘a legal 
entitlement which cannot be removed without prior bargaining’ with the copyright 
owners.42  
 Copyright law is not only about the protection of copyright owners. It is also 
about ensuring the protection of the public interest in the promotion of arts, culture and 
science.43 These ends of copyright run through the theories that have been advanced 
for its justification. From a review of relevant literature, Fisher summarised four main 
theories in this regard.44 Although focusing on IP generally, Fisher’s summary is 
																																								 																				
40 M Ficsor ‘The international copyright treaties and collective management – key issues (background 
paper)’ (2009) available at 
http://www.zis.gov.rs/upload/documents/pdf_en/pdf/seminari/15sep2009_copyright_protection.pdf, 
accessed on 6 March 2017; A Lorrain ‘Governing collective rights management of copyright protected 
resources, or how building upon copyright collectivisation’ (2013) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398901, accessed on 6 March 2017. 
41 Whether or not copyright is actually property is debatable. The debate usually arises within the 
context of copyright and human right discourse. This is highlighted briefly under the discussion of 
mandatory collective management below and in chapter three. 
42 A Kur and J Schovsbo ‘Expropriation or fair game for all? The gradual dismantling of the IP 
exclusivity paradigm’ (2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1508330, accessed on 6 March 
2017.   
43 C Armstrong et al Access to Knowledge in Africa: The Role of Copyright (2010) 3-5. 
44 W Fisher ‘Theories of intellectual Property’ available at 




obviously important in this discussion because some of the key literature he reviewed 
considered the justification of copyright law. Moreover, copyright law is a genre of IP 
law. According to Fisher, the first theory adopts the utilitarian approach, which 
‘requires lawmakers to strike an optimal balance between, on one hand, the power of 
exclusive rights to stimulate the creation of [...] works of art and, on the other, the 
partially offsetting tendency of such rights to curtail widespread public enjoyment of 
those creations’ (utilitarian theory). The second theory employs the ‘propositions that 
a person who [labours] upon resources that are either unowned or “held in common” 
has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts – and that the state has a 
duty to respect and enforce that natural right’ (natural rights theory). The third theory 
hinges on the belief that ‘private property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of some 
fundamental human needs; [and] policymakers should thus strive to create and allocate 
entitlements to resources in the fashion that best enables people to fulfil those needs’ 
(economic theory). Finally, the fourth theory is ‘rooted in the proposition that 
[copyright] can and should be shaped so as to help foster the achievement of a just and 
attractive culture’. Fisher describes this as the ‘social planning theory’. According to 
him, this theory is similar to the utilitarian theory ‘in its teleological orientation, but 
dissimilar in its willingness to deploy visions of a desirable society richer than the 
conceptions of “social welfare”’45  
To achieve the goals highlighted above, copyright law seeks to strike an 
equitable balance between the copyright owners’ and public interests by limiting the 
exclusivity vested on copyright owners through the instrumentality of exceptions and 
limitations such as fair dealing (and fair use) exceptions, among others. Discussion of 
these exceptions and limitations is beyond the scope of this thesis.46 It suffices to note, 
however, that copyright exceptions and limitations are limited in their application. 
There are uses of copyright works over which copyright owners still exercise their 
exclusivity, which are not covered by copyright exceptions and limitations. In these 
areas, users of copyright works are bound to seek authorisation from copyright owners 
before exploiting their works. Even in areas where copyright exceptions and limitations 
are applicable, users may also wish to seek authorisations because of the vagueness of 
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some of the exceptions and limitations. Further, there are also uses for which 
authorisation from copyright owners is not required, but for which the user must pay 
certain remuneration.  
Copyright law only gives rights to copyright owners to enable them derive 
reward for their labour and investment. But the responsibility to transform these rights 
to actual and material rewards rests on the copyright owners.47 This can be achieved 
through effective management, monitoring and enforcement of the rights. In other 
words, the copyright owners’ rewards are best determined through a ‘complex 
interaction of law, market forces and institutional arrangements’.48  
 Every stage of societal development brings about difficulty in individual 
monitoring of uses and enforcement of copyright for copyright owners. This difficulty 
flows from the nature of copyright works and the copyright market,49 which is 
significantly impacted by digitisation. Copyright works are capable of multiple uses 
without dissipation in their value. They are capable of being used at the same time and 
at different places by different users. For instance, it is possible for a single sound 
recording to be performed in multiple restaurants, bars, hotels, nightclubs, shopping 
malls, buses, airplanes, and trains; or aired on television and radio to millions of people 
globally. It is also possible for the sound recording to be streamed live on, or 
downloaded from, Internet platforms simultaneously across the globe. The same 
situation afflicts literary works and other copyright works. In such situations, 
widespread unauthorised use of copyright works is inevitable. This is so because the 
copyright owners will not be able to prevent or authorise all uses of their works. They 
cannot be in all places at the same time. The individual copyright owners will incur 
significant cost in trying to negotiate copyright license with all users, obtain royalties, 
and monitor the uses of their works. Consequently, they will not be able to gain reward 
or compensation for their creativity, labour and investment in producing the copyright 
work. 
 The emergence of collective management is a reaction to the above situation. 
Historically, collective management was a product of the creative thinking – a form of 
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revolution – of copyright owners as a solution to the difficulty plaguing individual 
monitoring and enforcement of copyright.50 The literature is replete with the story of 
the emergence of collective management.51 It suffices to note that collective 
management started well over two hundred years ago in France.52 It has today spread 
across the globe and is contributing largely to the gross domestic products of nations.53  
 The spread of collective management is not mainly because it serves the interest 
of copyright owners alone. It is also useful in solving the problems of access to 
copyright works for users. For instance, a user may be interested in using a sound 
recording. The sound recording would usually contain various rights such as public 
performance rights, mechanical (reproduction) rights, and broadcasting rights. These 
rights may inhere in different persons such as the composer of the music, the author of 
the lyrics, the publisher of the music, the performer and producer of the sound 
recording. It is also possible for these rights to inhere in a single individual. But getting 
hold of the individual is another matter entirely. The situation is more complicated 
where the user is interested in multiple sound recordings. This is so in cases of mass 
users like broadcasting firms. The foregoing is what scholars have regarded as the 
problem of rights fragmentation in copyright law.54 No doubt, it will be difficult and 
extremely costly for the user to obtain a license in such circumstance. Thus, through 
collective management the gap between the copyright owners and users is bridged. 
Collective management makes it easy for users to secure licenses from copyright 
owners while at the same time enabling copyright owners to obtain reward for their 
efforts.  
 Collective management operates through CMOs, which operate within the 
national boundaries. To bridge the gap between copyright owners and users, CMOs are 
expected to obtain mandates from copyright owners. The copyright owners include 
national copyright owners and foreign copyright owners. From national copyright 
owners, the CMOs in a particular country obtain mandates through assignments, 
exclusive licenses or non-exclusive licenses as the case may be. National CMOs obtain 
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authorisation through reciprocal agreements with sister foreign CMOs, on behalf of 
foreign copyright owners. Reciprocal agreements are possible through the network 
provided by international organisations of national CMOs.55 Thus, within a country, a 
particular CMO would be able to possess a world repertoire of copyright works. In 
practice, CMOs’ repertoires usually include works over which the CMOs do not have 
authorisation. Such works includes orphan works, works of deceased copyright owners 
that are already in the public domain.56  
 Armed with the world repertoire, CMOs solve the problem of fragmentation by 
bundling the various rights of copyright owners within their repertoire and granting 
access to users through the issuance of blanket licenses.57 Blanket licenses ‘issued to 
users have been very useful instruments that allow access to the totality of a CMO’s 
repertoire. Users obtaining blanket licenses are not only permitted to use any work, but 
they are entitled to do so as many times as they want’ within the timeframe for which 
the license was issued.58 The blanket license also makes it easy for the management of 
the right of every copyright owner within the repertoire of the CMO. CMOs also issue 
licenses – known as transactional, per work or per programme license – covering only 
particular work and for specific use.59 However, blanket licenses are more widespread, 
even in Nigeria and South Africa, because they are more effective in solving the 
transaction cost problem associated with individual management of copyright.60 
Further, blanket licenses enable users to use any work in a CMO’s repertoire at a fixed 
fee ‘independent of the number of works actually used, the number of times each work 
is played, or the song’s popularity’. They ‘provide users with certainty from 
involuntary infringement, and they effectively price each additional performance of a 
work at its effective marginal cost (of zero)’.61  However, to Katz and Sarid, blanket 
licenses may lead to an ‘all-or-nothing regime’ which ‘forces most users to buy more 
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units than they wish at a higher price than they would otherwise pay’.62 As will become 
apparent in 2.4.3 (below), the use of blanket licenses is at the core of the CMO 
competition discourse 
 It suffices now to note that, from the economic literature, the transaction cost 
argument forms a major justification for collective management.63 Principally, the 
‘transaction cost theory focuses on the circumstances that in a real world with many 
kind of transactions, cost will accrue’.64 Flowing from Coase’s treatise,65 transaction 
cost appears multi-dimensional. There is the search cost, which includes the cost of 
identifying potential trading partners and to gather information on them. There is also 
the contracting cost, which refers to the costs associated with negotiating and executing 
agreements. There is the monitoring cost, which includes the cost of checking 
compliance with an agreement and cost of tracking unauthorised uses. And there is the 
enforcement cost, which concerns the costs of dealing with a trading partner found in 
breach of an agreement.66 With regards to copyright, the main question of transaction 
cost is ‘how can one best correct inefficiency of the use and dissemination of [copyright 
works], triggered by the existence of transaction costs? By individual [...] or rather by 
collective rights management?’67  
 This is important especially in this era of widespread digitisation that has 
opened up easy and less costly alternatives for individual rights management by 
copyright owners and hence, calling to question the transaction cost justification of 
collective management. Nonetheless, the prevailing view, which this writer aligns with, 
is that collective management still remains an efficient means of rights management 
even in the face of digitisation. The argument is that through the acquisition of a 
worldwide repertoire, CMOs have become natural monopolies (explained in 1.1 above) 
because the worldwide repertoire makes it possible for CMOs to explore economics of 
scale and scope in rights management to the advantage of both copyright owners and 
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users within the collective management and licensing market.68 However, there is need 
for adaptation of collective management to adequately utilise the opportunities placed 
by digitisation in the area of rights management.69 
The foregoing view is not shared in all quarters. Katz believes that CMOs’ 
natural monopoly is a mere assumption because in practice there are other equally 
viable alternatives to take care of the transaction cost problem in rights management.70 
According to Katz, the transaction cost justification ‘simultaneously proves too much 
and explains too little’ because ‘[a]ccepting that management by individual authors on 
a per-work basis may be inefficient only implies that management will be done by 
different sorts of intermediaries; it explains why we have different kinds of 
[middlemen], not why it is necessary to have only one of them’.71  
That notwithstanding, collective management affords copyright owners a 
platform for solidarity as discussed in 2.2 above.72 Copyright owners will not enjoy the 
benefits of such solidarity when they act individually or through various intermediaries. 
Moreover, the transaction cost argument is two-sided. It can be viewed from the users’ 
side also. Copyright users will prefer to deal with a single entity that can avail them all 
they want as far as rights clearance is concerned.73 Collective management helps to 
reduce transaction cost for copyright owners as well as users. Viewed this way, the 
transaction cost argument, as a justification for collective management, is further 
fortified. Even so, Katz’s argument is not without merit especially because the 
transaction cost theory propounded by Coase recognises that ‘both changes in 
technology and costs of the mechanism used in lieu of market pricing’ have a tendency 
of lowering or eliminating the net benefits of relying on CMOs.74 Moreover, collective 
management does not totally wipe out the possibility of individual rights management. 
Collective management is only seen as the most preferred means in view of the capacity 
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for CMOs to solve transaction cost problem and bring about efficiency in the collective 
management and licensing market. Thus, collective management is usually adopted in 
situations where individual rights management is practically impossible, and given the 
nature of the copyright market as alluded to above, such situations are rife. 
Even so, the justification of collective management does not rest on the 
transaction cost argument alone. There is the theory of aggregation and syndication 
projected by Watt, while exploring the types of contracts being executed in the 
collective management and licensing market. According to Watt, CMOs ‘form 
contracts at two principal points along the supply chain’. First, there is the contract 
among copyright owners who are members of the CMO for distribution of the royalties 
collected by the CMO. Secondly, there are the licensing contracts executed by CMOs 
with users of the CMO’s repertoire. Based on the aggregation and syndication theories, 
Watt contends that ‘there are significant efficiency benefits from having copyrights 
managed as an aggregate [repertoire], rather than individually, based on risk-pooling 
and risk-sharing through the contracts between the members themselves. Similarly, 
there are also aggregation benefits [...] of licensing only the entire [repertoire], rather 
than smaller sub-sets’ of copyright. Thus, Watt rightly believes, in my view, that 
despite the possibility of digitisation to reduce transaction cost (as discussed 2.4 
below), it has not waned the relevance of collective management because with 
collective management, individual CMOs can easily tackle the problem of widespread 
piracy resulting from digitisation. Also, CMOs are better placed to deploy the 
advantages of digitisation for rights management to the benefit of copyright owners. 
However, to be more efficient, Watt canvasses for a system where royalties are not 
distributed among copyright owners on the bases of actual usage of their works but on 
the bases of negotiated royalty distribution independent of actual usage of copyright 
works. To Watt, this system is more aligned with the theory of aggregation and 
syndication.75 But does the existence of CMOs in the manner envisaged by Watt and 
the transaction cost theorists not eliminate competition among rights owners and thus 
calls to question the need for CMOs from a competition point of view? This question 
will be addressed in 2.4.3 below. 
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 For now, it is important to state that the pervasiveness of collective management 
is entrenching a collectivisation movement within copyright regimes. This appears to 
be downplaying the individualistic foundation of copyright.76 Put differently, in order 
to enjoy the benefits afforded by the collective management system, copyright owners 
tend to give up their exclusivity by way of rights transfer to CMOs. According to 
scholars, this is causing a shift from property rules based on copyright exclusivity to 
liability rules based on collectivisation.77 Property rules have been briefly described 
above. It remains to be observed that in ‘economic terms, liability rules refer to a legal 
structure where third parties are allowed to use the protected subject matters without 
prior authorisation from rights holders, provided that they pay compensation’.78 
Although property rules and liability rules tend to be theoretically opposed, ‘the main 
practical difference between [them] is that the former entitles the right owner to claim 
for an injunction when third parties use the protected subject matter without prior 
authorisation, whereas the liability rules only provide for compensation’.79 Within the 
context of collective management, this distinction is better appreciated through the 
prism of the classification of CMOs, in 2.2 above, as exclusive rights CMOs (property 
rules) and remuneration rights (liability rules), which as stated above, has implications 
on the extent to which competition law may be applied to collective management.  
	
2.4.2 Impact of digitisation on collective management 
Digitisation affords both challenges and opportunities to collective management. It is 
now possible to distribute, stream and download sound recordings, musical videos, and 
movies on the Internet. The same applies to literary and other copyright works. The 
challenges and opportunities of digitisation are underpinned by the borderless nature 
of the Internet, the fragmentation of licensing practices and the proliferation of 
distribution channels.80  
 The challenges thrown up by digitisation include questions of the nature of 
rights associated with digital contents, protection of the rights and the extent and 
manner of enforcement of such rights. It also includes questions of the applicable law 
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especially since there is, strictly speaking, no international copyright law.81 Further, 
CMOs evolved as national monopolies. National laws bind their operations. Although, 
they have been able to adapt to the technological changes in the analogue world, 
digitisation calls to question their continued relevance. This is more so when viewed 
from the perspective that digitisation affords opportunity for individual rights 
management and other rights management systems with low transaction cost. Such 
rights administration includes the reliance on online rights aggregators,82 the 
deployment of blockchain technology and the use of Creative Common licenses.83  
In view of the foregoing, there are two extreme views about the impact of 
digitisation on collective management. On the one hand, there is the suggestion that 
digital technology such as blockchain and other online rights aggregation platforms 
have the propensity to displace CMOs in the digital environment. On the other hand, 
these digital infrastructures are also being regarded as a mere hype without any real 
threat to collective management. However, as the following discussion shows, the 
impact of digitisation on collective management is somewhere in between the above 
extremes. 
  Katz is a leading voice among the scholars with the view that digitisation has 
eroded the need for CMOs in modern days. The author had earlier prophesied of the 
demise of CMOs as natural monopolies as a result of the growth of alternative rights 
management platforms made possible by digitisation.84 Indeed, the opportunities for 
digital rights management (DRM) offered by digitisation has made individual rights 
management attractive to copyright owners, especially large corporations owning 
substantial amount of repertoire. Studies show that large copyright owners, such as 
EMI and Sony, have set up special entities for management of their on-line rights.85 
For this purpose, the copyright owners withdrew their online rights from CMOs to 
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which they initially transferred such rights.86 These large rights owners are able to 
explore DRM systems because of the large repertoire they control. They also have the 
capacity to utilise the opportunities afforded by the Internet. These factors put 
transaction cost in their favour as against small rights owners. But the small rights 
owners still have to rely on CMOs for management of their rights in the digital sphere. 
The reason for this is not far-fetched. Individually, small copyright owners do not 
possess the necessary repertoire, which will make them attractive to online users. 
Furthermore, as a result of digitisation, there is the growing trend among copyright 
owners to provide selected works or even relevant parts of their repertoire under non-
exclusive open content licenses, for example, under a Creative Commons license.87 
From a CMOs perspective, this may make licensing more difficult because it may 
introduce an additional task of determining whether and for which work royalty should 
be collected.88  
 Interestingly, through global networks, CMOs are also able to explore DRM 
systems for rights management on the Internet.89 The international organisations of 
CMOs already developed comprehensive Internet databases of copyright works under 
the repertoire of their member CMOs.90 This gives CMOs an advantage in terms of 
digital rights management over other individual platforms. As Schwemer observed, 
major European CMOs formed subsidiary to manage their online repertoire.91  
 The existence of several licensing platforms on the digital sphere has 
implications on the user side of the market, especially multimedia uses. The existence 
of various licensing entities on the Internet sphere will complicate rights clearance for 
such multimedia users. Multimedia uses usually involve multiple rights clearance from 
various copyright owners across several borders. Notwithstanding the ease of tracking 
individual copyright owners in the digital sphere, obtaining such authorisation would 
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not be an easy task for such users. The situation is even worse assuming a user has to 
bypass these online licensing platforms and obtain licenses directly from all CMOs in 
every territory its multimedia services are accessed. Such users will prefer to obtain a 
single license from a single source covering all relevant works and with global 
coverage (a multi-repertoire multi-territorial license). In the circumstance described 
above, the major challenge of a user is how to obtain such license.92 
 To resolve the foregoing challenges CMOs devised the idea of a one-stop-shop 
multi-territorial license. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI) with a number of CMOs developed the Simulcasting agreement.93 The aim of 
the agreement was ‘to safeguard the traditional system of a one-stop-shop for multi-
repertoire licenses while adding the crucial feature that online use can be multi-
territorial’.94 The agreement was used as a basis for providing cross-border or multi-
territorial licenses, on behalf of owners of rights in sound recordings, for Internet 
radio.95 The Santiago agreement was also crafted by BMI (USA), Performing Rights 
Society (PRS – UK), Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers of Music (SACEM 
– France), Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA – Germany) and Vereniging BUMA (BUMA – 
Netherlands). The Santiago agreement sought to adapt the traditional framework of 
collective management to the digital sphere by allowing each of the participating 
societies to grant one-stop-shop licenses which included the music repertoires of all 
member societies and which were valid in all their territories.96 The International 
Bureau of Societies Administering the Rights of Mechanical Recordings 
Reproduction’s (BIEM) Barcelona agreement also aimed to achieve same goal. 
However, ‘soon after the two standard agreements were reached, the Directorate 
General Competition of the [EU] expressed competition concerns regarding a customer 
allocation clause contained in both agreements – despite its support for the underlying 
one-stop shop principle. The agreements have not been renewed and concluded 
																																								 																				
92 Haunss op cit note 80. 
93 ‘Simulcasting is defined as the simultaneous transmission by radio and TV stations via the internet 
of a sound recording that is included in the broadcasts of radio and/or TV signals’: Graber op cit note 
19, fn18.   
94 R Hilty and S Nerisson ‘Collective Copyright Management and Digitization: The European 
Experience’ (2013) MPIIPCL Research Paper No.13-09 12. 
95 Hviid, et al op cit note at 69. 
96 ‘Music Royalties Deal Breaks Competition Law, says Commission’ 4 May 2004 Out-Law.com 





However, the IFPI Simulcasting agreement got clearance by the European 
Commission (EC) under the EU competition rules. It should be noted that the usage of 
the IFPI Simulcasting agreement is highly doubtful. Its utility seems to have been 
undermined by later developments in the EU (highlighted below) aimed at fostering 
competition in the online management of musical copyright by fostering multi-
territorial licenses for individual repertoire of CMOs as against the on-stop-shop 
system, which the Simulcasting agreement represented.98  
 There was also the CISAC model agreement devised to allow CISAC members 
to offer multi-repertoire licenses with multi-territorial effect.99 The CISAC model 
agreement had the effect of transferring the monopoly status of CMOs in the analogue 
domain to the digital sphere. The CISAC agreement was ruled against by the EC 
because it raised vital competition law concerns, such as concerted actions on the part 
of the CMOs concerned, and membership and territorial restrictions under art.101 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.100 But the CJEU overturned the EC’s 
ruling in 2013. To decide the issues of membership and territorial restrictions, the 
CJEU first had to consider whether the model agreement amounted to concerted actions 
among CISAC members. It found that the EC ‘has not proved to a sufficient legal 
standard the existence of a concerted practice relating to the national territorial 
limitations’.101  
The need to foster competition in the online music market induced the EU to 
adopt a Directive in 2014,102 relevant provisions of which will be relied upon when 
examining the specific competition concerns in chapter five below. It suffices now to 
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mention that the Directive forms the focus of ample literature which point out its 
weakness even when it was still at the proposal stage. One major flaw being that the 
Directive seems to create uncertainty and instability: that it is aiming to promote 
competition in the EU online music market, by focusing on the economic services of 
CMOs while ignoring their socio-cultural functions through which they promote 
cultural diversity and creativity. 103  
The proponents of this view, with which this writer aligns, take the position that 
it is important to not ignore the socio-cultural functions of CMOs when determining 
collective management competition related issues. Although the focus of competition 
law is primarily on the economic aspect of collective management, competition law 
makers and enforcers should also bear in mind the socio-cultural functions of CMOs. 
Moreover, CMOs, as monopolies, ensure efficiency in the copyright management and 
licensing market through the totality of their economic and socio-cultural role by which 
they ensure the achievement of copyright law’s goal of promoting creativity. Thus, 
competition law should be applied to CMOs in a manner as not to erode their 
monopoly. Rather, the focus should be on the exercise of the monopoly. 
2.4.3 CMOs’ competition concerns 
Flowing from the discussion in 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 above, the main question to be addressed 
under this sub-heading is whether from a competition perspective, the existence of 
CMOs as natural monopolies is still relevant in the light of the existence of alternative 
rights management platforms and the possibility of individual rights management as a 
result of digitisation. Put differently, should CMOs’ natural monopoly be preserved by 
regulation while preventing them from abusing their dominance in the relevant 
collective management and licensing markets or should the question of competition be 
left to be determined by market forces of demand and supply. A resolution of this issue 
will help to determine if there is a need for the regulation of CMOs from a competition 
law perspective. 
Lenard and White prefer a competitive system of collective management 
fostered by market forces. In their study of collective management in the US music 
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industry and the impact of digitisation, the authors conclude that regulation of the US 
music CMOs through consent decrees and the Copyright Royalty Board has further 
entrenched the CMOs’ natural monopoly. As stated in 2.2 above, the Copyright 
Royalty Board and consent decrees regulate royalties charged, among others, by CMOs 
in the US. Lenard and White argued that while such monopoly is very relevant in the 
analogue world in that it is obtained from CMOs capacity to solve transaction cost 
problems, same cannot be said of the digital environment. The authors believe that 
digitisation makes licensing, monitoring and usage of copyright works easy and at 
reduced transaction costs. The authors took cognisance of the fact that major copyright 
owners are withdrawing their online rights from CMOs and managing it themselves. 
They also noted the rise of online right aggregators that have made music licensing 
transactions cheaper and easier.  However, they argue that despite these developments, 
continuous regulation through the Copyright Royalty Board and consent decrees have 
solidified collective management and made CMOs more dominant in the US music 
market. Thus, the authors believe that a move away from the regulatory system to a 
system where licensing prices are determined largely by the cost of music production, 
demand and supply subject to competition law oversight will bring about the desired 
competition especially in this digital era.104  
Kobayashi seemed to share similar reasoning with Lenard and White. He 
recognised that digitisation, and the regulatory mechanisms through the Copyright 
Royalty Board and consent decrees instead of market pricing, have lowered the benefits 
of collective management and this gave rise to the withdrawal of online rights by major 
copyright owners from CMOs in the US. But the regulatory framework under the 
consent decrees still acts as barriers for copyright owners to withdraw their online 
rights. As interpreted by the rates court in the US, copyright owners are prevented from 
partial withdrawal under the consent decrees, which only allow complete withdrawal 
of rights by copyright owners from CMOs.105 Kobayashi argued that this would lead to 
abandonment of the regulatory regimes and acceleration of innovative technological 
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solutions to lower transaction costs associated with music licensing. The effect of this 
would be more competition and lower prices for music licenses.106  
However, according to Fujitani, price competition is ordinarily not an important 
factor in copyright licensing because users are rarely influenced by price while 
choosing a copyright work. Users are mainly influenced by the unique quality of the 
copyright work informed by their social tastes and aesthetic preferences. Similarly, 
copyright owners are eager to license their works because of the gains of widespread 
usage of their works: that is, ‘more lucrative sales’, among others. Thus, according to 
the author, ‘artificial attempts to inject competition into [copyright licensing] market 
place are unlikely to ensure that users can secure [licenses] at [lower] costs’.107 In my 
view, assuming price competition is an important factor, it may not be of much 
economic benefit to copyright owners within the context of collective management. 
Indeed, according to Riis, if CMOs offer  
‘[...] licences of the same repertoire covering the same territories, and if they compete 
solely on price, economic reasoning suggests that licences will be priced at marginal 
cost. The marginal cost in [collective management] is relatively low, and pricing at 
marginal costs implies that collective licensing of copyright is unprofitable to authors.  
This scenario results in a race to the bottom that gradually erodes the value of the 
copyrights’.108 
 
Aligning with the above view, Schild contends that reliance on market forces to bring 
about competition in collective management is ‘unlikely to lead to results beneficial to 
all stakeholders’.109 Schild’s view seemed to resonate with Besen, et al. In their 
economic analysis of collective management in the US, the authors recognised the 
benefits of CMOs as natural monopolies. Yet, to the authors, competition in collective 
management, promoted by regulation and not market forces, will ensure the required 
efficiency. The authors identified three reasons for the absence of competition in 
collective management: that is (a) regulation authorising one CMO for a particular 
right; (b) regulation mandating CMOs to accept and treat equally all copyright owners 
within the class of rights managed by the CMOs; and (c) efficient negotiation of 
licenses between CMOs and user groups. To promote competition, the authors prefer 
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a regulatory system that allows CMOs to discriminate against copyright owners of the 
class forming their repertoire and refuse them membership. Such framework will 
enable individual management and/or entry of new CMOs to manage the copyright 
rejected by the existing CMO and bring about competitive licensing.110 In a competitive 
licensing system,  
‘[CMOs] would employ agents to prevent unauthorised performances of [their] 
members' works, but the members would set their license fees independently as they 
competed for the patronage of licensees. Each user would be free to determine the 
number of songs for which he or she obtained licenses, and the aggregate fee paid by 
a licensee would depend both on the number of works used and the fees set by 
copyright [owners]’.111      
    
Aligning with the foregoing, Katz is of the view that regarding CMOs as natural 
monopolies on the basis of their capacity to solve transaction cost problem in the 
copyright market ‘proves too much and explains too little’.112 He points out that even 
in the analogue world, for which the transaction cost argument is projected as 
justification for CMOs, alternatives exist for efficient copyright licensing, through per-
work or per-program (transactional) licensing, at reduced cost. The author forecasted 
that with the growth of digital technology, copyright licensing will become easier and 
cheaper, hence displacing the transaction cost argument in favour of CMOs. Like Besen 
et al, Katz believes that regulatory frameworks should promote competition in 
collective management. To achieve this, the author recommends a regulatory system 
that not only empowers CMOs to refuse membership, but also prevents CMOs from 
requiring their members to grant them exclusive licenses over their works.113    
 Chin agrees with Katz and Besen et al. Chin’s argument is hinged on the 
possibilities brought about by digitisation: individual rights management and 
management through internet rights aggregators, such as Google’s YouTube and 
Google Books. These aggregators ‘aggregate rights so that users may access them 
readily; enable users to obtain licenses [...] in some cases directly from [copyright 
owners]; and facilitate payment of license fees to [copyright owners]’. To the author, 
CMOs may only be useful in enforcement which is outside the purview of aggregators. 
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Even so, Chin pointed out that digitisation has made monitoring of usage very easy for 
copyright owners.114 Thus, he believes that  
‘unless there are compelling reasons, legal requirements leading to monopoly that in 
turn require regulation should be eliminated and competition among [CMOs] should 
be fostered, so that [copyright owners] and users may have greater choice and 
hopefully receive better terms overall. [...] transparency and efficiency are likely to 
increase as a result’.115 
 
The respective treatises of Besen et al’s, Katz and Chin are focused mainly on 
how to promote competition within the collective management and licensing markets 
by fostering a system that ensure the existence of more than one CMO and other 
licensing platforms including through individual licensing. Scholars, such as Katz and 
Chin believe that the existence of more than one CMO or licensing platforms is 
indicative of competition within the copyright collective management and licensing 
market. First, while this argument may not be faulted from an economics point of view, 
it does not necessarily reflect the notion of competition within the context of collective 
management given the special nature of goods (copyright) being administered by 
CMOs. First, as shown below, the existence of more than one CMO or licensing 
platforms for a class of copyright within a given collective management and licensing 
market does not necessarily indicate competition in practice within that market. In the 
context of collective management, both CMOs or other licensing platforms existing in 
the market for a class of copyright can still exist as monopolies in respect of the 
copyright works forming their respective repertoire. This is so because the repertoire 
of each CMO in the market forms a distinct, but complementary, product for users of 
the copyright works. Moreover, in putting their repertoire together, the CMOs are not 
only creating distinct products, but are also resolving the transaction cost problems 
relating to licensing and royalty collection for copyright owners and users within the 
particular collective management and licensing markets.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the arguments put forward by Besen et al, 
Katz and Chin seem to overlook the socio-cultural role of CMO and appear to limit 
their analysis to copyright licensing only. As, canvassed in 2.2 and 2.4.1 above, CMOs 
do not only solve the problem of access in the copyright market, they also ensure the 
promotion of art, creativity and social welfare. Thus, while CMOs raise some 
competition concerns, especially in their relationship with copyright owners and users, 
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the efficiencies they bring to the copyright management and licensing markets through 
their socio-cultural functions cannot be ignored when considering the issue of their 
monopoly.116  
Thirdly, Besen, et al, Katz and Chin seem to base their arguments on the 
premise that the existence of CMOs as monopolies eliminates competition among the 
copyright owners whose works make up the repertoire of the CMOs. The belief is that 
CMOs can be regarded as arrangements between competitors (copyright owners), 
which results in the elimination of competition among the competitors who, through 
the CMOs collude in fixing prices. This form of arrangement involving companies 
providing telephone network connectivity has been regarded, by the US Supreme Court 
under US competition (antitrust) law, as the ‘supreme evil’ of antitrust. This was in the 
case of Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 117 which arose in 
the US telecommunications industry. The case involved an arrangement between 
competitors in the television network connectivity market. 
However, the collective management and licensing markets envisaged under 
copyright law varies from other markets, such as the telephone network connectivity 
market in the telecommunications industry. Collective management and licensing 
markets exist only because of copyright law, which requires users of copyright works 
to secure consent from the copyright owner, or be liable to pay damages for 
infringement or face criminal sanctions as the case may be.118 Also, the lawmakers did 
not intend to weaken the power of copyright owners to control the use of their works 
beyond the exceptions and limitations stipulated by copyright law. Furthermore, 
copyright law does not vest copyright owners the power to fix prices collusively. 
Viewed this way, it becomes apparent that an arrangement in other markets readily 
accepted as price fixing under competition law may pass scrutiny if the arrangement 
occurred within the context of the collective management and licensing markets. The 
foregoing formed the rationale for the acceptance of CMOs by the US Supreme Court, 
in the celebrated case of BMI v CBS,119 as organisations of copyright owners 
(competitors) that are not price fixing cartels. According to the court, CMOs constitute 
market arrangements among copyright owners that are reasonably necessary for the 
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enjoyment of the economic benefits of their copyright and, as such, cannot be declared 
per se illegal under competition law without convincing evidence of how such 
arrangement limits competition in the market. Moreover, the blanket licenses crafted 
by CMOs are distinct products of the CMOs. Thus, from a competition law perspective, 
a CMO cannot be regarded as ‘a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of 
many sellers, but [as] a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the 
individual [copyright works] are raw material’.120 
The foregoing position finds support in Drexl who believes that the argument 
put forward by Katz and other writes stated above ‘seem to pursue allocative efficiency 
as the goal of regulation’ while ignoring the ‘essential copyright goal of promoting 
creativity’. As will be discussed in more depth in chapter five below, copyright, like 
competition law, ultimately promotes ‘creativity in the sense of dynamic competition’ 
as against static competition or ‘pure price competition’.121 Further, Drexl observed 
that empowering CMOs to reject copyright owners would mean CMOs ‘have to 
identify the [work] they want to offer to users. In such a system, CMOs, as regular 
market participants, have to base their decision on a business rationale. Given the 
superstar phenomenon, they face the difficult task of predicting what [work] will be 
successful in the future’.122 
Moreover, as argued elsewhere, it is not easy to tell in advance which work will 
become successful in the future and confer superstar status on the creator/owner of the 
work. The success of a work, and superstar status of the creator, largely depends on the 
ever-changing users’ tastes.123 The result of this, according to Drexl, is that CMOs will 
have to take the economic risk of gauging average tastes before accepting copyright 
owners as members. A very likely consequence in this regard would be that CMOs will 
only accept owners of popular works, while leaving out owners of unpopular works 
who may likely be absorbed by another CMO. Ultimately, this would lead to the 
existence of different CMOs specialising,124 for instance, in the management of 
copyright in different genres of music or different class of literature. The net effect of 
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such specialisation would be the existence of specialised monopolies with whom 
copyright users will have to negotiate separate licenses, hence leading to the 
fragmentation problem highlighted in in 2.4.1 above. This situation is true of the 
analogue, as well as digital, environment. In the digital environment, although 
copyright owners’ transaction costs may reduce (especially large copyright owners), 
studies show, as discussed in 2.4.2 above, that the users would not be so fortunate. 
Online multimedia users would have to identify individual copyright owners, different 
rights aggregators and CMOs managing online rights. This would be worse where the 
license required relates to multi-territorial uses.125  
It is important to emphasise that the existence of more than one CMO or 
licensing platforms for a class of copyright owners is not indicative of competition on 
the user side of the market. The repertoires of the respective CMOs are not ‘perfect 
substitutes’ to each other.126 They are mainly complementary. The repertoires ‘may 
well be indispensable for the users to offer an attractive programme’ to their clients.127 
In essence, to be properly covered, a copyright user would be interested in obtaining 
blanket licenses from both CMOs. Thus, the CMOs would not be forced by market 
forces to reduce their tariffs in order to attract users. Indeed, CMOs would be inclined 
to collude for the purpose of obtaining higher tariffs from copyright users. However, 
the existence of more than one CMO may indicate competition on the copyright 
owners’ side of the market. This is so because the CMOs would be interested in beefing 
up their respective repertoire. For this purpose, the respective CMOs may offer 
packages that are attractive to copyright owners, especially those regarded as successful 
mainstream artists.128 This may come in form of promises of high royalty returns and 
lower administrative costs per copyright owner. In economic terms, collective 
management ‘causes high fixed cost but relatively low marginal cost for the 
management of an additional work’ with the effect that the larger CMO would be better 
placed to deploy economics of scale and become established as a natural monopoly.129 
The downside of this is that such larger CMO would place prohibitively high market 
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entry barriers (in form of membership discrimination and exclusivity of license) for 
potential competitors.  
 Collective management in needletime rights in South Africa justifies the 
foregoing argument. As further discussed in chapter four below, SAMPRA and IMPRA 
currently administer needletime rights. While SAMPRA represents members of 
Recording industry of South Africa (RiSA) and SAMRO, IMPRA represents 
independent producers and performers of South Africa. There is no indication of 
competition for membership and users between the CMOs. They both have clear cut 
membership base and users would usually obtain licenses from both of them. Another 
justification may be found in the US. Here, ASCAP, BMI and Society of European 
Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) administer the performing rights in music for 
their respective members. However, until 1930 when SESAC was formed, ASCAP was 
the only CMO. The emergence of SESAC, and later BMI in 1940, was because of 
ASCAP’s membership discrimination and prohibitive tariff structure respectively.130 
At this time, the CMOs were not under any regulation. Consent decrees informed by 
US anti-trust regulations were later introduced to regulate them.131 Even so, 
competition seems absent among the CMOs in the licensing market (user side) because 
of the complementarity of their repertoire from user perspective.132  
 That being said, the competition promotion argument seems to ignore the socio-
cultural function played by CMOs through which copyright’s role of promoting 
cultural diversity may be achieved. CMOs’ socio-cultural role has been highlighted in 
2.2 above. It does not need restatement here. Suffices to note that allowing CMOs to 
reject copyright owners would take away the cross-subsiding effect of collective 
management and lead to more administrative cost per copyright owner since the 
rejection may result in membership reduction for CMOs. This will largely be to the 
detriment of small copyright owners but to the benefit of few large copyright owners. 
The reduction in membership and existence of more CMOs will also reduce the 
bargaining power of copyright owners against large corporate users. It will also 
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displace the risk-sharing platform afforded to copyright owners by CMOs through 
deployment of aggregation and syndication discussed in 2.4.1 above.133  
In view of the foregoing, a more effective approach, from a competition law 
perspective, would be a regulatory framework which preserves the monopolistic nature 
of CMOs while giving room for some form of competition among copyright owners, 
within a CMO’s fold, that promotes creativity and cultural diversity. Such framework 
would enjoin CMOs to accept copyright owners of the class forming their repertoire 
on a non-discriminatory basis, while preventing them from insisting on exclusive 
licensing from copyright owners. Drexl agrees with this approach when he posited that  
‘creative competition requires exclusion of competition between [CMOs] as a 
condition for equal market opportunities of all works. Creative competition, however, 
should not be misunderstood as an exclusion of competition as such. It actually 
promotes competition between a larger number of works and culturally more diverse 
works at the price of restraining competition between [CMO]. In addition, equal 
market access does not cause anticompetitive effects to the disadvantage of more 
popular works [...]. only the principle of equal market access guarantees that customers 
will decide on the popularity of works, without being restricted in their choice by pre-
selection by [CMOs]. Accordingly, a model of creative competition provides a much 
more open and dynamic market for copyrighted works’.134 
 
Although CMOs may be regarded as classic manifestation of market dominance 
and price-fixing cartel among ordinarily “competing” copyright owners, the foregoing 
informs competition law’s toleration of CMOs as ‘necessary evils’.135 In other words, 
competition courts, especially from the US and EU, have regarded CMOs as not per se 
illegal under competition law. The courts’ attitude has been to preserve the monopoly 
of CMOs, which emerged from their ability to solve transaction cost problems related 
to licensing through the use of blanket licenses.136 This is achieved, however, by a 
balancing exercise. The courts weigh CMOs’ role against the freedom of copyright 
owners to dispose of their works, the need for effective collective management, the 
socio-cultural role of CMOs, and the need to foster competition in the copyright 
market. Specifically, blanket licenses have been declared as agreements that are not 
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price-fixing. They have been held to be pro-competitive because they developed as a 
new product to help CMOs achieve their purpose. Further, CMOs as monopolies have 
been tested under the market dominance rules through the rule of reason approach and 
have also been found to be pro-competitive because of their role that promotes 
creativity, social welfare and efficiency in the copyright management and licensing 
markets.137  
Flowing from the foregoing, a more efficient approach in the regulation of 
CMOs, from competition law perspective, is not to prevent their existence as dominant 
entities in the copyright management and licensing markets. The approach is to prevent 
the abuse of their monopoly by subjecting CMOs to efficiency, transparency and 
accountability standards in their relationship with copyright owners; users; and among 
themselves. In pursuit of this objective, competition law seeks to address specific 
competition concerns such as (a) abuse of market dominance, excessive pricing 
(royalties), (b) refusal to license, (c) refusal to accept copyright owners as members, 
(d) discrimination between copyright owners and (e) discrimination between users, 
among others.138 CMOs will then be scrutinised under the rules against restrictive 
agreements, abuse of market dominance and merger control. These rules and whether 
they have been captured in the copyright sector-specific regulation regimes for CMOs 
in Nigeria and South Africa will be deeply examined in chapter five below. 
2.5 Regulation of collective management 
Although collective management emerged from private initiative of copyright owners, 
it is currently being subjected to some form of government regulation.139 However, 
there are arguments against this trend on the thought that ‘the legislature or judiciary is 
inherently inferior to industry insiders in shaping a proper framework for the 
commercialisation of copyright’. Further, that ‘the spontaneously founded [collective 
management] illustrate the ability of the industry to create its own solutions on the basis 
of property rights’.140 An in depth discussion of these issues is not intended here, safe 
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to point out that the prevailing view, with which this writer concurs, is that government 
regulation of collective management is not only necessary but also inevitable given the 
nature of the collective management and licensing markets, which defines the 
relationship between CMOs and copyright owners, the relationship between CMOs and 
users of the copyright works, and the relationship between CMOs. Moreover, the public 
nature of the services rendered by CMOs, which are largely private entities, makes 
governmental oversight important in the public interest.141 By common knowledge, the 
main objective of regulating collective management is to ensure efficiency, 
transparency and accountability. The specific concerns addressed by competition law 
in reaching this objective has been highlighted in 2.4.3 above. It remains now to 
mention that copyright sector-specific regulatory framework generally provides for 
issues relating to CMO’s legal form, structure and internal governance, conditions for 
CMO membership by copyright owners, royalty distribution, and licensing, royalty and 
tariff setting between CMOs and users. Other issues generally covered by copyright 
sector-specific regulations include dispute resolution mechanisms, among others.142 
These issues are further discussed within the context of the Nigerian and South African 
copyright sector-specific regulations in chapters three and four below. 
 Given their emergence as vehicles for the ease of the copyright licensing and 
enforcement problems, CMOs were initially regarded as subjects of copyright law. 
However, they eventually came under competition law scrutiny upon realization of the 
propensity to be anticompetitive within the copyright market. Thus, it is not unusual to 
find countries that subject CMOs to scrutiny either under copyright sector-specific 
regulatory regime or under both copyright and competition regimes.  
For countries adopting copyright sector-specific regulation, the observed trend 
is that while some make all the provisions relating to collective management under the 
general copyright law,143 some others make a few provisions in the copyright law and 
empower a political office holder or a supervisory body to make rules for the 
regulation.144 Also, some enact a separate law entirely for regulation of collective 
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143 The Consolidated Act on Copyright, Consolidated Act No.1144, 2014 (Denmark). 
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management.145 In all these cases, the supervision of collective management is placed 
under the powers of a political office holder, a supervisory agency or a judicial or quasi-
judicial (special tribunal) body depending on the relevant national law.146 As shown in 
chapters three and four respectively, Nigeria and South Africa are examples of 
countries where CMOs are supervised under copyright sector-specific regulations.  
From the discussion in 2.2 above, it is apparent that the US forms an interesting 
example of a country where both competition and copyright law are applied in 
regulating CMOs. First, the main CMOs, ASCAP and BMI, which are classified as 
exclusive rights (performing rights) CMOs are regulated under consent decrees 
informed by US antitrust (competition) law. The consent decrees are administered by 
a dedicated royalty rate judge as determined under the US Musical Works 
Modernisation Act, 2018. The Musical Works Modernisation Act also provides for an 
extensive regulatory framework for CMOs established for the collection and 
distribution of royalties collected in respect of remuneration (mechanical) rights in 
relation to musical downloads and interactive streaming. The EU is another example 
of a jurisdiction where CMOs are subject to regulation under copyright sector-specific 
regulation and competition law. The Directive on Collective Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for 
Online Use in the Internal Market, 2014 (CRM Directive) is relevant here. The CRM 
Directive is a codification of the CJEU CMO-related competition principles established 
over four decades under art. 101 and 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). It is also informed by EU copyright law. Nonetheless, the 
CJEU still scrutinizes CMOs in EU member countries under framework of art.101 and 
102 of the TFEU. 
The fact that CMOs are ordinarily constructs of copyright law raises question 
as to the appropriateness of applying competition law for their regulation. In other 
words, should competition law be applied to CMOs as substitute to copyright law and 
vice versa or should both copyright and competition be applied complementarily? Such 
																																								 																				
145 Germany and Netherlands are examples of countries with a separate law for collective management. 
See Law on the Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 1995 as amended (Germany); 
Act on the Supervision of Collective Management Organizations for Copyright and Related Rights, 
2003 as amended (Netherlands). 
146 L Guibault and S van Gompel ‘Collective management in the European Union’ in D Gervais op cit 




question is usually considered against the backdrop of the sector-specific regulation (or 
regulated industry) defence to competition law oversight,147 and it gives rise to the need 
to consider the strengths and weaknesses of applying competition law within a sector-
specific domain such as collective management. These issues will be better appreciated 
within the context of the copyright and competition law interface discussed in 5.2 
below. 
For now, it is important to note that copyright sector-specific regulatory 
frameworks appear more effective in regulating CMOs mainly because the whole idea 
of collective management emerged to effectuate copyright as defined by copyright law. 
As such, the systems of control, procedures for redress and available remedies under 
copyright sector-specific regulations may be more suited to address CMO’s overreach 
and to promote efficiency in the relevant copyright management and licensing markets. 
However, law enforcers under copyright sector-specific regulations may usually not be 
equipped to tackle issues relating to the elimination of competition within the copyright 
management and licensing markets arising from CMOs dominant behaviour. In such 
situation, resort to competition law becomes important. Competition law is generally 
crafted to address monopolies and dominant behaviours that limit competition, and lead 
to inefficiencies, in a given market. Market definition is an important trigger to the 
application of competition with the effect that for completion law to intervene, the 
specific conduct complained against must be situated within a defined market. On the 
other hand, the application of copyright law does not require market definition. The 
important question is whether copyright exists in the work that is the subject matter of 
a legal action. Thus, while competition law is more suited to address concerns arising 
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from abuse of dominance by CMOs in a given market, copyright law is suitable for 
copyright infringement claims, among others.  
Within the context of collective management, resort to competition legal 
frameworks may be challenged on the ground that the CMO’s conduct being 
complained about is sanctioned by copyright sector-specific regulation. However, the 
extent to which, and the conditions upon which, the sector-specific regulation defence 
can be relied upon by a CMOs under the Nigerian and South African competition 
legislation is examined in chapter five below. Even where such defence is sustained, it 
does not obviate the anticompetitive effects the impugned conduct of the CMO will 
have on the collective management and licensing market. Thus, it is important for 
copyright sector-specific regulations for CMOs to be framed in a manner as to vest 
legal authority on the relevant copyright regulatory body to address the competition 
concerns of CMOs. In the absence of such rules, competition law intervention becomes 
inevitable.  
To pre-empt the discussion in chapter five, it deserves mention that the Nigeria 
and South competition legislations apply to all economic activities in both countries 
unless where a particular economic sector is exempted, excluded or excepted from the 
ambit of the legislations.148 Thus, the competition legislations are applicable in 
principle to CMOs. But, this thesis aims to determine whether the competition 
legislations in both countries need be applied to CMOs in practice. To resolve this 
question, it is important to first examine the existing copyright-sector specific 
regulations to determine if they empower the relevant copyright regulatory bodies to 
address the specific CMOs’ competition concerns highlighted in 2.4.3 above.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The key functions of CMOs are the monitoring of uses of copyright works; the 
negotiation of royalties with users of copyright works on the basis of agreed tariffs; the 
issuance of licenses; collection of royalties; distribution of royalties among copyright 
owners; and in deserving cases, the enforcement of copyright. These functions are 
regarded as CMOs legal and economic functions. Apart from these, CMOs also carry 
																																								 																				





out other socio-cultural functions aimed at promoting cultural creativity and social 
welfare within the collective management and licensing markets. In this regard, CMOs 
serve as a bridge between copyright owners and copyright users to ensure access to 
copyright works for users and reward for copyright owners, and thereby help in solving 
the problem of transaction cost which copyright owners and users will ordinarily face 
in the copyright market.  
The capacity of CMOs to solve the transaction cost problem by deploying 
economics of scale and scope and their ability to promote creativity and social welfare 
makes them very relevant despite the development of digital technology and its impact 
on copyright licensing. From competition law perspective, CMOs have been very 
important means of commercialising copyright and achieving the creativity promotion 
goals of copyright law. As such, the approach of competition courts has been to 
preserve CMO’s monopoly while subjecting its exercise within the collective 
management and licensing markets to competition law oversight by addressing specific 
competition concerns identified in 2.4.3 above. Copyright law makers also recognise 
the importance of collective management within the copyright legal framework and the 
tendency for CMOs to overreach copyright owners and users if not subject to regulatory 
oversight. Thus, sector-specific regulatory regimes set out general and specific 
acceptable conducts for CMOs as highlighted in 2.5 above.  
Generally, the aim of regulating CMOs is to ensure efficiency, transparency 
and accountability in collective management. In achieving this aim, copyright and 
competition law may either be applied as substitute to each other or as complementary 
regulatory regimes. However, the fact that collective management is a copyright 
construct and enabled by copyright law can be raised as defence to competition law 
oversight of a CMO’s anti-competitive conduct. Such defence would not arise if the 
impugned conduct of the CMO is being scrutinised under copyright sector-specific 
regime. But such regime will have to confer legal authority on the relevant copyright 
regulatory body to address CMO competition concerns. The next two chapters are 
structured to examine the copyright sector-specific regulatory frameworks for CMOs 
in Nigeria and South Africa respectively with the aim of determining whether they 
empower the relevant copyright enforcement bodies to address the competition 




CHAPTER THREE: REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The research objective has been clearly stated in the previous chapters. This chapter 
focuses on the regulatory framework for CMOs in Nigeria. The Nigerian Copyright 
Act and CMO Regulations are the principal regulatory framework for CMOs in 
Nigeria. Also, CMOs fall under the corporate governance rules in the Company and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA)1  especially as it relates to issues of company formation, 
corporate governance and winding up. The aim of this chapter is to determine if the 
regulatory concerns highlighted in the previous chapter are captured in the Nigerian 
regulatory framework. Discussion in this chapter will help to determine if the 
regulatory framework empowers the copyright regulatory body to address the CMOs’ 
competition concerns highlighted in chapter 2 above, but discussed in chapter five 
below.   
3.2 Emergence of collective management in Nigeria 
The origin of collective management in Nigeria, like other former British colonies, is 
linked to Britain.2 The British Copyright Act, 1911 was made applicable in the 
colonies. 3 The Act preceded the establishment of the Performing Rights Society (PRS) 
in Britain in 1914. By virtue of the existing legal environment, the operation of PRS 
extended to the colonies, Nigeria inclusive.4  
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 This continued until Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960. 
Consequently, PRS’ operation in Nigeria ceased until 1974 when it entered into an 
agency arrangement with a Law firm, Giwa & Atilade and Co.5 The law firm was 
mandated ‘to get Nigerian composers to join PRS and to commence licencing and 
collecting of royalties from Nigerian users’ on behalf of PRS.6 So, the first indigenous 
CMO in Nigeria was an agency type CMO. The promulgation of the first Nigerian 
copyright law in 1970 was another reason for the agency arrangement.7  
 The agency arrangement prevailed in Nigeria until 1986 when it was 
terminated.8 This followed the establishment of the first full-fledged indigenous CMO, 
Musical Copyright Society Nigeria (MCSN), in 1984 and reciprocal agreements 
between it and PRS wherein it acquired the assets and liabilities of PRS in Nigeria.9 
The agency arrangement, which preceded MCSN, succeeded in securing mandates of 
notable Nigerian copyright owners for PRS. But it had challenges on the user side for 
some reasons including the level of awareness and the lack of trust for a foreign 
company. MCSN faced similar challenges even though it recorded some strides in both 
the copyright owners and users market.10  
 MCSN’s operations were unregulated even after the promulgation of the 
Nigerian Copyright Act in 1988.11 Its operation came under regulation after the first 
amendment to the Nigerian Copyright Act in 199212 and the passage of the Copyright 
(Collecting Societies) Regulation, 1993 (1993 Regulation) when prior approval for 
operation as a CMO became compulsory in Nigeria.13 MCSN’s application for 
approval was refused on the ground of its ‘refusal to furnish the NCC all relevant 
information’.14 The refusal was hinged on the belief that MCSN was not a truly 
nationalistic CMO because of the huge control PRS had over it.15  
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 The Performing and Mechanical Rights Society (PMRS) was established in 
1994 by local musical copyright owners to manage musical copyright.16 It was 
approved under the then prevailing legal framework, thus, making it two CMOs in the 
music industry. Being the first CMO, MCSN had very robust repertoire with the 
knowhow and capacity for collective management. Its major setback was the lack of 
approval. On the other hand, PMRS lacked the required repertoire and managing 
capacity to attract necessary patronage and cooperation.17 This situation continued until 
sometime in 2005 when the NCC approved MCSN to operate alongside PMRS.18  
 Consequently, collective management in the Nigerian music industry became 
embroiled in crisis, the dialectics and dynamics of which have been copiously recorded 
elsewhere.19 The crisis led to further reform of the regulatory framework resulting in 
the enactment of the CMO Regulations in 2007. This also led to the establishment of 
the Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON) with its approval in 2010 as the sole CMO 
in the music industry.20 Once again, MCSN was unapproved and the crisis continued. 
The crisis attracted the attention of the Nigerian House of Representatives (HofR). The 
HofR Committee on Justice and Judiciary investigated NCC’s refusal to approve 
MCSN leading to the adoption of certain resolutions by the HofR, discussed later.21 
The resolutions gave impetus for the Ministerial directive to NCC for the immediate 
approval of MCSN in April 2017.22 Following internal conflicts, brief account of which 
is highlighted below, COSON’s approval was recently suspended by the NCC.23 
 The emergence of CMOs in Nigeria is not peculiar to the Music industry alone. 
The Reprographic Rights Society of Nigeria (REPRONIG) was established and 
approved in 2001 as the sole CMO in the print/publishing and visual arts industries in 
Nigeria.24 On its part, the Audio Visual Rights Society of Nigeria (AVRS) was 
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20 Ola op cit note 9 at 20. 
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General of NCC, N.I.149/1, 22 March 2017 (in file with author). 
23 NCC’s Letter to the General Manager, COSON dated 30 April 2018 (in file with author).   




established to cater for copyright management in the audio-visual industry. It was 
approved in 2014 as the sole CMO in that industry.25  
 Nigeria now has four CMOs: REPRONIG and AVRS for the print/publishing 
and visual arts industries, and audio-visual industry respectively. MCSN and COSON 
(approval suspended) for the music industry. Interestingly, both MCSN’s and 
COSON’s respective repertoire include similar category of copyright for the same 
classes of copyright owners. Consequently, they will concurrently be representing 
composers, publishers, performers and owners of sound recordings in Nigeria. 	
3.3 Legislative history of the regulation of CMOs in Nigeria 
It is important to briefly set out the legislative history of the regulatory framework for 
CMOs in Nigeria. This will aid proper understanding of the case law to be examined 
in the course of this chapter.  
 Historically, the defunct Copyright Decree of 197026 (the 1970 Decree) was the 
first regulatory framework for CMOs in Nigeria. Section 13 of the 1970 Decree 
empowered the then Federal Commissioner of Trade to appoint three persons as a 
competent authority to regulate the licensing practices of a licensing body (CMO).27 
The competent authority was empowered to stipulate royalties and other terms and 
conditions upon which to grant compulsory licenses. It was to exercise this power 
where it appeared to it that a CMO was unreasonably refusing to grant, or imposing 
unreasonable terms and conditions for the grant, of licenses for copyright works.28 The 
competent authority’s decision was subject of appeal to the commissioner,29 who was 
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27 Ibid ss13(1) and (3) and 19. The Minister of Trade and Industry is the equivalent of this position 
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empowered to make regulations providing procedural rules for the competent 
authority.30  
 The competent authority was to be an ad hoc arrangement to consider 
complaints relating to licensing practices of CMOs. The provisions were never 
activated probably because there were no complaints. Thus, the assertion above that 
MCSN’s operations were unregulated during this period is not unfounded. It could also 
be said that the competent authority was the precursor to the Nigerian Copyright 
Commission (NCC), regarding regulation of CMOs, and not the Nigerian Copyright 
Council (the Council) created under the Nigerian Copyright Act before the first 
amendment.31 This is because the competent authority had some supervisory powers 
under the 1970 Decree specific to CMOs, while the Council had none. However, the 
better view is that, under the 1970 Decree, the then Federal Ministry of Trade was 
responsible, through the commissioner, for the broad mandate similar to that of the 
NCC under the extant Nigerian Copyright Act32 and as such should be regarded as the 
actual progenitor of the NCC. 
 Under the 1988 Decree (Nigerian Copyright Act before its first amendment), 
there was no provision for regulation of CMOs. But the draft Decree submitted to the 
then Federal military government proposed a s35 to regulate CMOs.33 The 1988 Decree 
created the council mentioned above with mainly administrative powers over copyright 
in Nigeria. Most of the Council’s activities were centred on public enlightenment 
campaigns and seminars on copyright.34  
 The non-regulatory environment ushered in by the 1988 Decree was corrected 
by an amendment decree in 1992 (1992 Decree).35 The 1992 Decree created the NCC 
with its current broad powers36 and introduced s32B (now s39 of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act) that formed the bedrock for the current regulatory framework for CMOs 
in Nigeria. The NCC made the 1993 Regulations pursuant to this section. The 1993 
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Regulations was repealed and replaced by the CMO Regulations in 2007. The 1988 
Decree was further amended by a decree in 199937 (1999 Decree) to include s15A (now 
s17 – discussed later). The Nigerian Copyright Act is a product of the 1988 Decree as 
amended in 1992 and 1999.  
 
3.4 Agencies regulating CMOs in Nigeria 
The NCC is the main agency regulating CMOs in Nigeria. It will be the focus of 
discussion in this part. But it should be mentioned briefly that the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) established under CAMA,38 with its composition and roles spelt 
out therein,39 generally administers and implements the provisions of CAMA. Its roles 
regarding CMOs fall within its broad mandate, which includes formation of companies, 
corporate governance issues, winding-up, among others.  
 The NCC is established under the Nigerian Copyright Act as a body corporate 
with the right to sue and be sued in its corporate name, among others.40 The Nigerian 
Copyright Act also provides for the composition41 and general function of the NCC.42 
Specifically, the NCC regulates CMOs in Nigeria,43 and where expedient, it may assist 
in the establishment of a CMO for any class of copyright owners.44 In this regard, The 
NCC’s policy initiatives are aimed, among others, at promoting effective rights 
management by proper regulation and organisation of collective management in 
Nigeria.45  
The NCC’s policy focus, which shapes its supervision of CMO, includes: 
encouraging the establishment of strong and credible national CMOs reflecting the 
aspirations and expectations of Nigerian copyright owners; encouraging the formation 
of CMOs for different categories of copyright works or class of rights; providing 
technical support for effective management of rights by approved CMOs; engendering 
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transparency and accountability in the management of CMOs’ affairs; ensuring proper 
balancing of the interest of copyright owners and users; and ensuring a conducive and 
rancour-free licensing environment for approved CMOs.46  
The NCC played a key role in the establishment of REPRONIG, COSON and 
AVRS. The NCC also carries out activities aimed at ensuring compliance with the 
Nigerian Copyright Act and the CMO Regulations by CMOs. Such activities include 
unscheduled assessment of CMOs and workshops on collective management. It has 
ensured the coming into effect of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) envisaged in the 
CMO Regulations.47  The NCC recently intervened in the ongoing internal crisis 
(briefly highlighted shortly) in COSON and was very vehement in ensuring that MCSN 
did not carry out the tasks of a CMO following its initial refusal to grant approval to 
MCSN. The NCC did this through arrests of MCSN’s principal officers, raids and 
seizures of alleged copyright infringing documents, and criminal prosecution of 
principal officers of the MCSN and other administrative and enforcement actions.48  
 Such raids, seizures and arrest exercises of the NCC led the MCSN and its 
principal officers to institute a human right enforcement suit.49 In the suit, the MCSN 
claimed declaratory, injunctive (interdict) and compensatory reliefs against the NCC. 
After declaring the arrests and seizures as ‘arbitrary and heavy handed’,50 the court, per 
Archibong J (as he then was), stated: 
The [NCC] was established to reinforce the rights of copyright owners, assignees and 
licensees; not to be an institutional hurdle with arbitrary power to restrict the private 
enjoyment and enforcement of such rights. Copyright owners do not exist at the 
pleasure of the [NCC]; or merely to validate its establishment. And most definitely the 
[NCC] was not established to undermine, denigrate or exact obeisance from copyright 
owners’.51 
 
The above admonition reflects the need for the NCC to be cautious in the 
discharge of its functions in order not to abuse its powers under the Nigerian Copyright 
Act. The judgment declared the MCSN (then unapproved by NCC) as owner, assignee 
and exclusive licensee of copyright for the purpose of instituting the action. This aspect 
of the judgment appears to fly against the provision of s17 of the Nigerian Copyright 
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Act. However, differing judicial pronouncements on the implication of that section 
existed in the Court of Appeal,52 until very recent intervention by the Supreme Court.53 
The provisions of s17 will examined in due course. It suffices now to state that 
Archibong J’s judgment seems to highlight a salient issue: whether an unapproved 
CMO is absolutely bared from access to the court insofar as the cause of action is 
outside the provisions of the Nigerian Copyright Act? This issue will be addressed 
shortly. There is a pending appeal against the judgment.54 But in view of the recent 
Ministerial directive for the approval of MCSN, it is doubtful whether the NCC will 
still pursue the appeal.55 
 In a similar human rights enforcement action, the FHC – through Yunusa J – 
held its earlier position and stated as follows:  
‘the [Copyright Act] has endowed the [NCC] with the burden of enforcing the 
provisions of the [Copyright Act]. However, [the NCC] also have the responsibility to 
carry out such burden with care and trust for the citizenry. The [NCC] must not get 
intoxicated by enormous powers made available to them by law for its own cause and 
in the benefit of its citizens.’56  
 
The Court of Appeal recently upturned the judgment of Yunusa J.57 The Court 
of Appeal found that under s38 of the Nigerian Copyright Act, the NCC’s copyright 
inspectors do not need a search or arrest warrant to enter into premises; arrest persons 
they reasonably suspect to be infringing copyright; and seize any document or thing 
they reasonably believe to be infringing copyright.58 The appellate court also held that 
having not been approved to operate as a CMO by the NCC, the respondents were 
operating illegally. As such, the NCC’s copyright inspectors were right in law to have 
carried out the arrest and seizure without a search and arrest warrant.59 Another factor 
that influenced the court’s judgment was that the respondents were already standing 
trial and that the seizures were done to obtain evidence against them in the trial.60 The 
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propriety of the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the power of copyright inspectors under 
the Nigerian Copyright Act is beyond the scope of this work. 
 However, the judicial authority seems to give the impression that the NCC’s 
regulatory power, particularly as it relates to approval or non-approval of CMOs, is an 
unquestionable exercise of administrative discretion. Specifically, the judgment of the 
FHC, per Ajakaiye J, in the case of PMRS v NCC61 gives credence to this perception. 
The background to the case is that the defunct PMRS made an application for renewal 
of its license to operate as a CMO. The NCC refused the application. The application 
was made under the defunct 1993 Regulation. This was at a time when NCC and 
stakeholders in the music industry were trying to harmonise the operations of MCSN 
and the defunct PMRS as a way of resolving the existing crisis. The NCC refused the 
renewal to allow a smooth harmonisation process. The PMRS approached the court by 
way of judicial review of administrative action seeking an order of certiorari to quash 
the decision of the NCC refusing renewal and an order of mandamus compelling the 
NCC to grant it renewal.  
 The FHC declined the reliefs sought by PMRS. On the issue of certiorari, the 
judge reasoned that since the action of the NCC complained against by PMRS was 
purely administrative and not judicial or quasi-judicial, the prayer for certiorari could 
not be sustained. The judge drew a distinction between purely administrative actions 
and judicial or quasi-judicial actions against which an order of certiorari may be 
issued.62 On the prayer for mandamus, the judge set out the conditions for the grant of 
mandamus. One of such grounds is that the order will not be granted if the action of 
the public authority complained against is an exercise of discretion. The judge held that 
NCC’s approval is an exercise of discretion and as such, the order of mandamus could 
not be issued.63  
The FHC, per Buba J, recently held similar position in COSON v MCSN & 
Ors.64 The facts of the case will be highlighted in a later part of this chapter. For now, 
it should be noted that the FHC’s position related to the issue of whether, in exercising 
its discretion to approve another CMO for a class of copyright owners under s39(3) of 
the Nigerian Copyright Act (examined later), the NCC must hear from the existing 
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approved CMO? Holding that the NCC does not need to hear from existing CMOs 
before approving another CMO for the same class of copyright under s39(3), the FHC 
described the NCC’s discretion in this regard as ‘an absolute discretion.’65  
It is doubtful if the position taken by Ajakaiye J in PMRS v NCC supra (and the 
description of NCC’s discretion as absolute by Buba J above) would stand proper 
appellate review. The authorities seemed to have moved away from the anachronistic 
differentiation between administrative and judicial or quasi-judicial actions for the 
grant of certiorari. The emphasis in such applications is whether the public authority’s 
decision affects the rights of the applicant and if so, whether the public authority acted 
beyond its powers or did not follow laid down procedure in coming to its decision.66 
Secondly, it is not appropriate for the court to simply refuse the order of mandamus on 
the ground that the refusal of NCC to grant the renewal was an exercise of discretion. 
Granted, courts are, and should be, wary to interfere with the exercise of administrative 
discretion.67 But in deserving cases, the court may need to subject the exercise of 
administrative discretion to some judicial test to ensure that the discretion is not 
exercised arbitrarily and unreasonably.68 The courts will inquire whether the discretion 
was exercised in good faith; whether the public authority allowed the exercise of 
discretion to be fettered in anyway; whether the public authority made relevant 
considerations when exercising the discretion; whether the exercise of discretion is not 
unreasonable; whether the authority acted according to laid down rules; and whether it 
considered all available facts before making its decision.69 
 A detailed discussion of the above test is beyond the scope of this work.70 It 
suffices to state that where the exercise of administrative discretion failed the test, the 
court may hold that the discretion was not exercised at all and may direct the public 
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authority to exercise its discretion according to the enabling law.71 The point being 
made so far is that the NCC’s discretion in the regulation of CMOs is not absolute and 
unquestionable. In deserving cases, the court may investigate the exercise of discretion 
to ensure that the NCC did not act arbitrarily and unreasonably.  
 Section 50 of the Nigerian Copyright Act further buttresses the argument that 
the NCC’s exercise of discretion is not absolute. The section subjects the NCC’s 
powers to Ministerial directives. In carrying out its functions, the NCC is under a duty 
to comply with any directive from the Minister relating to the performance of its roles 
under the Nigerian Copyright Act. The exercise of the power by the Minister of 
Justice/Attorney General of the Federation (MoJ/AGF) came under attack recently in 
COSON v MCSN supra. Following the MoJ/AGF’s directive leading to the approval of 
MCSN by the NCC, COSON initiated a suit seeking, among others to void the directive 
and the consequent approval of MCSN. It contends that the MoJ/AGF is not the 
Minister envisaged under s51 of the Nigerian Copyright Act and as such lacked the 
competence to issue the directive. In effect, the approval of the MCSN based on it is 
void. The FHC rejected COSON’s contention. It held that the MoJ/AGF validly issued 
the directive having been designated by the President to oversee copyright regulation 
in Nigeria.72 The FHC also held that compliance by the NCC with the directive under 
s50 of the Nigerian Copyright Act is mandatory.73 However, the Ministerial power over 
the NCC is overly broad and susceptible to abuse. It is capable of derailing the NCC in 
the exercise of its functions and throwing the copyright-based industry into chaos.  As 
such, it should be exercised sparingly and on sound judgment of copyright law and 
policy.   
3.5 Regulation of CMOs  
The relevant sections of the Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO Regulations are 
examined in this part. Relevant sections of CAMA touching on CMOs will also be 
examined. It is observed that while the Nigerian Copyright Act uses the term ‘collecting 
societies’, the CMO Regulations adopts the term ‘Collective Management 
Organisations’ (CMOs). The different terms used are neither confusing nor conflicting. 
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Both terms mean the same thing. They refer to associations of copyright owners, or 
other organisations, involved in complete, partial or agency type collective 
management.74 The term “collecting societies” have been referred to severally as 
copyright collective societies, collective rights management organisations, among 
others.75 The CMO Regulations also defines Collective Management Organisations as 
collecting societies defined under the Nigerian Copyright Act.76.Even so, there are 
plans to achieve consistency in terminology between the Nigerian Copyright Act and 
the CMO Regulations.77 As seen from the discussion so far, this thesis adopts the more 
widely used term “CMO”. That being said, the goal under this head is to examine the 
specific rules contained in the Nigeria copyright sector-specific regulation so as to law 
the necessary foundation for the resolution of the research questions in chapter five. 
 
3.5.1 Approval to operate as a CMO  
In terms of s39(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act, a CMO ‘may apply’ to the NCC for 
approval. The application should be made in the form prescribed in the Schedule to the 
CMO Regulations and on payment of the prescribed fee.78 Failure to obtain approval 
before operating as a CMO is an offence.79 Despite the use of the term ‘may apply’, 
the approval requirement under s39 is mandatory.80 The approval requirement has not 
been without some challenge. The challenge rests on three planks,81 considered in the 
following discussion. 
 
3.5.1.1 Copyright exclusivity and no-formality argument 
It has been contended that 
‘section [39] constitutes a barrier [...] as it fetters the freedom of right owners to 
determine the economic conditions for the exploitation of their works. It is also at 
variance with the exclusive right of control [...] The Berne Convention [...] provides 
that “the enjoyment and exercise of the rights therein guaranteed shall not be subject 
to any formality’’, an injunction from which section [39] would appear to derogate’.82 
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It is already over-flogged that the protection of the exclusive rights of authors forms 
the centrepiece of the Berne Convention, other international copyright treaty, and the 
Nigerian Copyright Act. Under the Berne Convention, national legislators have the 
liberty to subject the exercise of copyright exclusivity in special cases to certain 
conditions that must not conflict with the normal exploitation of their works or 
unreasonably prejudice their legitimate interest.83 Further, national legislators are 
enjoined under the Berne Convention not to subject the enjoyment and exercise of 
exclusive rights to any formalities.84  
 The issue here will be whether the approval requirement is a condition or a 
formality. If it is a formality then it contravenes the minimum standards for protection 
of copyright under international norms and under the Nigerian Copyright Act. If it is a 
condition, however, the issue will be whether it unreasonably prejudices the legitimate 
interests of copyright owners.  
 The formality challenge was canvassed in the case of MCSN v Details (Details) 
before the Court of Appeal.85 The case was an appeal from the FHC where it was held 
that the appellant lacked locus standi to initiate the action since the NCC did not 
approve it to operate as a CMO.86 At the Court of Appeal, the appellant raised the issue 
of formality and contended that the approval requirement contravenes art.5(2) of the 
Berne Convention. The appellant contended that, apart from being a signatory, Nigeria 
has domesticated the Berne Convention and as such, art.5(2) should prevail over the 
approval requirement.87 It should be noted that the appellant in this case did not explain 
how the approval requirement constitutes a formality. Sadly, in its judgment, the Court 
of Appeal did not address the issue of formality. Instead, it dwelled on the issue of 
domestication of the Berne Convention and held that the appellant did not establish that 
the Berne Convention has been domesticated and as such cannot override the Nigerian 
Copyright Act.88  
																																								 																				
83 Articles 9, 11bis 2 and 13(1). 
84 Article 5. 
85 Supra note 79. 
86 MCSN v Detail [1990] IPLR 260. 
87 Supra note 79 at 5. 




 The appellate court’s position on the issue of domestication of the Berne 
Convention cannot be faulted.89 However, by dwelling so much on the issue and failing 
to address the issue of formality, the Court of Appeal gives the impression that if the 
Berne Convention had been domesticated, the approval requirement in the Nigerian 
Copyright Act would have been held to contravene the no-formality principle. The 
position canvassed by the appellant seems based on a misconception of the no-
formality requirement in art.5(2) Berne Convention. The no-formality principle simply 
means that member countries of the Berne Convention are not allowed to subject the 
genesis or existence of copyright in works to any formalities.90 The protection of 
copyright is automatic upon creation of a work, so long as the work meets the 
originality and fixation requirements under the Nigerian Copyright Act.91  
 The approval requirement is aimed at bringing all CMOs in Nigeria within the 
regulation of the NCC.92 It does not abrogate or hinder the formation of CMOs, neither 
does it preclude the protection of copyright owners’ exclusive rights. It is not an 
abridgement or infringement of exclusive rights. It recognises exclusive rights and 
provides safety nets in exercising the rights through CMOs.93 It does not contravene 
the relevant Berne Convention relating to the placing of conditions for the exercise of 
exclusive rights.94 
 
3.5.1.2 Human rights argument 
It has been contended that the approval requirement contravenes the human rights to 
freedom of association and to own property protected under the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.95 The view is that where the NCC refuses to approve 
a CMO, the rights of copyright owners to associate as a CMO and to individually own 
properties (movable property) are taken away.96 Two FHC judgments seemed to 
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support this view.97 But one of them has been upturned on appeal.98 The prevailing 
view, as held in recent Court of Appeal cases, is that the approval requirement does not 
infringe on copyright owners constitutionally guaranteed human rights to freedom of 
association and to own property. In all these cases, the courts took the position that the 
approval requirement is meant to identify and bring CMOs within the regulation of the 
NCC.99 In addition, the courts are of the correct view that the rights to freedom of 
association and to own property are not absolute rights. They are rights that can be 
limited by a law, such as s39, which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in 
other to promote public order, among others. With regards to the right to own 
properties, the prevailing view is that the approval requirement is not compulsory 
acquisition of property. Thus, it does not infringe the right to own property.100  
 The decision of the FHC in MCSN v NCC101 is important on the issue of whether 
copyright may be regarded as moveable property under s44 of the Constitution. In that 
case, the MCSN initiated an action for the enforcement of human rights under the 
defunct Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 (FREP Rules). The 
MCSN sought, among others, a declaration that s39 is null and void as it seeks to 
abrogate copyright owners’ rights to freedom of association and to own property. The 
FHC, per Sani J, refused the declaration and held that the section does not abrogate the 
fundamental rights complained about. In reaching this conclusion, Sani J took the view 
that the provision of the Constitution regarding the right to own moveable and 
immoveable properties does not include the right to own intellectual property 
(copyright). In other words, Sani J was of the view that copyright is not property 
envisaged under the Constitution.  
 Sadly, the Court of Appeal did not directly consider the issue of the nature of 
copyright as moveable or immoveable property raised by the main appeal. Instead, the 
appeal was decided on the Respondent’s notice, which sought confirmation of Sani J’s 
judgment on the ground, among others, that the FHC lacked jurisdiction since the case 
was not originally initiated through the right procedure. The respondent’s contention is 
that the main claim of the appellant at the FHC was for a declaration that s39 is null 
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and void as being inconsistent with the Constitution and that such action cannot be 
validly initiated under the FREP Rules. The Court of Appeal upheld the respondent’s 
contention and rightly held that,102 under the defunct FREP Rules, it is the person 
whose human rights have been, is being or is likely to be infringed that can approach 
the court to enforce such rights. The right cannot be enforced on his/her behalf. 
However, the Court of Appeal appears to have made one declaration too many when it 
stated further that 
‘[t]he appellant in his Motion on Notice stated that the applicant has a right as owner, 
assignee, and exclusive licensee of various authors and entities. This means that the 
appellant is not the owner of the copyright and therefore cannot sue for infringement 
on those rights [...].’103 
 
The above pronouncement appears ambiguous. It seems to imply that CMOs, 
or other assignees and exclusive licensees cannot institute actions for the infringement 
of copyright. Overall, the judgment left the issue of the nature of copyright and its 
protection under the Constitution unanswered. Onyido et al, while attempting to 
explain the judgment, stated that 
‘the transfer of rights to the [CMO] under current law although described generally as 
an assignment, is truly not intended as a complete and outright transfer of rights in the 
strict sense. It is more or less equivalent to a non-exclusive license, with the owners 
reserving the power to withdraw such rights at any time or to deal directly with third 
party users, if so desired’.104  
The above position will be probed further shortly. For now, it should be stated 
that the position of Sani J on the nature of copyright and the right to own property, 
pointed out above, seems to conflict with established authorities. The Supreme Court 
of Nigeria has long declared copyright to be an incorporeal property,105 which is a 
moveable property. This position was echoed by Asein who regarded copyright as 
falling within the category of moveable property known as choses in action because of 
its intangibility.106 Again, Oyewunmi regarded copyright as proprietary rights.107  
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 These views find legislative support in s11 of the Nigerian Copyright Act where 
copyright is regarded as moveable property. The protection afforded moveable 
property in the Constitution applies to both tangible and intangible properties. The 
Constitution does not differentiate between both. Section 44(1) of the Constitution 
provides that no ‘moveable property [...] shall be taken possession of or acquired 
compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes 
prescribed by a law [...]’ (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court not only 
recently reaffirmed its position on the nature of copyright as a property, it confirms it 
as falling under moveable properties protected under s44 of the Constitution.108 It 
follows from the foregoing, that to exclude copyright from the ambit of moveable 
property protected under the Constitution would be turning the law on its head. 
 As moveable property, copyright can be transmitted by assignment, license 
(exclusive or non-exclusive), by testamentary disposition or by operation of law.109 The 
effect of an assignment or exclusive license, for instance, is to vest the assignee or 
exclusive licensee with the right to sue for the infringement of the copyright like the 
owner of the copyright, among others.110 To have legal effect, an assignment or 
exclusive license must be in writing.111 The effect of an assignment may be limited ‘to 
only some of the acts which the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to 
control, or to a part only of the period of the copyright, or to a specified country or 
other geographical area’.112 Such limitations must be contained in the assignment and 
if not so contained, the assignment put the assignee entirely in the stead of the copyright 
owner for the period of the assignment.  
 The foregoing applies within the context of collective management. Generally, 
Nigerian CMOs are required to operate through the mandate of copyright owners. 
Subject to relevant provisions of the CMO Regulations, examined shortly, the mandate 
may be granted by way of assignments, exclusive license or non-exclusive license to 
CMOs. Where a copyright owner grants a CMO mandate by way of a non-exclusive 
license, such mandate simply means that the CMO’s powers to deal with the copyright 
is limited to administering of the rights within the context of collective management. 
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But the situation is not so clear in the case of assignments and exclusive licenses. This 
is so because an assignment or exclusive license has the legal effect of putting the 
assignee or exclusive licensee in the stead of the assignor or exclusive licensee, as the 
case may be, in respect of the right transferred.113 However, the practice of collective 
management tends to vary from the legal implication of assignment and exclusive 
license of copyright.  
To illustrate the foregoing point, take the case of music for instance. A 
composer of music has a bundle of rights made up of performing rights, which include 
the right to publicly perform live, publish or broadcast the music; reproduction rights 
(mechanical rights); and distribution rights. Ordinarily, a transfer by the composer of 
his/her copyright in the music to a CMO without a clear limitation as to the part of the 
bundle being transferred legally implies a divestment of the composer’s copyright. 
However, within the context of collective management, the practice is that the 
composer is transferring only part of the bundle that can conveniently and efficiently 
be administered only through collective management. In practice, that part of the 
bundle is usually the performing right (less the right of the composer to live 
performance of the work). This is probably why Onyido, et al contended (as noted 
above) that an assignment to a CMO does not constitute an outright transfer of 
copyright in a work. This point is, however, debatable especially in situations where 
the assignment or exclusive license does not expressly preclude the CMO from 
managing other rights in the bundle. In such situations, it is important to take note of 
the practice relating to assignments and exclusive licenses in the relevant copyright 
industry relating to rights management when construing such assignments or exclusive 
licensees.114 
	
3.5.1.3 Existing CMO argument 
The challenge of the approval requirement based on s52(3) of the Nigerian Copyright 
Act has been laid to rest in the recent case of MCSN v CBS (CBS).115 That section refers 
to the transitional and savings provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule to the 
Nigerian Copyright Act and provides that its force cannot be affected by the repeal of 
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the 1970 Decree. Specifically, s3(1) of the Fifth Schedule relates to copyright licensing 
contracts, which were executed before the commencement of the Nigerian Copyright 
Act. The above case was a reference by the FHC at the instance of the appellant.116 The 
appellant had initiated a suit at the FHC and sought several declaratory, injunctive and 
compensatory reliefs against the respondent. The respondent objected to the 
jurisdiction of the FHC to hear the suit on the ground of lack of locus standi on the part 
of the appellant because the NCC had not approved the appellant as a CMO.  
 The reference called upon the Court of Appeal to interpret ss6(6)(c), 40 and 44 
of the Constitution and ss17, 39 and 52 of the Nigerian Copyright Act. The appellant 
contended that s52 allows it to continue to operate as a CMO without the need for 
approval since it acquired most of the works in its repertoire through licenses executed 
long before the Nigerian Copyright Act came into force. The argument was rejected by 
the Court of Appeal because, contrary to the appellant’s contention, s52(3) preserves 
only licensing contracts which were effective before commencement of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act. It does not jettison the requirement for a CMO to obtain the NCC’s 
approval under s39.117 Perhaps, the appellant’s position in the above case would have 
been strengthened if it were an approved CMO before the commencement of the CMO 
Regulations, under which existing approved CMOs are deemed approved. They may 
continue operation for the unexpired duration of their approval. They must, however, 
apply for renewal under the CMO Regulations and for such purpose, must comply with 
the conditions for renewal of approval.118 Further, the appellants would have succeeded 
under s52(3) if they have focused their argument on the copyright constituting their 
repertoire instead of focusing on their status as an existing CMO. Here, the appellant’s 
argument would have been that the copyright in their repertoire were obtained before 
s17 came into force and that since s17 is not retrospective, it cannot be resorted by the 
respondent to prevent the appellant from enforcing their copyright that is saved under 
s52(3).119 
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3.5.2 Conditions for approval, renewal and revocation of approval 
Under the Nigerian Copyright Act, the NCC may approve a collecting society if it is 
incorporated as a company limited by guarantee; undertaking the main roles of a 
collecting society; represents a substantial number of copyright owners; and complies 
with the CMO Regulations.120  
 
3.5.2.1 Incorporation as a company limited by guarantee 
By this requirement, CMOs in Nigeria must be non-profit organisations in terms of 
s26(1) CAMA, which provides: 
‘Where a company is to be formed for promoting commerce, art, science, religion, 
sports, culture, education, research, charity or other similar objects, and the income and 
property of the company are to be applied solely towards the promotion of its object 
and no portion thereof is to be paid or transferred directly or indirectly to the members 
of the company except as permitted by [CAMA], the company shall not be registered 
as a company limited by shares, but may be registered as a company limited by 
guarantee’. 
 
Opadere criticised this requirement as a ‘major error in law’, which poses ‘great 
limitations to the possibility of maximizing [CMOs]’.121 The author’s stance is based 
on his perception that ‘a company limited by guarantee is mainly for the promotion [of] 
charity, not for profit making, nor distribution or sharing of profit among members, 
[...]’122.  
 However, s26 CAMA is not limited to companies having charity as their object. 
It includes companies for the promotion of art, culture, science, education, and 
research, among others. CMOs do not perform their roles as charitable organisations. 
To perform effectively, CMOs retain some percentage of the royalties collected on their 
members’ behalf. It could be argued that the percentage retained is the CMOs’ income. 
This income is not shared or distributed among their members. It is used to defray the 
administrative and management cost of the CMOs. What is distributed among members 
may not, technically, be referred to as the income of the CMOs. Rather, it is the funds 
of members collected by the CMOs on their behalf,123 and in pursuance of their role as 
company limited by guarantee. It is to be ‘treated and accounted for as a liability owed 
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[by CMOs] to their members’.124 Thus, requiring CMOs to be incorporated as 
companies limited by guarantee is not an error of law.  
However, Baloyi and Hooijer appear to support Opadere’s criticism.125 
According to the authors, ‘if corporate law prohibits the distribution of financial 
benefits to members of a non-profit corporation without providing for exceptions 
resulting from the administration of members’ rights, this is likely to affect the 
functioning of the [CMO]’.126 In view of this, it is safer to adopt the incorporated 
trustees form provided for under s590(1) CAMA, which enables, among others, any 
association established for educational, literary, scientific, social, developmental, 
cultural, etc. to apply to the CAC to be registered as an incorporated trustee. The point 
being made is that CMOs would still operate as non-profit organisations if they were 
registered as incorporated trustees. Also, if the incorporated trustees form were 
adopted, the problem that may arise from the application of s26 CAMA would 
disappear. Alternatively, s26 CAMA should be amended with a clear exception in 
favour of CMOs. To this end, the exception contained in the South African Companies 
Act is recommended.127 Under that law, CMOs in South Africa, which were previously 
companies limited by guarantee are now adopting a non-profit company form as 
defined by the law.128 This will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 The company-limited-by-guarantee corporate form for CMOs under the 
Nigerian Copyright Act may have been adopted because of the requirement for 
approval of the memorandum of association of a company limited by guarantee by the 
MoJ/AGF.129 This is because given the public nature of CMOs’ functions, the 
MoJ/AGF’s approval of their memorandum of association may serve as some form of 
guarantee for public confidence in the CMOs. Further, the approval may operate as an 
exemption under s26 CAMA. Thus, allowing CMOs to distribute royalties among their 
members without running afoul of the provision prohibiting payment of company’s 
income to members. The wide usage of the company-limited-by-guarantee corporate 
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form for CMOs globally,130 may be another reason for its adoption under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act. Interestingly, as part of the ongoing review of CAMA, a new s26(5) is 
being proposed in the CAMA (Repeal and Amendment) Bill, 2018 to replace the 
current s26(5) of CAMA.131 The proposed s26(5) will jettison the requirement of the 
MoJ/AGF’s approval of the memorandum of association of companies limited the 
guarantee and replaced with a duty on the CAC to advertise the application for 
registration on 3 national newspapers. The rationale for this proposal is that there is no 
justification for requiring the MoJ/AGF’s approval memorandum of association of 
non-profit organisations incorporated as companies limited by guarantee and not 
requiring same for those registering as incorporated trustees. Moreover, such 
requirement for non-profit organisations under current s26(5) will protract the process 
of incorporation and frustrate the ease of doing business in Nigeria.132 
 
3.5.2.2 Undertaking the main roles of a CMO 
This criterion seems clear from the discussions of CMOs’ roles in 2.3 above. To meet 
the criterion under the Nigerian Copyright Act, a CMO only needs to show by its 
memorandum of association that its main objects are negotiation and granting of 
copyright licenses, collecting of royalties on copyright owners’ behalf and distributing 
same among them.  
 
3.5.2.3 Representation of a substantial number of copyright owners 
The Nigerian Copyright Act does not define ‘substantial number of copyright owners’ 
that a CMO needs to represent. The CMO Regulations fill in the gap. As part of the 
application for approval by a CMO, a membership list of not less than 100 copyright 
owners of the class sort to be represented by the CMO is required. The list must indicate 
the signed consent of prospective and/or actual members of the CMO.133 This 
requirement by the CMO Regulations, however, seems to conflict with s17 of Nigerian 
Copyright Act. That section provides, among others, that any person representing more 
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than 50 copyright owners of a category of copyright works cannot maintain an action 
for copyright infringement unless the NCC approves the person as a CMO.134  
 Resolution of the apparent conflict pointed out above may depend on how the 
phrase ‘more than 50 copyright owners’ is interpreted. First, the phrase seems to 
suggest that the substantial number of copyright owners required under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act for approval should be not less than 50 copyright owners as against the 
not-less-than-100 required by the CMO Regulations. This is because once a CMO 
represents more than 50 but less than 100 copyright owners, it cannot bring an action 
for infringement of copyright of its members unless the NCC approves it; and the NCC 
cannot approve such CMO because it may not be able to present a list of 100 members 
and above. Secondly, or in the alternative, it may be argued that the ‘more than 50 
copyright owners’ in s17 of the Nigerian Copyright Act is specifically for the purpose 
of conferring right of access to court on CMOs while the not-less-than-100 members 
requirement of the CMO Regulations is specific to the application for approval. In other 
words, they both deal with separate matters. Thirdly, and perhaps the proper 
interpretation, would be that the phrase does not conflict with the CMO Regulations. 
From the wording of the CMO Regulations, the CMO is not expected to have up to 100 
actual members. It suffices if the CMO has up to 100 prospective members evidenced 
by their signed consent. But s17 of the Nigerian Copyright Act refers to CMOs with 
actual members. 
 
3.5.2.4 Compliance with the CMO Regulations 
In addition to the membership list discussed above, a company seeking approval as a 
CMO is required to accompany the application with certain documents.135 Upon receipt 
of the application, the NCC may require the CMO to advertise the application in 
designated newspaper(s).136 The purpose of such advertisement may be to give those 
whose names are listed as members of the CMO and members of the general public 
opportunity to object to the approval of the CMOs. The ground of such objections may 
be that the CMO did not meet the conditions upon which the NCC may accept an 
application; that the persons whose names are listed as members did not sign up to be 
members; among others. Before accepting an application, the NCC must satisfy itself 
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that the company has complied with the requirements for approval and other issues 
such as arrangement for internal governance; competence of management staff; among 
others.137 
 The CMO Regulations do not require a company seeking approval to have a 
secretary. The issue is left to the CMOs to decide. For effective administration of a 
CMO, the office of a secretary is imperative.138 Apart from its importance, it is also a 
compulsory legal requirement.139 CMOs are private companies. Thus, the directors 
may appoint any person that appears to possess the requisite knowledge and experience 
for the office of secretary.140 Baloyi and Hooijer strongly advocate the appointment of 
lawyers as company secretaries, who would double as legal counsel, for CMOs. The 
rationale for this is that lawyers are best equipped to handle issues involving ‘statutory 
and other legal compliance, litigation management, relations with external legal 
counsel, contract management, legal risk management, general legal advisory services, 
corporate governance and government relations’.141 
 The NCC is allowed to accept an application subject to any modifications, 
conditions or limitations it finds appropriate. The NCC may do this if at the time of the 
application the CMO is not able to meet the requirements for approval but the NCC 
considers that the CMO may be able to do so before a final decision is made.142 
Nonetheless, the NCC may refuse approval if it is not satisfied with the application of 
a CMO.143 If otherwise, the NCC is obliged to issue a certificate of approval to the 
CMO.144 Where an application is refused or accepted subject to modification, the NCC 
is obliged to provide in writing the grounds of such refusal or modification on request 
of the CMO and on payment of the prescribed fee.145 
 The Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO Regulations are silent on the continued 
existence of an unapproved CMO. But court pronouncements seem to suggest that an 
unapproved CMO is not an entity in law and cannot file any action in court. According 
to Abang J, ‘the [MCSN] ought to have obtained prior approval of the [NCC] 
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appointing it a [CMO] before it can file an action in court’ (emphasis mine).146  Ikyegh, 
JCA’s pronouncement is more direct. To the learned JCA, ‘a [CMO] must obtain the 
approval of the NCC under section 39 [Nigerian Copyright Act] before it will have 
legal existence [...]’ (emphasis added).147  
 The above pronouncements are far-reaching and erroneous. Recall that it is an 
offence to operate as a CMO without approval. Unapproved CMOs will also face 
hurdles in exercising right of access to the court to enforce any right under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act. However, non-approval of a CMO does not automatically convert the 
CMO to a non-entity, an inchoate entity or an illegal organisation. It does not 
automatically wind-up the CMO. Also, recall that incorporation as a company limited 
by guarantee is a condition for approving a CMO. Upon incorporation, a CMO is vested 
with corporate personality. It can own properties; sue and be sued in its corporate name; 
enter into contracts; and exists in perpetuity except wound-up, among others, under 
CAMA.148 Thus, an unapproved CMO would be able to enforce other rights outside 
the Nigerian Copyright Act such as the right to sue for breach of contract; rights based 
on claims to moveable and immoveable properties, excluding copyright; right to apply 
for judicial review of administrative action; enforcement of fundamental rights, among 
others.149  
 After refusing an application for approval, the NCC should be able to file a 
petition before the FHC to wind-up the CMO. Sadly, the NCC does not fall under the 
class of those who may petition for winding-up of a company.150 This may be cured by 
an amendment of the Nigerian Copyright Act to empower the NCC to file for winding-
up of a CMO on the ground of non-approval; or allow the NCC to notify the CAC to 
file the petition or to strike off the CMO as a defunct company.151 Alternatively, the 
law may be amended to have similar effect as s2 of the Austrian Collecting Societies 
Act, 2006, which allows the supervisory body to shut down an unapproved CMO. 
These recommendations are made on the reasoning that having not approved a CMO, 
it makes no sense allowing it to exist since the main reason for its incorporation would 
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have been defeated. Another way to get around this would be to amend the Nigerian 
Copyright Act to remove the incorporation requirement and instead require CMOs 
applying for approval to present an undertaking to incorporate. The law will then make 
an approval license from the NCC a requirement for incorporation by the CAC. This 
way, a non-approval by the NCC automatically prevents the legal birth of the CMO.  
 An approval granted by the NCC has a life span of three years subject to 
renewals for another two years.152 Every application for renewal of the first license 
must be made within six months before its expiration. The application for renewal must 
be accompanied by an up-to-date list of the members and the repertoire of the CMO at 
the time of application for renewal.153 The CMO Regulations does not expressly 
stipulate the period within which application for renewal of a subsequent license may 
be made. However, it appears the six months period provided in respect of the 
application for the first license applies to application for renewal of subsequent 
licenses. A different interpretation may be out of tune with the CMO Regulations. This 
being said, the NCC may grant a license of renewal if it is satisfied of the CMO’s 
conduct and compliance with the Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO Regulations.154 
The approval of a CMO is revocable at any time. This may be done on the NCC’s own 
motion or on application by any interested person. The grounds for revocation of 
approval include non-compliance with the Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO 
Regulations; non-representation of class of copyright owners for which the initial 
approval was granted, among others.155 
 
3.5.3 Locus standi of CMOs  
Locus standi is defined as the right of action that a litigant has in a cause of action and 
it is a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the constitutional right of access to the 
courts.156 To have locus standi, a litigant must show how his/her personal right has 
been injured by the wrong complained about. The litigant cannot rely on the injury of 
another to clothe him/herself with locus standi. Locus standi is a jurisdictional issue. 
Lack of it on the part of a litigant prevents the court from exercising jurisdiction over 
a matter. In determining questions of locus standi, the rule is that the courts must have 
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recourse primarily to the originating processes and the averments in the statement of 
claim filed by the claimant in a matter along with any document attached thereto. Locus 
standi may be conferred by statute or may arise from particular facts.157  
 Section 16 of the Nigerian Copyright Act is an example of statutory conferral 
of locus standi. Under that section, an owner, assignee or exclusive licensee of 
copyright has locus standi to initiate an action for infringement of that copyright in the 
FHC. However, the locus standi conferred by s16 is not absolute. It is subject to s17 of 
the Nigerian Copyright Act, which provides:  
‘[...] no action for the infringement of copyright or any right under the [NCA] shall be 
commenced or maintained by any person –(a) carrying on the business of negotiating 
and granting of licenses; (b) collecting and distributing royalties in respect of copyright 
works or representing more than fifty owners of copyright in any category of works 
protected by [the Nigerian Copyright Act], unless it is approved under section 39 [...] 
or is issued with a certificate of exemption by the [NCC]’. 
 
By way of an aside, s17 of the Nigerian Copyright Act is not peculiar to Nigeria. 
A similar provision exists in s1(3) of the German Law on the Administration of 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights. The section prohibits unauthorised CMOs in 
Germany from asserting or claiming any rights entrusted to them.158 It precludes them 
from filing any criminal complaint under s109 of the German Copyright Act.159 Section 
2(2) of the Austrian Collecting Societies Act also shares similarity with s17 of the 
Nigerian Copyright Act.  
 The provision of s17 of the Nigerian Copyright Act and its effect on CMO’s 
right of action for copyright claims has been the subject of several legal 
controversies,160 which were eventually resolved by the Supreme Court in early 
December 2018.161 The cases at the heart of the controversies have been extensively 
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reviewed elsewhere.162 However, it remains to be said that in terms of the Supreme 
Court’s judgement on the locus standi question, CMOs may initiate copyright 
infringement claims as (a)owner, (b) assignee and (c) exclusive licensee of copyright. 
This is so because, under sections 10 and 11 of the Copyright Act, copyright ownership 
may vest in natural persons (humans) and juristic persons (corporate entities, for 
instance).163 As stated above, copyright ownership is acquired through authorship, 
assignments, or exclusive licenses. Also, as a condition to obtaining the NCC’s 
approval, CMOs are required to be incorporated as companies limited by guarantee in 
Nigeria. The incorporation makes them juristic persons such that they can and usually 
do obtain copyright ownership via assignments and or exclusive licenses. Thus, CMOs 
may initiate copyright infringement actions in their personal capacity as owners, 
assignees and exclusive licensees of copyright in terms of s16 of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act without the need for approval by the NCC.  
Furthermore, CMOs may initiate copyright infringement actions as (d) persons 
involved in the business of negotiating, granting of licences, collection and distribution 
of royalties for not more than fifty owners of copyright in any class of works. They 
may also initiate actions as (e) associations of copyright owners established in terms of 
s39 of the Nigerian Copyright Act. CMOs falling under both categories (d) and (e) can 
only commence copyright claims in representative capacities. Aside suing in 
representative capacities, CMOs coming under category (d) will not require approval 
of the NCC to enjoy the right of action in terms of the Copyright Act. However, CMOs 
acting for more than fifty copyright owners will fall under category (e) and will most 
likely face the locus standi challenge under s17 of the Nigerian Copyright Act, 
especially if the copyright they seek to enforce was assigned or exclusively licensed to 
them after the commencement date of s17.  
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That being said, while the Supreme Court’s judgment has not annulled s17 of 
the Nigerian Copyright Act, it has watered down its impact on the right of action for 
unapproved CMOs. The point has already been over-flogged that, based on the 
judgment, CMOs have the right to initiate copyright infringements claims in their 
personal capacity as owners, assignees and exclusive licensees. In such cases, they are 
completely covered under s16 of the Nigerian Copyright Act. They may also initiate 
such actions in representative capacities as acting for less than or more than fifty 
copyright owners in respect of the class of copyright work under issue. However, in 
practice, this would not prevent an opposing party from raising the issue of locus standi 
under s17, especially where the CMO in question has not been approved by the NCC. 
Even so, on the strength of the Supreme Court’s judgments, the CMO would 
escape the clutches of s17 by showing that it sued in the capacity of owner, assignee 
and exclusive licensee and that the copyright it sought to enforce was acquired before 
the section came into being. Alternatively, the CMO may show that it initiated the 
action in a representative capacity on behalf of less or more than fifty copyright owners 
(as the case may be) and that the copyright it seeks to enforce was acquired before the 
commencement of s17 (10 May 1999). Where the CMO fails in any of the alternative 
approaches, it is submitted that such CMO cannot hide behind the Supreme Court’s 
decisions to avoid s17 of the Nigerian Copyright Act. Indeed, in view of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions, the time or point when the issue of locus standi is raised in a 
copyright infringement case initiated by an unapproved CMO is not important in 
resolving the locus standi question under s17 of the Copyright Act. The important 
question to be resolved will be whether or not the unapproved CMO obtained the 
copyright in its repertoire through assignments and/or exclusive licenses executed 
before or after the commencement date (10 May 1999) of s17 of the Nigerian Copyright 
Act.  
 
3.5.4 Number of CMOs  
The monopolistic nature of CMOs and its implication on competition within the 
collective management and licensing markets have been examined in 1.1 and 2.4 
above. Generally, they are natural or de facto monopolies (that is, without legislative 
backing). However, in some countries, they also exist as de jure monopolies obtained 




utility body as CMO; or by a concession system that empowers a regulatory body to 
approve a CMO among different applicants.164  
 The Nigerian Copyright Act provides the concession system. It promotes a 
monopoly – with legal recognition, but which is not exempt from competition law’s 
scrutiny – for the respective classes of copyright owners through an approval system 
administered by the NCC, as reflected under s39(1) and (3). According to the section, 
a CMO ‘may be formed in respect of any one or more rights of copyright owners [...]’. 
However, the NCC ‘shall not approve another [CMO] in respect of any class of 
copyright owners if it is satisfied that an existing approved [CMO] adequately protects 
the interest of that class of copyright owners’.  
 In essence, therefore, the Nigerian Copyright Act allows only one CMO 
administering one or more rights per class of copyright owners. But it grants the NCC 
discretion to approve another CMO for the same class of copyright owners if it 
considers that the existing approved CMO cannot take care of the interest of the 
copyright owners in that class. The Nigerian Copyright Act does not define ‘class of 
copyright owners’ for the purpose of this section. However, according to Ola, the issue 
can be resolved by recourse to the types of works protected under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act.165 Thus, a work protected under the Nigerian Copyright Act forms a 
class of copyright and the owners of copyright in that work form a class of copyright 
owners. The Nigerian Copyright Act protects literary works, musical works, artistic 
works, cinematograph films, sound recordings, broadcasts, performances, and 
expressions of folklore.166 While the NCC has the sole right to administer rights in 
expressions of folklore,167 CMOs may be formed to administer the rights in other 
works. The copyrights in the respective works that are protected are also identified in 
the Nigerian Copyright Act.168 For purpose of s39, it could be said that a ‘class of 
copyright owners’ means for instance, copyright owners of the copyright in literary 
works or musical works or sound recordings as the case may be.  
 A scenario that may give rise to the exercise of discretion by the NCC to 
approve more than one CMO for a class of copyright owners is where a CMO approved 
for a class of copyright owners does not administer the rights of other members of 
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similar class of copyright owners. For instance, if CMO (A) is approved to administer 
the public performance and mechanical rights in music for authors, composers and 
publishers of music, the NCC would be able to approve CMO (B) administering the 
same rights for performers. It would also be able to approve another CMO (C) to 
administer the same rights for producers of sound recordings as the case may be.  
 Another scenario that may goad the NCC to exercise this discretion is where it 
considers that an existing approved CMO is not adequately equipped in terms of human 
resource capacity, international collaboration, technical know-how and adequate 
repertoire to administer copyright for that class of copyright owners.169 This scenario 
played out in 2005 resulting in the approval of MCSN to operate in the music industry 
alongside the defunct PMRS.170   
However, the NCC’s current approach is based on the belief that maintaining a 
monopoly by approving a CMO per class of copyright owners will best ensure 
efficiency in collective management in Nigeria.171 But, will CMOs be more efficient if 
a monopoly is promoted, or if competition is fostered by regulation, or if market forces 
are allowed to determine the question of monopoly of collecting societies? There are 
differing views on this issue, especially from a competition law perspective which have 
already been discussed in 2.4 above.  
For now, to put discussions in this chapter in proper perspective, it is important 
to note, as pointed out in 2.4.3 above, that the existence of more than one CMO for a 
class of right is no indication of competition on the user side since the respective 
repertoire of the CMOs are usually complementary in practice. It may also not be 
indication of competition for copyright owners. Thus, when examining s39(3) the focus 
should be on how to organise CMOs in the industries within the ambit of the section to 
tackle abuse of market power by CMOs. This is because, as was shown in 2.4.3 above, 
whether one or more CMOs exists in both markets, anti-competitive concerns are 
bound to arise. Do the Nigerian Copyright Act and the CMO Regulations empower the 
relevant regulatory body to deal with such concerns? The resolution of this issue will 
form the core of discussion in chapter five below. 
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 The challenges in applying s39(3) in the music industry led to the HofR’s 
resolution mentioned earlier.172 Among others, the resolution called on the NCC to 
approve the MCSN and ‘revisit the application of other organisations’ that applied for 
approval as CMOs, ‘regardless of the existence or non-existence of a licensed [CMO] 
for musical works in Nigeria’.173 The resolution aligned with Ola’s argument for 
multiple CMOs per class of copyright,174 which was echoed as justification in the 
MoJ/AGF’s directive to NCC for approval of the MCSN. As a further justification, the 
MoJ/AGF also cited the ‘emerging and expanding role of the internet’ and its impact 
on collective management,175 already discussed in 2.4.2 above. This seems to resonate 
with the views that digitisation has made less relevant the transaction cost argument as 
justification for CMOs’ monopoly since it makes management through rights 
aggregators and individual rights management, including through blockchain 
technology, possible. However, as argued in 2.4.2, the challenges posed by digitisation 
are strong arguments in favour of a single CMO in form of a one-stop-shop. 
Nonetheless, if the MoJ/AGF’s contention is that COSON is not well equipped to face 
the challenges brought about by the Internet and that MCSN’s approval is necessary 
for some collaborative efforts, then, the directive for the approval of another CMO is 
justified. This aligns with the view expressed above on possible scenarios for the 
exercise of discretion by the NCC under s39(3).   
 This being said, the approval of another CMO is commendable. It is a first step 
towards resolving the collective management crisis in the music industry. The better 
approach to resolve the crisis, however, is not to approve two CMOs for same rights 
and same class of copyright owners. This approach would continue to engender crisis 
in the form of unhealthy anti-competitive manoeuvres between the CMOs; confusion 
on ownership of copyright in particular works; confusion on the part of copyright 
owners as to which CMO to belong to; difficulty in obtaining licenses; a non-united 
and weak bargaining platform for copyright owners vis-à-vis large copyright users in 
the music industry; among others. In sum, it may lead to ‘duplication of functions and 
reduction in economics of scale and thus [is] unlikely to bring benefits’176 to members 
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of the CMOs. Approving a single CMO for the entire music industry is not a better 
approach either.177 Both approaches would run against the spirit and letters of s39(3).  
 The way forward would be to reorganise collective management in the music 
industry. Such reorganisation should be based on a proper understanding of the 
structure of copyright relating to music under the Nigerian Copyright Act. A piece of 
music contained in a CD, for instance, is not indivisible in terms of the copyright 
contained in it. Copyright in a piece of music should not be regarded as belonging to a 
single class of copyright owners (although, in modern times it is of course possible to 
have one person own all the copyright in a piece of music). Yet, generally every piece 
of music in a CD may be a combination of literary works (the lyrics), musical works 
(the composition or rhythm), sound recordings and performances. It may also be a 
combination of two of these works, usually the musical work and sound recording. And 
different people generally own the copyright in these works. Thus, it could be argued 
that the music industry is multi-class in terms of works and copyright ownership. The 
music industry includes owners of copyright in literary works, musical works, sound 
recordings and performances respectively. This may be distinguished from other fields 
of collective management, such as in the audio-visual industry in Nigeria, which 
appears mono-class. In the Nigerian audio-visual industry, for instance, authors of 
cinematographic films form the major class of copyright owners. This is so because, in 
terms of s51(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act, they are defined as the persons who 
made arrangements for the making of the films and subject to the provisions of s10,178 
such persons are the owners of copyright in the films. Further, they are obligated under 
s10(4) to conclude, prior to the making of the film, written contracts with other 
copyright owners whose works are to be used in the films. According to Koskinen-
Olsson and Lowe, in practice, the persons who made arrangement for the making of 
the film are the producers and the contract they conclude with other copyright owners 
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whose works are used in the film usually include transfer of copyright to the producers 
by such copyright owners.179 
 In terms of collective management, the music industry appears very rewarding. 
The earnings from that industry in terms of royalty distribution through CMO, as shown 
in the previous chapter, are huge and they increase annually. Naturally, such venture 
will attract varying interests with the effect that more persons will be interested in 
establishing CMOs in the industry.  
 Therefore, it is recommended that the work-based collective administration 
approach be adopted to reorganise collective management in the music industry. The 
work-based approach is when CMOs are established to administer copyright based on 
types of copyright work.180 Here, the emphasis is on types of copyright work and class 
of copyright owners. This is different from the rights-based approach where the 
emphasis is on types of copyright.181 For instance, following the work-based approach, 
CMO (A) may be established to administer copyrights in sound recordings belonging 
to music producers. On the other hand, CMO (B) may be established to administer 
copyright in musical works belonging to authors, composers and music publishers. 
Still, another CMO (C) may be established to administer copyright in performances 
belonging to performers. Consequently, three CMOs will then exist under s39(3), with 
each of them as a monopoly over the management of the copyright in their respective 
repertoires. 
 Adewopo seems to be in disagreement with the above approach. He seems to 
prefer a single CMO for the music industry. According to Adewopo, ‘there would be 
no better way to promote an organised confusion, not only as between the authors 
themselves but also among the various categories of users of the same work(s)’ if 
different CMOs existed as proposed above. Further, Adewopo believes that ‘it would 
[...] be an administratively inefficient and counterproductive manner of managing 
resources, which negates the original objective of the idea of pooling of resources under 
[collective management]’.182  
 Contrariwise, one could argue, however, that the above recommendation is not 
novel. It finds support, for instance, in the law and practice in Kenya, which seems to 
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negate Adewopo’s position. The Kenyan Copyright Act183 has a similar provision as 
s39(3) of the Nigerian Copyright Act.184 Section 46(5) of the Kenyan Copyright Act 
provides that the ‘[b]oard shall not approve another [CMO] in respect of the same class 
of rights and category of works if there exists another [CMO] that has been licensed 
and functions to the satisfaction of its members’. Generally, s46 of the Kenyan 
Copyright Act places CMOs under the regulation of the Kenya Copyright Board 
(KECOBO). It also requires CMOs to be licensed by KECOBO before they can operate 
in Kenya. In exercising its discretion under s46(5), KECOBO has approved formed the 
practice of approving three CMOs for the music Kenyan industry:185 one to administer 
the copyrights of authors, composers and publishers of musical works; another to 
administers the copyright of music producers in sound recordings; and a last one to 
manage the copyright of performers in musical works.186   
 It is suggested here that the foregoing recommendation would lead to 
inclusiveness of all stakeholders in the Nigerian music industry, while preserving the 
CMOs’ monopoly in respect of their respective repertoire. The similarity in the 
copyright of the respective copyright owners in the music industry should make the 
recommended arrangement workable. This may not be without some challenge 
particularly on the user side of the copyright market. Users of copyright works are 
interested in obtaining a single license that allows them access all music related works. 
They try to avoid anything perceived as double or even triple licensing.187 Users are 
also interested in quick and uncomplicated licensing windows.  
 This challenge can be surmounted through the creation of a common window 
wherein users would obtain a single license covering the repertoire of the respective 
CMOs. The CMOs would then have to sort out their respective royalties. A 
memorandum of understanding executed by the CMOs will define the licensing issues 
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and the rights of the CMOs.188 A similar arrangement exists in Kenya. Recently, the 
Attorney General of Kenya issued a legal notice for a joint music tariff.  The notice 
requires a joint royalty invoice to be issued by the musical CMOs in Kenya.189 Another 
arrangement exists in Kenya for online uses of musical copyright. The arrangement 
was borne out of the agreement among the Kenyan musical copyright CMOs. It is a 
single online licensing platform, known as ngoma license. 190  
 The recommendation may not pose a challenge on the copyright owners’ side 
of the market. A person whose copyright ownership cuts across the types of works 
noted above would be at liberty to register as member of all CMOs. As will be shown 
shortly, CMOs are prohibited from placing restrictions on the member’s rights to join 
other CMOs. The NCC can initiate the reorganisation being recommended pursuant to 
its powers in s39(9) already discussed above.  
 
3.5.5 Relationship between CMO and their copyright owners 
This part focuses on the provisions relating to membership and royalty distribution 
under the Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO Regulations. The issues are whether 
CMOs have a duty to grant membership to copyright owners in the class for which the 
CMOs are approved; whether CMOs can restrict the copyright exclusivity of their 
members and the capacity of their members to withdraw membership; and whether 
CMOs are free to discriminate against members of the same class in terms of royalty 
distribution? As will be seen in chapter five below, these questions underline the 
CMOs’ competition concerns in their relationship with copyright owners. 
 
3.5.5.1 Membership of CMOs  
The CMO Regulations require all CMOs to open their membership to all copyright 
owners of the category of works or classes of rights for which the CMOs seek approval, 
or are approved, to operate.191 For the purpose of admitting copyright owners as 
members, CMOs are allowed to make provisions for collective membership through an 
association of copyright owners.192 REPRONIG has adopted this style of 
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membership.193 In such cases, the CMOs may claim an indemnity undertaking from 
such association against claims from the actual copyright owners in respect of any 
royalty distributed to the association or agent.194    
 CMOs are prohibited from requiring copyright owners to appoint them as sole 
collecting agents. In order words, CMOs cannot make assignment of all rights in a work 
by copyright owners a compulsory requirement for membership.  CMOs are also 
prohibited from requiring copyright owners to make them agent for any other purpose 
outside collective management.195 The prohibition extends to mandatorily requiring 
copyright owners to assign to them the right to collect royalties from equivalent foreign 
CMOs.196   
However, CMOs may require copyright owners to appoint them as agents, 
albeit not mandatorily, for collective management.197 This is because CMOs are 
prohibited from administering copyright in works over which they have not been duly 
authorised.198 A copyright owner has the right to withdraw his membership from, or 
the copyrights assigned to, the CMO. But reasonable notice to the CMO of intention to 
withdraw membership must be given to the CMOs.199 The question of reasonable 
notice is left for the CMO and the copyright owner to determine by contract. Although 
not stated in the CMO Regulations, copyright owners may appoint a CMO as their sole 
agent for collective management. This finds support in the principle of copyright 
exclusivity and the freedom of copyright contract embedded in s11 of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act. However, copyright owners must act willingly without any inducement, 
coercion or misrepresentation on the part of the CMO. 
 In executing a membership contract, the provisions of s11 of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act ought to be kept in mind. Accordingly, an assignment or license may 
also be granted in respect of a future or an existing work in which copyright does not 
yet exist.200 Further, an assignment or license granted by one copyright owner shall 
operate as if granted by his co-owner in cases of co-ownership of copyright. In such 
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cases, subject to any contracts between them, the royalties received would be divided 
equitably between the co-owners of the copyright.201 Persons are deemed co-owners if 
they share a joint interest in the whole or any part of a copyright; or have interests in 
the various copyrights in a composite production – that is, a production consisting of 
two or more works.202 The CMO Regulations provides sanctions for violations of the 
prohibitions discussed so far, and for other prohibitions, by CMOs.203  
 As members of CMOs, copyright owners are conferred with certain rights and 
privileges under the CMO Regulations. This is in addition to whatever privileges, 
reliefs or remedies they are entitled to under their membership agreements with the 
CMOs.204 Members of CMOs have a right to one vote each at general meetings. The 
aim of the voting right is to ensure that members are in charge or take part in the 
decision-making process of the CMOs. Copyright owners are also entitled to obtain the 
annual statement of accounts, annual reports, and auditor’s reports, among others, of 
their CMOs.205 
 
3.5.5.2 Royalty distribution  
Royalty distribution is one of the core objectives, and a means of gauging the 
performance, of CMOs. The CMO Regulations obligates CMOs to distribute royalties 
among their members in a manner that reflects, as nearly as possible, the actual usage 
of the works in the CMOs’ repertoire.206 Thus, CMOs are expected to establish a fair 
and equitable distribution plan based on a procedure acceptable to their members and 
on the information supplied by users.207 The CMO Regulations does not expressly 
require the NCC’s approval of CMOs’ royalty distribution plan. CMOs are, however, 
obligated to notify and furnish the NCC with any documentation, report or information 
required by the NCC,208 and this may include the distribution plan.  
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 Before distributing royalties to members, CMOs are allowed to deduct their 
administrative costs from the royalties collected for the year in question. The amount 
deducted must not exceed the limits to be decided by the CMOs’ governing board, 
subject to a maximum limit of 30% of the total royalties collected.209 In appropriate 
cases, and upon a written application by CMOs, the NCC may increase the maximum 
beyond 30%.210 CMOs are prohibited from exceeding the 30% maximum limit or any 
other limit approved by the NCC.211  
It is difficult to determine a generally reasonably justifiable maximum limit for 
management costs. An important consideration is the state of development of collective 
management in the country. Scholars seem to concur with the 30% maximum limit in 
a relatively young system like that of Nigeria.212 The public awareness and appreciation 
of CMOs’ role is only recently rising in Nigeria. Nigerian CMOs still face the daunting 
task of negotiating and obtaining licenses from copyright users as a result of the not 
too strong culture of respect for copyright.213 Consequently, high management costs on 
the part of CMOs appear inevitable. Hence, it is proper to afford CMOs a means of 
recouping their administrative expenses. The 30% maximum limit placed by the CMO 
Regulations may be justifiable on this ground. However, the discretion to increase the 
maximum limit by the NCC should be sparingly exercised. Otherwise, it may give 
room for abuse as it may be used to rip-off copyright owners. It should only be 
exercised where CMOs have shown evidence of efficient management on their part but 
challenges in the copyright management and licensing markets make excessive 
management cost indispensable.  
Recent events in collective management in music and sound recording in 
Nigeria tends to call to question the level of compliance with and enforcement of the 
provisions of the CMO Regulations on royalty distribution. While generally exploring 
the level of compliance to the CMOs’ regulatory framework in Nigeria is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the following event is highlighted because of its relevance to the 
present discussion. 
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In a letter addressed to the Board of COSON, some stakeholders made the 
following strong allegations: (a) that ‘the criterion for [royalty distribution] is not 
usually clear, and actual amount paid is always far less than the amount approved for 
distribution’; (b) that ‘the distribution policy of [COSON] is rather opaque and appears 
not to be fair’ and ‘it does not seem that much effort is being made to make the process 
better’; and (c) deduction of administrative costs in excess of the 30% maximum 
allowed by the CMO Regulations. The letter triggered a chain of events leading first to 
the removal of Chief Tony Okoroji as chairman of COSON’s Board and his 
replacement with Efe Omorogbe on 7 December 2017; the controversial reconstitution 
of COSON’s Board with Chief Tony Okoroji as chairman in an extra-ordinary general  
meeting on 19 December 2017; a petition to the DG of NCC by stakeholders of 
COSON; and NCC’s directive to COSON not to give effect to the resolutions reached 
at the extra-ordinary general meeting, ‘except the resolution on distribution of royalties 
to members’.214 The implication of NCC’s directive is that the removal of Chief Tony 
Okoroji and replacement with Efe Omorogbe as COSON’s chairman by the board on 
7 December 2017 remained the position. Despite ‘some observed irregularities’ in the 
19-December-2017 extra-ordinary general meeting, the NCC approve the royalties 
distributed in the extra-ordinary general meeting because the extra-ordinary general 
meeting was validly conveyed for the purpose of royalty distribution only.215 It should 
be noted that COSON failed to comply with the NCC directives and this prompted the 
suspension of COSON’s approval mentioned above. The NCC also restrained spending 
from COSON’s account, except for payment of salaries.216   
 CMOs are mandated to establish a ‘Holding Account’.217 That account must be 
used to hold any amount from the royalties and fees collected, which cannot be 
distributed for the following reasons –218 
• the CMO has lost contact with the member concerned; 
• the person entitled to the share is not currently a member of the CMO; 
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• the member or his/her agent is not ascertainable; or the copyright owner or 
his/her agent entitled to the share is not ascertainable; 
• there is a dispute as to entitlement to the share; and 
• a portion of amount collected cannot be allocated immediately owing to 
inadequate data for sharing of the amount. 
Money in the ‘Holding Account’ is to be held for a period of 7 years.219 However, 
where the above enumerated circumstances cease or the persons entitled to the money 
in the account become known within this period,220 the CMO is under a duty to 
distribute the money in the account based on the best available data.221 At the expiration 
of the ‘holding period’ money in the ‘Holding Account’ would fall into the CMOs’ 
general revenue as distributable income.222  
 
3.5.6 Relationship between CMOs and users  
The focus here is on the provisions relating to licensing practices and tariff setting of 
collecting societies. According to Adewopo, licensing and tariff setting do ‘not only 
constitute the paramount objective but are also of utmost importance in [collective 
management] and functioning of copyright system such that it requires a scrupulous 
observance of extant regulations as well as best practice that is carefully adapted and 
conducive to the needs and conditions of the local environment’.223 Licensing and tariff 
setting are a process involving preparation of tariffs by CMOs, negotiations with 
prospective users, resolution of any conflict arising from the negotiation and 
authorisation of uses by CMOs after resolution of the licensing and tariff issues.224 
Specifically, from a competition law perspective, the issues are whether CMOs have a 
right to refuse to license users; and whether CMOs can set excessive and discriminatory 
royalties, among others? These questions will be addressed below. 
 
3.5.6.1 Licensing practice  
The CMO Regulations imposes a duty to license on CMOs and they are obligated to 
make their complete repertoire available to users on non-discriminatory terms.225 
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According to Olubiyi and Adam, this may be interpreted to mean imposition of blanket 
licensing on CMOs by the CMO Regulations.226 However, a better interpretation is that 
the CMO Regulations requires CMOs to place all the works in their repertoire before 
users who should have the choice of either transactional or blanket licensing. Whatever 
the meaning, the aim of this provision is to enable users to identify the works within 
the repertoire of the CMO concerned and to prevent CMOs from granting licenses on 
discriminatory terms.  
The view has been rightly expressed that refusal to license on the part of CMOs 
is not an important issue in practice.227 Conflict mostly ‘arise with regard to excessive 
or discriminatory royalty rates’.228 This is because CMOs ‘have an interest in licensing. 
They want to license as much as possible, but at high royalty rates’.229 However, 
‘without a duty to license, they can retain license with the objective of increasing their 
bargaining power against users. Conversely, the recognition of a duty to license reduces 
the bargaining power of [CMOs] as dominant undertaking quite considerably’.230  
 CMOs are prohibited from discriminating in the grant of licenses to users of the 
same class either in terms of such license or differential tariff rates.231 Based on the 
circumstances peculiar to a particular user, CMOs may be reasonably justifiable in 
applying differential tariffs to users of the same class.232 From the tenor of the CMO 
Regulations, it can be taken for granted that CMOs may apply differential tariffs to 
users of different classes. Finally, CMOs are prohibited from inducing users to refrain 
from completing a licensing agreement with another CMO or copyright owner.233 
 
3.5.6.2 Tariff setting 
The CMO Regulations empower CMOs to set tariffs in respect of the royalties they 
demand for the use of the works in their repertoire.234 In setting up tariffs, CMOs are 
enjoined to take into consideration the monetary advantage obtained from the 
exploitation of the work by the user and the value of the work. Other factors to be 
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considered are the purpose for which, and the context in which, the work is used; 
manner or kind of use of the work; proportion of the use of a work in the context of 
exploitation; any relevant decision of the Federal High Court (FHC) or the Dispute 
Resolution Panel (DRP); among others.235 
 While CMOs are empowered to set tariffs, they are enjoined to subject such 
tariffs to agreement between them and user groups for the use of copyright works by 
members of the user groups.236 Further, CMOs are obligated to notify the NCC of the 
tariff as agreed upon by the user group.237 However, it appears that where no agreement 
is reached between the CMO and a user, the NCC may refer the matter to the Dispute 
Resolution Panel for possible amicable resolution. In resolving such matters, the 
Dispute Resolution Panel is obliged to consider any previous agreement on 
tariff/licensing between the parties.238 Failure to reach an amicable resolution despite 
referral of the dispute to the Dispute Resolution Panel does not in itself conclude the 
matter. It is opined that any of the parties may refer the dispute to the FHC because, as 
contended in 3.5.9 below, creation of the Dispute Resolution Panel does not take away 
the initial general jurisdiction of the FHC under the Nigerian Copyright Act. 
The foregoing provisions were at the heart of the royalty controversy between 
COSON and members of the broadcasting industry in Nigeria. Plans by the NCC to set 
up a Dispute Resolution Panel to determine the tariff between the parties did not 
materialise because the controversy was eventually resolved sometime in 2014 
following agreement on the acceptable tariff between COSON and the umbrella body 
of the broadcasting industry: Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria (BON). Detailed 
discussion of the fallouts of the controversy is beyond the scope of this work.239 Suffice 
it note that similar issues arose between COSON and MTN Nigerian Communications 
Ltd (MTNN) resulting in a suit filed at the FHC.240 Interestingly, before the court could 
proceed with the trial, both parties settled the matter out of court after agreeing on an 
acceptable tariff structure.241 Again, a detailed account of the events is beyond the 
scope of this work. However, both incidence indicate the importance of subjecting 
																																								 																				
235 Regulation 13(3)(a)-(g). 
236 Regulation 13(4).  
237 Regulation 13(5). 
238 See COSON v NTA-Star TV Network, unreported Case NO. NCC/DRP/001/2016 (23 December 
2016) 
239 Adewopo op cit note 114. 
240 COSON v. MTN Nigeria Communications Limited, unreported (FHC/L/CS/619/2016). 




proposed licensing tariff structure to agreement between CMOs and the target class of 
users.    
 Finally, CMOs are obligated to inform users of any planned change in tariffs.242 
Also, users are entitled to compensation or refund where they are unable to utilise a 
license granted by a CMO. The user must show that such inability resulted from 
negligence, misrepresentation or the fault of the CMO involved.243 Such situation may 
arise, for instance, where a CMO authorises a user, through a blanket license, to use a 
work not forming part of the CMO’s repertoire and the user is prevented by way of a 
copyright claim by the actual owner of copyright in the work.  
 
3.5.7 Relationship among CMOs  
The CMO Regulations also govern the relationship among CMOs. It prohibits one 
CMO from withholding information, which is reasonably required for effective 
collective management by another CMO.244 Such information include those regarding 
the repertoire of an author who has assigned his/her works to both CMOs; that may 
assist the other CMO in computation and equitable distribution of royalties; and on any 
existing reciprocal agreement of a CMO.245 
 The CMO regulations prohibit a CMO from using information obtained from 
another CMO for a purpose outside collective management.246 Finally, CMOs are 
prohibited from doing anything that has the effect of preventing another CMO from 
undertaking its functions.247 There is no express prohibition of concerted efforts by 
CMOs aimed at obtaining high tariffs from users or controlling the copyright market. 
However, it is highly doubtful whether the Nigerian copyright regulatory framework is 
best suited to address such issue. Discussion in chapter five will attempt to answer this 
issue under consideration of competition law principles.248  
3.5.8 Internal management, transparency and accountability  
The CMO Regulations make provisions aimed at ensuring transparency and 
accountability on the part of CMOs. They are required to have two decision-making 
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organs – a governing board and a general assembly.249 While the general assembly 
comprises all members of the CMOs, the governing board is required to – as far as 
possible – be representative of the different classes of copyright owners in a CMO.250 
The respective roles of both organs in CMOs have been adequately addressed 
elsewhere.251 Without doubt, the objective here is to ensure that copyright owners are 
in charge of the decision making in CMOs.  
 The CMO Regulations do not make express provisions on convening of 
meetings by CMOs. It only requires CMOs to keep a special register of the minutes of 
meetings of their governing boards and general assemblies. The certified copies of the 
minutes are to be submitted to the NCC where the NCC requires it.252 The provisions 
of CAMA can fill the gap created by the silence of the CMO Regulations on convening 
of meetings. The reason for this cannot be far-fetched. CMOs are incorporated as 
companies limited by guarantee under CAMA. As such, they are obligated to comply 
with the corporate governance rules provided by CAMA, including those relating to 
meetings of companies limited by guarantee.253  
 CMOs are required to make certain filings with the NCC. These filings are in 
form of annual returns; general report of activities; and audited financial report, which 
must include the total revenue, total expenditure and royalty payments to members in 
line with the CMO’s distribution plan.254 CMOs are required to, within 30 days of 
occurrence, notify the NCC of any alteration to their standard membership agreements; 
memorandum and articles of association or any internal rules; any reciprocal 
agreements; and judicial or official decision involving CMOs.255 The foregoing 
provision does not preclude CMOs from complying with the provisions of CAMA 
relating to filing of annual returns.256  
 Moreover, copyright users and other members of the public are entitled to 
obtain information from CMOs upon written requests. The CMO Regulations obligate 
CMOs to provide reasonable information on their services. The information should 
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include the description of the classes of rights administered by the CMOs; the tariffs, 
terms and conditions of license for all categories of users; among others. For this 
purpose, CMOs are prohibited from knowingly making false representations in respect 
of any matter for which information is required.257 
 To ensure accountability, CMOs are required to keep proper accounting 
records. Where necessary, the NCC may appoint auditors to audit the accounts of 
CMOs, at the expense of the CMOs. If the audit reveals the commission of an offence 
by the CMO or any of its officials, the NCC is empowered to initiate criminal 
proceedings against such CMO or its officials.258 Whether the NCC’s power to initiate 
criminal proceedings in this regard extends to prosecution of the criminal proceedings 
will depend on the nature of the crime committed. Pursuant to s38(3) of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act, the NCC may prosecute, through its copyright inspectors, if the act in 
question qualifies as an offence under the Nigerian Copyright Act or the CMO 
Regulations. However, where the offence committed is financial in nature, the NCC 
would not be able to prosecute such offence. The mandate of the NCC under the 
Nigerian Copyright Act does not extend to prosecution of financial crimes. In such 
circumstance, the NCC’s power to ‘initiation criminal proceedings’ will be limited to 
filing a complaint to, and assisting, the relevant authority saddled with the duty of 
prosecuting financial crimes. Even so, an officer indicted of such offence must be 
suspended immediately by the CMO.259  
 
3.5.9 Dispute resolution  
In the course of collective management, disputes may arise between different CMOs; 
between CMOs and copyright owners; between different copyright owners; between 
copyright owners and users; and between users and collecting societies as the case may 
be. The CMO Regulations makes provision for dispute resolution mechanism in the 
form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Specifically, reg.14 of the CMO 
Regulations requires disputes to be referred to the NCC, which may set up a Dispute 
Resolution Panel to settle the dispute. The Dispute Resolution Panel is to conduct its 
proceedings in line with the Copyright (Dispute Resolution Panel) Rules, 2007 (DRP 
Rules). However, such dispute must arise from any matter falling within the ambit of 
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the CMO Regulations, especially in relation to tariff setting,260 licensing agreements, 
royalty collection and distribution, and the conduct of one CMO in relation to another 
CMO. 
 The above provision appears to make it mandatory for parties to a dispute to 
submit, at first instance, such dispute to the NCC for onward referral to the Dispute 
Resolution Panel. Rule 5 of the DRP Rules reinforces this point. Rule 5 of the DRP 
Rules empowers the NCC’s Director-General to direct parties to a dispute referred to 
the NCC to cease further proceedings. In effect, the reg.14 and the DRP Rules may 
foreclose the rights of aggrieved persons to seek redress in court. In this regard, the 
CMO Regulations seems to conflict with the Nigerian Copyright Act, which stipulates 
the FHC as the court of first instance for resolution of disputes relating to copyright.261  
 However, another view is that there is no conflict between reg.14 and the 
Nigerian Copyright Act. Although couched in mandatory terms, reg.14 may be 
regarded as permissive. This is because in enabling the NCC to make rules under the 
Nigerian Copyright Act, the legislators could not be deemed to have empowered the 
NCC to amend or repeal any provision of the Nigerian Copyright Act. The CMO 
Regulations is a creation of the Nigerian Copyright Act, hence it cannot attempt to 
override or give an impression of overriding the Nigerian Copyright Act.262 Thus, 
parties are at liberty to proceed directly to the FHC in the event of disputes and they 
will not be deemed to have contravened reg.14.  
 Even so, the FHC would be willing to stay proceedings in a matter before it for 
compliance with reg14 upon proper application by any of the parties. This is so, not 
because bypassing reg.14 will affect the court’s jurisdiction, but because the courts are 
inclined to promoting ADR, especially where such mechanism exists. In any case, an 
award from the Dispute Resolution Panel does not prevent parties from approaching 
the FHC as a court of first instance. According to Adewopo, reg.14 is made ‘with 
possible recourse to court, by either or both parties, for judicial review, if the need 
arises’.263 
 Regulation 14 is not without some value. First, as an ADR mechanism, it will 
afford a faster and less cumbersome procedure for the resolution of disputes in the 
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Nigerian collective management system. Secondly, it makes it possible for the parties 
to be actively involved in the dispute resolution process. Thirdly, it is presumed that 
the NCC will not appoint non-experts to make up a Dispute Resolution Panel. 
Consequently, the awards delivered by the Dispute Resolution Panel could help to 
enrich the jurisprudence on collective management in Nigeria since the awards may 
serve as references in disputes on collective management before the FHC. 	
3.6 Conclusion 
The Nigerian regulatory framework for CMOs has been the focus of the discussion in 
this chapter. Legislative, judicial and administrative developments on collective 
management in Nigeria were examined and appropriate recommendations made where 
necessary. The main focus is on how the regulatory framework governs the relationship 
between CMOs and copyright owners; CMOs and users; and among CMOs 
themselves. In this regard, issues concerning royalty distribution, membership of and 
assignment of rights to CMOs, CMOs’ powers to grant or refuse license to users, and 
the fixing of royalty rates were particularly discussed. 
Essentially, the aim of the foregoing discussions is to lay the foundation for a 
determination, in chapter five, of whether the Nigerian regulatory framework for 
CMOs empowers the NCC to address the CMOs’ competition concerns identified in 
2.4.3 above. In a similar vein, the next chapter will focus on the regulation of CMOs 




CHAPTER FOUR: REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the regulation of CMOs in South Africa. Principally, the 
regulatory framework for CMOs in South Africa is found in the SA Copyright Act, 
Performers Protection Act and the CS regulations. The provisions of the Companies 
Act relating to incorporation, corporate governance, winding-up and establishment of 
the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) would also be relevant 
in this kind of discourse. The goal in this chapter is to determine if the regulatory issues 
highlighted in chapter two are covered in the South African regulatory framework. 
Discussion in this chapter will be very useful in determining whether the South African 
regulatory framework empowers the CIPC to address the CMOs’ competition concerns 
in the next chapter.  
4.2 Emergence of collective management in South Africa  
The emergence of collective management in South Africa up to 2014 has been 
extensively discussed elsewhere1 and it suffices here to highlight some main points and 
major developments before and after 2014. Like Nigeria, the growth of CMOs in South 
Africa is rooted in the UK and it began in the field of music. In 1925, Performing Rights 
Society (PRS) appointed law firms as agents in the Southern African Development 
Community countries then under the UK’s control (UK’s SADC)2 with the chief agent 
– the firm of Ivan Christian Silberbauer – based in South Africa.3  
The Southern African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO) was formed in 
1961 as the South African Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers 
(SAFCA) by Dr. Gideon Roos Snr. (a former DG of South African Broadcasting 
Corporation – SABC) with significant help from PRS, which, along with some other 
of its members, constituted SAMRO’s first membership base.4 SAMRO’s operation 
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permeated the entire UK’s SADC, until recently with some of the countries in the 
region developing their own CMOs. The original name – SAFCA – was dropped in 
1966 following conflict with the name of another organisation then operating in the 
South African music industry. SAMRO then became known as the South African 
Music Rights Organisation. However, this was letter changed to the current name to 
reflect the reach of its operations.5 SAMRO changed its legal status from company 
limited by guarantee to a non-profit company under the Companies Act from 1 May 
2013.6 This may not be unconnected to the recommendation of the Copyright Review 
Commission (CRC) that ‘SAMRO should amend its constitutive document in order to 
be aligned with the [Companies Act] and acceptable standards of corporate 
governance’.7 The CRC was established on 18 November 2010 by the Minister of 
Trade and Industry ‘to assess concerns and allegations about the [CMOs'] model [...] 
in place for the distribution of royalties to musicians and composers of music’ in South 
Africa.8 Specifically, the issues considered by the CRC included the structure of 
CMOs, licensing, royalty collection and distribution, among others. Major findings and 
recommendations of the CRC will be highlighted as the chapter progresses.  
Although formed mainly to administer the performing rights of its members, 
SAMRO at some point attempted to include mechanical rights of its members within 
its administration. This caused some conflict between SAMRO and UK’s Mechanical-
Copyright Protection Society (MCPS), which was then administering mechanical 
rights in South Africa. Both SAMRO and MCPS came to an understanding which 
limited SAMRO’s activities in this area to ‘mechanical licensing of the Department of 
Information’.9  
With the help of MCPS, the South African Recording Rights Association 
Limited (SARRAL) was established in 1963 by George Hardy.10 SARRAL then 
became the main CMO administering mechanical rights in South Africa. Its 
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membership was made up of ‘MCPS, Chappell and some key local publishers’.11 After 
its formation, SARRAL began to face difficulties at different times until its demise 
through a winding-up order in 2009.12 First, SARRAL had difficulty obtaining 
assignments from composers, authors and publishers who already had confidence in 
SAMRO. Thus, SARRAL had to come to an arrangement with SAMRO, whereby 
SAMRO got assignments of mechanical rights from the composers, authors and 
publishers and then sub-assigned same to SARRAL to manage. Secondly, the advent 
of recording companies in the area of music publishing through the purchase of 
publishing companies influenced the creation of the National Organisation for 
Reproduction Rights in Music in South Africa (NORM) in 1971, which administered 
mechanical rights of the ‘record-label aligned publishers’.13 This led to a drastic 
decrease in SARRAL’s membership. SARRAL’s existence was greatly threatened 
until MCPS, Society for the Administration of Mechanical Rights (SDRM - France), 
Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers of Music (SACEM – France) and 
GEMA (Germany) came to its rescue and it was then reorganised and repositioned.  
Even so, SARRAL’s membership became largely constituted of composers, authors 
and small publishers until it was liquidated.14  
The demise of SARRAL paved the way for negotiations between SAMRO and 
NORM which began in 2011,15 and led to the formation of CAPASSO as a non-profit 
company in 2014.16 CAPASSO, which was initially to be known as Composers, 
Authors and Publishers Association of South Africa (CAPASA),17 is now the only 
CMO administering musical mechanical rights in South Africa. The CRC report18 gave 
vent to the negotiations between SAMRO and NORM for the formation of 
CAPASSO.19 In its report, the CRC recommended the implementation of ‘one society 
one right’ for collective management in South Africa, on the basis of which it 
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recommended the merger of SAMRO’s mechanical rights arm and NORM to form one 
mechanical rights society.20 
CMOs did not emerge in the area of needletime rights, until about 2008 when 
SAMPRA was formed by the Recording industry of South Africa (RiSA).21 Needletime 
rights are the rights of performers and music producers to be remunerated when their 
sound recording (containing the performers’ performance) is broadcast, transmitted in 
a diffusion service or communicated to the public.22 RiSA, formed in the 1970s, is a 
trade association of about 3000 members including the major music producers in South 
Africa. It collects royalties in respect of music videos from broadcasters through RiSA 
Audio Visual (RAV), which it created in 2000.23 In essence, SAMPRA’s membership 
base consists of music producers. The late entry of needletime CMOs in South Africa 
was occasioned by the long history behind the legal recognition of needletime rights in 
South Africa, which will be discussed in the next section. For now, it should be noted 
that, in 1949, the SABC entered an agreement with the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) ‘whereby the SABC would pay the IFPI a fee per side of 
a record used in a “spot” programme’.24 The agreement lasted till 1965 when 
needletime rights were expunged by the repealed Copyright Act, No 63 of 1965 (1965 
Copyright Act).25  
In 2009, SAMRO sojourned into the needletime arena through the Performers’ 
Organisation of South Africa Trust (POSA).26 POSA was established as a trust to 
administer the needletime rights of performers who are members of SAMRO.27 The 
requirements of the SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act for sharing of 
needletime royalties between producers and performers; the resultant conflict as to the 
appropriate share of royalties for performers; and the need to resolve this conflict led 
to the creation of the new SAMPRA incorporated as a non-profit company in 2016.28 
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The provisions of the SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act and the conflict 
will be discussed in the course of this chapter.  
The new SAMPRA is a merger between SAMPRA and POSA following a 
cooperation and settlement agreement reached in 2014 between the two CMOs. The 
new SAMPRA now has two chambers: the performers’ chamber (constituted by 
POSA) and the copyright owners’ chamber (constituted by SAMPRA). Both chambers 
are each entitled to appoint six directors to the board of the new SAMPRA, which 
comprises 13 directors including the chief executive officer.29 The CRC’s 
recommendation for the merger of SAMPRA and ‘SAMRO’s needletime unit to form 
one [CMO] for needletime’ was further impetus for the negotiation between SAMPRA 
and SAMRO.30 Moreover, being that SAMPRA was historically accredited to 
administer needletime rights for music producers, the new entity took its name.31  
The Independent Music Performance Rights Association (IMPRA) is another 
CMO in the area of needletime rights administration in South Africa. It was formed in 
2014 as the CMO for the needletime rights in sound recordings belonging to local 
independent performers and music producers. Its membership includes performers and 
producers belonging to Music Performers Association of South Africa (MPASA), 
Association of Independent Record Companies of South Africa (AIRCO) and Kwazulu 
Natal Music Industry (KUMISA), among others.32  
The Dramatic, Artistic and Literary Rights Organisation (DALRO), the only 
CMO for rights in literary, artistic and dramatic works in South Africa, was established 
in 1967 as a private company by SAMRO.33 SAMRO is its sole shareholder, but it has 
publishers, authors and artists on its board. It has mandating agreements, on a non-
exclusive basis, with publishers in South Africa. It may appear unusual for SAMRO to 
solely own DALRO since CMOs are supposed to be associations of copyright owners. 
Technically, however, there is nothing wrong in this practice because it is possible to 
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have a CMO established as a licensing agency by an individual or corporate entity 
insofar as such CMO operates with the mandate of relevant copyright owners and has 
copyright owners as part of its decision-making process.34 It may also appear out of 
place for DALRO’s mandate to come from publishers and not from the actual creators 
or authors of the literary works. But, if it is recalled that authors usually enter into 
personal contracts transferring their economic rights to publishers then it will become 
clear that DALRO’s practise of getting mandate from publishers is not unsupportable. 
The only snag will be if the authors do not transfer the rights in their works to 
publishers. In such cases, DALRO will have to deal directly with the authors 
concerned.35  
Finally, there is the Motion Picture Licencing Company (MPLC), which was 
established in 1996 in the United States of America (USA) to administer the rights of 
producers and distributors in Hollywood. It has extended its operations to South Africa 
and grants licenses for public performance rights in Hollywood movies.36 There is also 
the Christian Copyright Licencing International (CCLI) – a US CMO – that started 
granting licenses to churches in South Africa for Christian videos since 1995.37 From 
the foregoing, the following represents the current state of CMOs in South Africa:  
 
Table 1: Summary of collecting societies in South Africa 
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4.3 Legislative history of the regulatory framework 
The first national copyright legislation in South Africa, contained in Schedule III of the 
Patent, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act,38 did not make provisions for the 
regulation of CMOs. Essentially, Schedule III comprised the entire provision of the 
British Copyright Act 1911 (Imperial Copyright Act). 
 The situation changed with the enactment of the defunct 1965 Copyright Act. 
Among other things, chapter 4 of the 1965 Copyright Act created the Copyright 
Tribunal and empowered it to grant compulsory licenses, among others, where a 
licensing body had failed or refused to grant such licenses. The chapter was modelled 
after the British Copyright Act of 1956, which was inapplicable in South Africa. 
According to the CRC report, the ‘British parliament had set up a tribunal, originally 
known as the Performing Rights Tribunal, to provide a remedy for major copyright 
users who had complained about the terms on which performing rights societies were 
doing business’.39 In effect, chapter 4 of the 1965 Copyright Act was meant mainly to 
regulate the licensing practice of CMOs. 
However, chapter 4 of the 1965 Copyright Act was never applied to the existing 
CMOs. The only reported case in which it was applied involved some local opera and 
dramatic practitioners and owners of copyright in some musical dramas. The local 
practitioners had sought a license to perform the musical dramas, which was refused 
by the copyright owners because the local practitioners were going to perform the 
musical dramas before a segregated audience. South Africa was then under the 
Apartheid regime. Relying on its powers under chapter 4, particularly s28 thereof, the 
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Copyright Tribunal granted the license.40 Chapter 4 is the progenitor of the current 
chapter 3 of the SA Copyright Act, which has been considered recently in three 
reported cases,41 which will be examined in 4.5.4 below.  
Thus, for a long time, CMOs in South Africa were not subject to regulatory 
oversight. CMOs was only introduced into the regulatory lexicon in 2002,42 when the 
needletime rights were reintroduced to the SA Copyright Act and Performers 
Protection Act. It was stated in the previous section above that the late foray of 
needletime CMOs into collective management in South Africa is linked to the history 
behind the legal recognition of needletime rights in South Africa. In effect, the history 
of the regulatory framework for CMOs in South Africa will be incomplete without a 
mention of how needletime rights emerged in South Africa.   
Accordingly, the needletime right was originally recognised in the Imperial 
Copyright Act.43 However, it was not provided for under the 1965 Copyright Act.44 
According to Dean, the needletime right was proposed in the Bill from which the 1965 
Copyright Act was enacted. The proposal for the needletime right was, however, 
abandoned on the floor of parliament owing to the lobbying of the SABC, which was 
strongly opposed to the recognition of the right.45 However, an official report claimed 
that the removal of needletime rights from the 1965 Copyright Act was due ‘to the 
alleged existing abuse of rights and an intractable attitude of the record industry to 
agree to a reasonable royalty rate’.46 According to the official report, the SABC 
opposed the inclusion of the  needletime right on the ground that the promotional value 
of broadcasting was sufficient compensation instead of  royalties.47 On their part, the 
record industry believed that the promotional value of broadcasting should rather be 
taken into account when negotiating licenses.48 Whatever may be the reason, the effect 
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of the absence of the needletime right from the 1965 Copyright Act was that the owners 
of copyright in sound recordings could only enjoy mechanical rights.49 This situation 
persisted under the SA Copyright Act. Efforts to reintroduce the needletime right in 
1993 also failed.50 However, renewed attempts for reintroduction of the needletime 
right paid off in 2002 following the recommendations of the Music Industry Task Team 
(MITT). According to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), ‘lobbying by musicians, 
performers and the recording industry’51 was very instrumental to the reintroduction of 
needletime rights. 
The MITT was set up by the then Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology ‘in response to expression of problems within the music industry by 
musicians and their representative organisations’.52 After its hearings and deliberations, 
the MITT made several findings including that the copyright legislation, particularly 
with regards to needletime rights, was inadequate and outdated.53 It, therefore, 
recommended that the draft amendment by the Standing Committee on the Copyright 
Act (Standing committee) regarding needletime rights be implemented without delay.54 
It should be recalled that the Standing committee had in 1995 acted as a commission 
of enquiry, solicited public opinion on the reintroduction of needletime rights and 
recommended the draft amendment.55 The Copyright Amendment Act (CAA)56 and the 
Performers Protection Amendment Act, No 8 of 2002 (PPAA) were based on the draft 
amendment. Among others, the CAA substituted the initial s9 with the extant s9, and 
introduced ss9A and 39(cA) to the SA Copyright Act,57 while the PPAA introduced 
the extant s5 to the Performers Protection Act.58     
In addition to mechanical and rental rights, s9 SA Copyright Act recognises 
music producers’ needletime rights to broadcast, transmit through a diffusion service 
and communicate the sound recordings produced by them to the public (needletime 
rights). The section also confers exclusive rights on music producers to authorise any 
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person to carry out any of the aforementioned acts in respect of their sound recordings. 
In terms of s9A, no person is allowed to broadcast, transmit through a diffusion service 
or communicate a sound recording to the public without payment of royalty to the 
music producer, unless otherwise agreed. In the same vein, s5 Performers Protection 
Act recognises the right of performers to be remunerated for the broadcast, 
transmission through a diffusion service and communication to the public of a sound 
recording containing their performance.  
Further, ss9A SA Copyright Act and 5 Performers Protection Act require the 
amount of royalty payable to the music producer and the performer to be determined 
by agreement between the user of the sound recording, the music producer and/or the 
performer as the case may be; or between the user and the representative CMOs of the 
music producer and/or the performer as the case may be. Also, the SA Copyright Act 
and Performers Protection Act seem to recognise the practice in the music industry 
where performers authorise music producers to record their performances; and that 
pursuant to such authorisations, music producers may collect royalties from third 
parties using the sound recording embodying such performances. Thus, the SA 
Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act require royalties collected by music 
producers to be shared by the performer and the music producer. However, the 
performer’s and music producer’s share is to be determined by agreement between 
them or their respective CMOs.59  
The framers of the draft amendments that led to the CAA and PPAA probably 
recognised the danger of allowing CMOs to exist almost unregulated. Hence, they 
introduced s39(cA). That section empowered the Minister (of Trade and Industry)60 to 
make regulations ‘in consultation with the Minister of Finance, providing for the 
establishment, composition, funding and functions of [CMOs] contemplated in [s9A], 
and any other matter that it may be necessary or expedient to regulate for the proper 
functioning of such [CMOs]’. The CS Regulations, which will be examined in the 
course of this chapter, was made pursuant to this section.  
Being the CMOs contemplated under s9A, only needletime CMOs come under 
the regulatory framework provided by the CS Regulations.61 Those administering 
mechanical rights, performing rights in music, reprographic rights and audio-visual 
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rights (non-needletime CMOs) are not within the framework of the CS Regulations. 
However, they are subject to the scrutiny of the Copyright Tribunal in respect of 
licensing under chapter 3 SA Copyright Act and that of the CIPC under relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act. Further, after the introduction of the needletime right 
and the passage of the CS Regulations, it became apparent that sound recording 
producers and performers were not receiving their royalty as envisaged by the SA 
Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act. According to the CRC Report, the reason 
for this state of affairs was that the ‘legislation, which provided for a statutory licence 
in respect of needletime, did not adequately protect the rights owners, whose rights 
were made subject to the licence’.62 The foregoing motivated the CRC to recommend 
the enactment of a regulatory framework that covers all CMOs in South Africa, among 
others.63 The proposed amendment in clause 25 of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 
(CAB)64 is influenced by this recommendation.65 The proposed amendment will be 
discussed in more detail below. For ease of reference, and where necessary, a 
distinction will be made between the regulation of needletime and non-needletime 
CMOs under 4.5 below. To this end, and flowing from the discussion so far, CMOs in 
South Africa can be broadly classified into needletime and non-needletime CMOs. The 
new SAMPRA and IMPRA being needletime CMOs, while SAMRO, DALRO, 
CAPASSO, RAV, MPLC, and CCLI are non-needletime CMOs.	
 
4.4 Agencies regulating CMOs in South Africa  
The CIPC is established, as a juristic person to function as an organ of state within the 
public administration of South Africa,66 with the objective to ensure the efficient and 
effective registration of companies and IPRs; maintain accurate and up-to-date and 
relevant information concerning companies and IPRs, among others; promote 
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education and awareness of company and IP laws; and promote compliance with, and 
the efficient, effective and widest possible enforcement of, the Companies Act and IP 
laws, among others.67  
Pursuant to the foregoing powers, the CIPC supervises both needletime and 
non-needletime CMOs, in terms of relevant provisions of the SA Copyright Act, 
Performers Protection Act and the Companies Act generally.  However, and in addition 
to other relevant provisions of the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and 
the Companies Act, the CIPC applies specific provisions of s9A SA Copyright Act, s5 
Performers Protection Act and the CS Regulations only to non-needletime CMOs. The 
reason for this claim is not far-fetched. The CS Regulations is limited to needletime 
CMOs because s39cA, which empowers the Minister to make the regulation 
specifically refers to CMOs contemplated in s9A (needletime collecting societies). 
Further, since CMOs in South Africa are either non-profit companies or private 
companies (as shown in 4.2 above), the Companies Act apply to all CMOs on general 
issues relating to corporate governance, company formation, etc. Thus, the CIPC 
regulates all CMOs from the perspectives of corporate governance, and other general 
provisions of the SA Copyright Act, while its supervisory role on specific issues 
relating to collective management are limited to the CS Regulations which only apply 
to needletime CMOs.  
For instance, and in relation to all CMOs, the Commissioner of the CIPC acts 
as Registrar, and certifies the orders, of the Copyright Tribunal under the SA Copyright 
Act.68 Further, the Commissioner enforces relevant provisions of the Companies Act 
dealing with non-profit companies and private companies. Such relevant provisions of 
the Companies Act relate to incorporation, membership, accountability, company 
governance, winding-up, among others.69 However, regarding needletime CMOs 
specifically, the CS Regulations stipulates the responsibilities of the Registrar, who is 
also the Commissioner of the CIPC,70 to include general supervision, accreditation, 
																																								 																				
67 Companies Act, ss186 and 187; DTI ‘Presentation to the Subcommittee: Trade and Industry – 
Regulation of Collecting Societies’ (28 March 2018) 6 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2018/SubCommittee_Copyright.pdf, accessed 5 April 2018 
68 SA Copyright Act, s29(4) and (5). 
69 Companies Act, ss1, 8, 13, 30, 33, 34, part f of Chapter 2, 81(1)(f), and Schedule 1. 
70 SA Copyright Act, s1: ‘Registrar means the Commissioner appointed in terms of section 189 of the 
[Companies Act]’; CS Regulation, Regulation 1 defines the Registrar to mean ‘the Registrar of 
Copyright at the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO).’ Note that CIPRO 
is now defunct and replaced with CIPC under Companies Act, s189. Thus, Regulation 1 should be read 




renewal and withdrawal of accreditation of needletime CMOs; maintenance of the 
register of accredited needletime CMOs; and ensuring that needletime CMOs carry out 
their legal obligations. Other responsibilities of the Registrar in this regard are approval 
of needletime CMOs’ distribution plans; and attendance of annual or special general 
meetings of members of accredited needletime CMOs if invited. The Registrar is also 
empowered to receive an annual activity report from accredited needletime CMOs 
setting out information on their activities, financial records, among others as may be 
necessary to assess the degree of compliance of the needletime CMOs with the CS 
Regulations, the SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act. Further, the 
Registrar may apply to the court for relief against airing needletime CMOs and for an 
order placing such CMO under judicial management, winding-up or dissolving the 
CMO, among others.71  
The Competition Commission is another agency that may play a role in the 
regulation of CMOs in South Africa. The Competition Commission is established 
under the Competition Act.72 Among others,73 it is empowered to implement measures 
to increase market transparency; investigate and evaluate alleged restrictive horizontal 
and vertical practices,74 and abuse of dominant positions;75 control mergers;76 and grant 
or refuse applications for exemptions under the Competition Act.77 However, the 
supervision of CMOs by the Competition Commission would depend on whether 
CMOs are excluded from the application of the Competition Act78 or whether they fall 
under the category of undertakings that may be exempted under s10 of the Competition 
Act. Overall, the focus of this thesis is whether there is need to apply the Competition 
Act to CMOs at all. The answer to this question will depend on whether the SA 
Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and CS Regulations empower the CIPC to 
to address the CMOs’ competition law concerns. This issue will be resolved in the next 
																																								 																				
71 Regulations 3, 4, 8(5); Shapiro v SARRAL supra note 12. 
72 Competition Act, ss19 and 20. 
73 Competition Act, s21. 
74 Competition Act, ss4 and 5. 
75 Competition Act, Chapter 2, Part B. 
76 Competition Act, s3. The section excludes certain undertakings, including concerted conducts 
designed to achieve a non-commercial socio-economic objective or similar purpose, from the 
Competition Act’s ambit. Given the role of collecting societies, it appears they may be excluded from 
the Competition Act. However, similar provision under the TFEU (Article 106(2)) has been interpreted 
otherwise by the CJEU in OSA v Lecebne Lazne, unreported Case C-351/12, para.81(27 February 
2014).  
77 Competition Act, s10. 




chapter. For now, the general perception appears to be that the Competition Act is 
applicable to CMOs in principle,79 although the reality is that only the SA Copyright 
Act, Performers Protection Act and CS Regulations have been applied to CMOs in 
practice. Thus, the remainder part of this chapter will largely focus on the provisions 
of the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and CS Regulations. Provisions of 
the Companies Act will only be examined as they become relevant.  	
4.5 Current regulation of CMOs  
The discussion in this part is divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-section 
focuses on the regulation of needletime CMOs, while the second relates to non-
needletime CMOs. In this regard, the first two sub-sections generally address issues 
regarding accreditation and the permissible number of CMOs; the relationship between 
CMOs and copyright owners (their members); and the relationship between CMOs and 
users of copyright works under the current regulatory framework. The relationship 
between CMOs under the regulation regime is discussed in the third sub-section 
generally. The fourth and fifth sub-sections then examines provisions relating to the 
internal management, transparency and accountability of all CMOs, and dispute 
resolution in collective management generally.  
 
4.5.1 Regulation of needletime CMOs 
This sub-section examines the provisions of the CS Regulations. As now already over-
flogged, the CS Regulations only applies to needletime CMOs. Thus, the discussions 
here focus only on needletime CMOs. However, it is important to state at the outset 
that the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and CS Regulations, as well as 
the Companies Act, are silent on the issue of CMOs’ legal form. In other words, CMOs 
(needletime and non-needletime) in South Africa are generally not expressly required 
																																								 																				
79 For instance, an attempt at applying competition law principles to royalty dispute between a 
collecting society and a user of sound recording was rejected by the SCA as follows: ‘It is quite clear, 
however, that at no stage during the lengthy proceedings before the [Copyright Tribunal] were 
principles of competition law referred to, or applied. The evidence led by the parties did not have as its 
objective the proof of any principles of competition law. If from the outset the dispute between the 
parties had been framed in the context of competition law principles, there is ground for thinking that 
further, or other, evidence, would have been produced by the parties. The issue was not investigated or 
canvassed before the [Copyright Tribunal]. To apply these principles now would alter the whole basis 
upon which the parties approached and dealt with the central dispute between them.’ SAMPRA v 
Foschini supra note 42, para 5; J Hofman and T Schonwetter ‘International agreements, national fair 
use legislation and copyright royalty collection agents’ (2006) available at 




to adopt any particular legal form. It should be noted that CMOs are generally non-
profit organisations and unless required by law they can take any other form such as 
limited liability companies or partnerships, amongst others. Indeed, as shown in 4.2 
above, most of the CMOs in South Africa are non-profit companies, while some are 
private companies. Therefore, any organisation intending to act as a needletime or non-
needletime CMO would be at liberty to choose any legal form. However, such 
organisation would need to comply with the provisions of the Companies Act relating 
to formation of companies generally.80 	
4.5.1.1 Accreditation to operate as needletime CMO  
The CS Regulations empower the Registrar to accredit any person or licensing body 
interested in functioning as a CMO on behalf of fifty or more music producers (or an 
organisation representing them), or fifty or more performers (or an organisation 
representing them), either jointly or separately.81 Such person or licensing body must 
apply in writing to the Registrar who may consult any person or institution before 
granting or refusing the application.82 The requirements for the grant of accreditation 
are –83 
• the applicant is capable of ensuring adequate, efficient and effective 
administration of the rights to be entrusted to it.  
• the applicant’s membership is open to all rights owners (or their association) 
of the class of rights the applicant intends to administer. 
• the applicant affords its members the right and opportunity to take part in the 
decision-making process relating to the applicant’s affairs, the administration 
of rights and distribution of royalties. 
• the applicant is capable of complying with its obligations under the CS 
Regulations. 
• the managers and members of the governing body are largely South Africans 
or permanent residents and are fit and proper persons to act in the capacity. 
• the applicant’s place of business is situated in South Africa.  
																																								 																				
80 Companies Act, ss8, 10, Chapter 2 (parts A and B), and Schedule 1. 
81 Regulation 3(1). 
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• the accreditation will not undermine or diminish the adequate, efficient and 
effective administration of rights by an already established and accredited 
needletime CMO. 
If the above requirements are satisfied, the Registrar is enjoined to grant the 
accreditation.84 But where the requirements are not met, the Registrar has two options. 
First, he/she may provisionally refuse accreditation, if, in his/her opinion, the applicant 
may modify and/or supplement the application to meet the requirements. Where this is 
the case, the Registrar is expected, within 30 days of notifying the applicant of the 
provisional refusal, to furnish the applicant with reasons for same.85 The Registrar is 
also required to give the applicant a further period of not less than 30 days to modify 
and/or supplement the application, after which the Registrar may grant or refuse the 
application depending on whether or not the conditions for accreditation are met.86 
Secondly, the Registrar may refuse an application outright from the outset if the 
applicant does not satisfy the above conditions. In such cases, the Registrar is obligated, 
within 30 days of the refusal, to furnish the applicant with reasons in writing.87 
 The Registrar has exercised the accreditation powers in the past. The defunct 
SARRAL was the first CMO to be accredited under the CS Regulations. SARRAL was 
accredited in March 2007.88 SARRAL’s accreditation was questionable because it 
came at a time when there was a pending winding-up petition against SARRAL.89 
According to Baloyi and Pistorius, SARRAL  ‘used the accreditation to persuade the 
court not to liquidate it’.90 In fact, SARRAL’s counsel had contended in court that 
‘accreditation could not have been granted unless the Registrar was satisfied that 
[SARRAL] was able to ensure adequate, efficient and effective administration of the 
rights entrusted to it’.91 This argument did not impress the court, which held through 
Burochowitz J:  
‘There is no dispute that the main or principal business of [SARRAL] pertains to the 
collection of mechanical royalties in respect of mechanical reproductions of 
composers’ works and not needletime royalties. The Registrar has no powers or rights 
																																								 																				
84 Regulation 3(4)(a). 
85 Regulation 3(4)(b). 
86 Regulation 3(4)(d). 
87 Regulation 3(4)(c). 
88 Baloyi and Pistorius op cit note 1 at 396. 
89 Shapiro v SARRAL supra note 12. 
90 Baloyi and Pistorius op cit note 1. 




to regulate or to seek to regulate [SARRAL]’s non-needletime royalty collections.’92 
(emphasis mine) 
 
The part of the above pronouncement highlighted in italics needs to be carefully 
scrutinised. It may mean that the Registrar cannot regulate non-needletime CMOs. 
However, as canvassed in 4.4 above, the Registrar, who is also the Commissioner of 
CIPC, has general powers to supervise all CMOs in South Africa. The Registrar’s 
supervisory powers relating to needletime CMOs is governed by the provisions of the 
SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and CS Regulations, as well as relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act. The non-needletime CMOs are subject to the powers 
of the Registrar under the Companies Act, SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection 
Act, excluding the CS Regulations. Granted, non-needletime CMOs do not require 
accreditation. It is submitted, however, that the Registrar can regulate their royalty 
collections, among others, for instance by issuing a notice requiring a the non-
needletime CMO to comply with the terms of its constitutive documents. The Registrar 
may then apply for winding up if the grounds contemplated in the Companies Act 
occur.93   
 Overall, the court found instances of mismanagement, lack of transparency, 
accountability and probity in the dealings of SARRAL regarding the administration of 
its members’ mechanical rights.94 Consequently, SARRAL was wound-up and its 
application for leave to appeal against the winding-up order was refused.95 The 
Registrar eventually withdrew SARRAL’s accreditation in 2010.96 The court’s 
decision seemed to further strengthen the CRC’s statement that  
‘in accrediting [needletime CMOs], the level of compliance was less than satisfactory. 
The most concerning case is in respect of SARRAL, which was accredited despite the 
fact that it had received a qualified audit report for the three consecutive years, had 
failed to comply with the [Companies Act] with regard the issuance of the audited 
financial statements, and had a pending case about its financial status. The lesson 
arising from this saga is that a comprehensive investigation is required before any 
accreditation process can be concluded.’97 
   
SAMPRA was the second CMO to be accredited under the CS Regulations. It 
was accredited in June 2007.98 However, it appears SAMPRA applied for renewal in 
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93 Companies Act, s81(1)(f). 
94 Shapiro v SARRAL supra note 12 at 33-45. 
95 Gilfillan op cit note 10 at 17. 
96 DTI op cit note 7 at 43. 
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2012 which was provisionally refused in July of the same year.99 This may not be 
unconnected to the then raging controversy on the distribution of royalty between 
music producers (represented by SAMPRA) and performers (represented by 
SAMRO).100  
The main issue concerned the exact share of the royalties for music producers 
and performers and who was to collect the performers share. SAMRO’s stand was that 
the share should be equal (50/50) between the performers and the music producers. 
Also, that it is entitled to collect the performers’ share from SAMPRA and distribute 
accordingly. On the other hand, SAMPRA held the position that it was obligated to pay 
the needletime royalties to music producers who would determine the performers share 
and pay them the royalty less any advances paid to them in terms of their recording 
agreement.101 The Registrar shared SAMRO’s view and indeed refused to approve the 
distribution plan submitted by SAMPRA. According to Baloyi and Pistorius, the issue 
led the Registrar into ‘threatening to terminate SAMPRA’s accreditation as a CMO, 
prompting SAMPRA to institute legal proceedings against the Registrar and SAMRO 
to have the Registrar’s decision reversed’.102 SAMPRA was eventually accredited in 
October 2012 and again in 2014.103  
 The next CMO to be accredited was SAMRO in 2008.104 SAMRO was 
accredited in respect of its performer members that comprised the Performers 
Organisation of South Africa (POSA) Trust, an arm of the new SAMPRA. Following 
this, IMPRA was accredited in August 2015.105 In view of Regulation 3(3)(g) of the 
CS Regulations and the accreditation of SAMPRA (note the discussion on the new 
SAMPRA above), it is doubtful whether the Registrar acted in compliance with the CS 
regulations in accrediting IMPRA. Regulation 3(3)(g) will be examined shortly.  
																																								 																				
99 GN No. 577, GG No. 35530 of 19 July 2012. 
100 N Matzukis ‘The Great South African Needletime Debacle’ (2012) available at 
http://www.posatrust.org.za/downloads/2012-05-26/Nick-Matzukis-Presentation.pdf, accessed on 21 
September 2017. 
101 Ibid. 
102 SAMPRA v Kadi Petje & Ors. unreported case no 9085/2010. The case was eventually withdrawn 
prompting SAMRO to institute SAMRO v SAMPRA & Ors. unreported case no 42008/13 for an interim 
interdict preventing SAMPRA from distributing its royalties. This case was also withdrawn following 
agreement between SAMPRA and SAMRO to end the conflict: Baloyi and Pistorius op cit note 1 at 
381, fn 66. 
103 GN No. R. 848, GG No. 35791 of 19 October 2012; GN Nos. 1068 and 1069, GG No. 38232 of 28 
November 2014. 
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Accreditations granted under the CS Regulations have a five-year lifespan, 
renewable every five years for another five years. CMOs have to apply for such renewal 
six months prior to the expiry of the initial accreditation. The renewal is not automatic: 
the Registrar still has to satisfy himself/herself that the requirements stated above have 
been fulfilled.106 When/if the CAB is enacted, the five-year lifespan will apply to all 
CMOs in terms of the proposed s 22B(5) of the CAB. Relevant proposals in the CAB 
will be discussed in 4.6 below.  
 The CS Regulations empowers the Registrar to withdraw an accreditation 
earlier granted. However, the Registrar must notify the CMO and state the reasons for 
such withdrawal. The situations that can lead to withdrawal of accreditation are –107  
• failure to disclose material facts at the point of application that may lead refusal 
of the application; 
• the Registrar becoming aware of unknown facts at the time of accreditation or 
subsequent occurrences, which would have constituted a ground for refusal of 
the application and which could have been irremediable;  
• In the Registrar’s opinion, the collecting society fails to comply with its 
obligations under the CS Regulations and ignores directions by the Registrar 
regarding the infractions; 
• A liquidation order has been issued against the CMO.108  
To prevent arbitrariness, the Registrar’s powers to grant, renew and withdraw 
accreditation under the CS Regulations are subject to judicial review at the Gauteng 
Division of the High Court of South Africa.109   
The CS Regulations does not stipulate the effect of the Registrar’s refusal to 
accredit a needletime CMO. It also does not proscribe such CMO. As will be shown in 
4.6 below, the proposed s22B of the CAB – which is largely similar to regulation 3 and 
which would apply to all CMOs if passed into law – does not take care of the situation 
either.110 The sanctions prescribed in regulation 4(4) (to be discussed shortly) applies 
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108 SARRAL’s accreditation was withdrawn in 2010 owing to the liquidation order issued against it in 
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only to accredited needletime CMOs. It seems that an unaccredited needletime CMO 
may continue to exist legally outside the supervision of the Registrar like other non-
needletime CMOs. Upon incorporation, CMOs become juristic persons – with other 
attributes conferred by incorporation – which exist in perpetuity until their name is 
removed from the companies register under the Companies Act.111 Refusal of 
accreditation to operate as a CMO is not a ground upon which the CIPC may apply to 
court for winding-up of a company. Since the Registrar cannot supervise such 
unaccredited needletime CMO in terms of the CS Regulations, it is arguable that he 
would only apply for winding-up of the CMO if the situations highlighted in the 
Companies Act occur.112  
 
4.5.1.2 Number of needletime CMOs  
Although not expressly stated, there seems to be some indication in the CS Regulations 
as to the number of needletime CMOs that may be accredited for needletime rights. 
Regulation 3(3)(g) seems more apposite on the number of CMOs. It provides:  
‘The Registrar shall not grant accreditation to an applicant unless he or she is satisfied 
that – [...] the accreditation of the applicant does not conflict with, undermine or 
diminish the adequate, efficient, and effective administration of the right to receive 
payment of a royalty in terms of section 9A [SA Copyright Act] or section 5(1)(b) 
Performers Protection Act, as undertaken by a [CMO] already accredited and 
established under the [SA Copyright Act]’. 
 
Some points are deducible from the foregoing. The number of needletime 
CMOs to be accredited at any point in time is based on the discretion of the Registrar. 
Thus, if the Registrar already accredited one needletime CMO for performers, he/she 
may not accredit another unless he is satisfied that accrediting the other CMO will not 
undermine the smooth administration of performers’ needletime rights by the first 
accredited CMO. Similarly, if the Registrar already accredited one needletime CMO 
for music producers, he/she may not accredit another unless he/she is satisfied that 
accrediting the other CMO will not undermine the smooth administration of music 
producers’ needletime right by the first accredited CMO. Finally, if the Registrar 
already accredited one needletime CMO for music producers and performers jointly, 
he/she may not accredit another unless he/she is satisfied that accrediting the other 
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CMO will not undermine the smooth administration of the music producers and 
performers right by the first accredited CMO. 
As earlier noted, there are currently two needletime CMOs: the new SAMPRA 
and IMPRA. IMPRA was accredited later in time. The basis for accrediting the two 
CMOs is not clear. However, it seems accrediting one CMO for music producers and 
performers jointly would bring about a more efficient and effective administration of 
needletime rights. The squabble in the past between SAMRO and SAMPRA (alluded 
to in 4.5.1.1 above and 4.5.1.3(b) below) and its impact on royalty distribution should 
have weighed heavily in the mind of the Registrar when considering the application of 
IMPRA. The effect of having two CMOs for one right on the users (as discussed in the 
previous chapter) of sound recordings is another factor the Registrar should have 
considered. Further, the Registrar should have been persuaded by the recommendation 
of the CRC in respect of ‘one society one right’, especially since IMPRA’s application 
was considered at a time when SAMRO and SAMPRA were negotiating a single 
platform for administration of their needletime rights. The CRC’s recommendation 
influenced relevant proposals in the CAB examined 4.6 below. 
  
4.5.1.3 Relationship between needletime CMOs and copyright owners  
The discussion that follows focuses on how the relationship between needletime CMOs 
and their members are regulated.  
 
a. Membership of needletime CMOs  
Primarily, the relationship between needletime CMOs and their members is defined by 
their constitutive documents (memorandum of incorporation – MOI – and other 
company rules), which must comply with the CS Regulations and relevant provisions 
of the Companies Act.  The two needletime CMOs (SAMPRA and IMPRA) are non-
profit companies. A non-profit company is a company incorporated for a public benefit 
or for an object relating to one or more cultural or social activities, or communal or 
group interest; and whose income and property are not distributable to its incorporators, 
members, directors or persons related to any of them, except ‘as a payment in respect 
of any rights of that person, to the extent that such right are administered by the 
company in order to advance a stated object of the company’, among others.113 As such, 
																																								 																				




they are generally not required to have members, except where their MOI provides 
otherwise.114 However, where their MOI requires them to have members, membership 
shall not be restricted or regulated in such a way that amounts to unfair discrimination 
on grounds of sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, religion, among 
others.115 Indeed, all members must be treated equally in terms of rights administration. 
Also, the MOI may allow membership to be held by juristic persons, including profit 
companies.116 Such juristic persons or profit companies should be those representing 
the class of right holders falling within the repertoire of the needletime CMOs.  
The CS Regulations specifically requires membership of needletime CMOs to 
be open to persons falling within the class of right holders represented by the CMOs, 
either directly or through an organisation of the class of right holders.117  An additional 
equality standard is provided for needletime CMOs composed of music producers and 
performers. The CS Regulations require the governing structure of such CMOs to 
provide for equal representation of the music producers and performers in the decision-
making process of the highest executive organ and the general assembly of the 
CMOs.118  Further, the CS Regulations preserves the rights, remedies and reliefs that 
members of needletime CMOs are entitled to under their membership agreement, the 
common law or any statute governing the CMOs.119 
The CS Regulations is silent on whether needletime CMOs may classify their 
members into voting and non-voting. It simply confers voting rights on each member 
of needletime CMOs with the effect that all members of needletime CMOs must be 
voting members.120 However, it is submitted that the CS Regulations must be read 
subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, which is the specific legislation that 
defines the form, and the content of MOIs, of legal entities. Under the Companies Act, 
a needletime CMO’s MOI may provide for two classes of members – voting and non-
voting members – and must stipulate the qualification for membership; the process of 
applying for membership; any initial or periodic cost of membership in any class; the 
grounds on which membership may cease or be suspended; and the rights and 
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obligations of membership in any class.121 Each voting members of needletime CMOs 
are entitled to one vote, and except otherwise provided by the MOI, the vote of every 
member is equal in value on any matter to be determined by vote in the CMO.122 
Therefore, the voting rights referred to in the CS Regulations would be exercisable by 
a voting member where the needletime CMO has two classes of members in terms of 
the Companies Act. Where the needletime CMO does not classify its membership into 
voting and non-voting, then the voting rights would be exercisable by all members. In 
addition, the members of needletime CMOs are entitled to obtain the CMOs’ annual 
statement of account, auditors’ reports, list of members of the governing council, 
among others.123 
Further, under the Companies Act, needletime CMOs, as non-profit companies, 
are prohibited from presuming the membership of any person; regarding any person as 
their member; or providing automatic membership of any person on any basis other 
than life-time membership awarded to a person for service to the collecting society and 
with the consent of the person.124 Finally, such CMOs are required to maintain a 
membership register.125  
 
b. Royalty distribution of needletime CMOs 
As gleaned from discussions in chapter two, one of the main roles of CMOs is the 
distribution of royalties among its members. Indeed, South African CMOs’ 
effectiveness and efficiency have been gauged on the basis of the frequency and size 
of their royalty distribution among others.126 The discussion in this sub-section is 
important in view of a recent report which alleged some impropriety on the royalty 
distribution practice of a CMO, such as ‘unlawful deductions from mostly black 
songwriters to benefit mostly corporate record company interests’ and non-remittal of 
royalties to members.127 However, the aim here is basically to examine the provisions 
of the CS Regulations on royalty distribution by needletime CMOs. That of non-
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needletime CMOs will be examined in 4.5.2 below. Discussion of the level of 
compliance by CMOs is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The CS Regulations specifically governs the royalty distribution of needletime 
CMOs. That is not to say needletime CMOs are not subject to relevant provisions in 
the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and the Companies Act that relate to 
royalty distribution.  
Generally, the Companies Act requires all needletime CMOs as non-profit 
companies to apply all their assets and income to advancing their objectives. They are 
prohibited from directly or indirectly paying any portion of their income to their 
members except as payment of royalty in respect of the rights of that person 
administered by the CMO, among others.128 Arguably, this provision may be regarded 
as the foundation for the distribution rules of needletime CMOs, a discussion of which 
is beyond the present scope.129 It suffices to state that needletime CMOs are expected 
to distribute royalties among their members fairly and based on the actual usage of 
works,130 determined by usage data supplied by users or by sampling as the case may 
be. Even so, they are not expected to distribute all royalties collected to their members. 
As already noted in the previous chapters, CMOs are generally entitled to retain a 
certain percentage of royalties collected to cover their administrative costs. The drafters 
of the CAB recognised this point when they proposed a new s22C(2)(c), which will be 
examined in section 4.6 below.  
  Specifically, needletime CMOs’ royalty distribution is guided by s9A SA 
Copyright Act and s5 Performers Protection Act.131 By a combined reading of s9A(2) 
SA Copyright Act and s5(4) Performers Protection Act, a music producer who has been 
authorised by a performer to embody his performance in a sound recording is entitled 
to collect needletime royalties for such performance. However, the royalty collected 
must be shared between the music producer and the performer. The performer’s share 
is to be determined by an agreement between the music producer and the performer or 
between their respective CMOs. Failing such agreement, the music producer or 
performer may refer the matter to the Copyright Tribunal under the SA Copyright Act 
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or they may agree to submit to arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act, No. 42 of 
1965.  
 The foregoing provision was at the heart of the needletime royalty crises 
highlighted in 4.5.1.1 above. The crises would have been averted had the SA Copyright 
Act and Performers Protection Act provided the percentage share for performers. It 
appears the CS Regulations attempted to fill this lacuna. As one of the grounds for 
approval of a needletime CMO’s distribution plan, the distribution plan should state an 
equal share of collected royalties between music producers and performers. However, 
this provision applies only where a CMO represents both music producers and 
performers and in the absence of a sharing agreement to the contrary.132 Other grounds 
for approval of needletime CMOs’ distribution plan are:133 absence of arbitrary or 
discretionary distribution; and provision, subject to the CMOs’ highest executive 
organ, for not more than 10% of royalty for promotion of arts and culture and members 
welfare. The s9A being proposed in the CAB does not also fill this gap. The proposed 
section retained the provisions of the extant s9A in this regard, with a new clause to the 
effect that the ‘performer’s share of the royalty shall represent fair and equitable 
remuneration’.  
Further, needletime CMOs are obligated to distribute not less than 80% of 
collected royalty equitably among their members.134  The distribution must be done at 
least once a year with the first distribution done not later than 18 months from the initial 
accreditation. Thereafter, it should be done on the anniversary of the initial 
accreditation or renewal of accreditation.135 Importantly, the distribution must be done 
based on a distribution plan approved by the Registrar,136 which shall be applied ‘based 
on information publicly available, trade information available to [the CMOs’] members 
and on information to be furnished by individual user groups’.137 Needletime CMOs 
are allowed to retain not more than 20% of collected royalty to defray administrative 
costs. To this end, needletime CMOs are enjoined to administer rights effectively and 
efficiently; to maximise the economic exploitation of the rights; and not to generate or 
accumulate unneeded profits in their hands.138  
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The CS Regulations extended its reach to reciprocal agreements. It provides 
that ‘whenever desirable, or expedient, a [needletime CMO] shall enter into reciprocal 
agreements with foreign [CMO], and it shall administer the rights entrusted to it and 
shall distribute at least 80% of the money collected to its members’.139 This rule 
recognises the need for needletime CMOs to enter into reciprocal agreements for the 
benefit of local music producers and performers. However, the legal justification for 
seeking to regulate a reciprocal agreement is not clear. It seems to stem from the 
principle of reciprocity and national treatment encapsulated in s4 Performers Protection 
Act.140 But as rightly stated in the CRC Report, there are no ‘reciprocal agreements in 
the copyright regime between states; a state such as South Africa cannot direct how 
reciprocal agreements should be structured in terms of [s4]’.141 	
Finally, it should be pointed out that the SA Copyright Act, Performers 
Protection Act and CS Regulations do not stipulate how CMOs may handle the 
royalties collected on works belonging to non-members. As previously stated in 
chapter three, this is not the position in Nigeria. An example of how CMOs handle such 
royalty is found in the CRC report, as follows: 
‘SAMRO retains the unclaimed royalties, which include those in respect of 
undocumented works, for three years. Over the three-year period, attempts are made 
to trace the beneficiaries of the unclaimed monies. In the case of non-members, those 
who are successfully traced are asked to join SAMRO and paid their share of 
distributions. After three years, the unclaimed monies are written back to income and 
distributed to the members based on the normal distribution criteria.’142  
 
CMOs cannot make membership a criterion for payment of royalties to non-
members who were successfully traced. They are within their rights to deduct the 
prescribed administration cost from such royalties before remitting it to the non-
members. The money collected as royalty belongs to the copyright owners (members 
or not) and not the CMOs.143 Apart from this, SAMRO’s treatment of royalties 
unclaimed after the three-year period seems justified. However, as recommended by 
the CRC, there is need for legislative intervention in this regard. Such regulation should 
prescribe the minimum retention period for unclaimed royalties after which it ‘should 
only be used for social-related activities and cultural projects that will benefit local 
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artists’.144 Sadly, the CAB does not propose any specific provision in this regard. 
However, there are some general provisions being proposed in the CAB, discussed in 
4.6 below, that may be of relevance to this issue.  
 
4.5.1.4 Relationship between needletime CMOs and users  
The discussions here focus on how the licensing practice and tariff setting of 
needletime CMOs are regulated. These issues are not covered by the Companies Act. 
They are dealt with by the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and largely 
by the CS Regulations.  
  The SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act lay the foundation for 
the licensing practice of needletime CMOs. Under these laws, users of sound 
recordings have an option to negotiate needletime royalties with the CMOs 
representing music producers and performers either jointly or separately; or with the 
music producers and/or performers directly. Whatever may be the case, payment of 
needletime royalty to the music producers’ CMO discharges users of the obligation of 
paying to performers’ CMO. In the same vein, payment of needletime royalty to 
performers’ CMO discharges users of the obligation of paying music producers’ 
CMO.145 In essence, the amount payable as royalty must be determined by agreement 
between the parties.146 Failing such agreements, the user or CMO involved may refer 
the matter to the Copyright Tribunal or both parties may agree to submit the matter to 
arbitration.147  
 For the purpose of such negotiations, needletime CMOs are obligated to make 
their complete repertoire available on non-discriminatory terms to prospective users.148 
This may not be interpreted to mean that needletime CMOs cannot negotiate different 
licensing terms with different user groups. Rather, it means that they cannot 
discriminate among users of the same group.149 This is because, needletime CMOs may 
enter into different framework agreements with different user groups for the use of 
works in their repertoire by potential users. They may also enter into non-exclusive 
licensing agreements with individual users or user groups.150 A framework agreement 
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is defined as a licensing agreement between a CMO and a user group fixing the terms 
and conditions of use of the repertoire of the CMO. Also, it can be regarded as an 
agreement between the CMO and a user group setting common standards and providing 
a uniform basis for the conclusion of individual agreements between the CMO and 
individual members of the user group.151 
To prevent arbitrariness, the CS Regulations further enjoins needletime CMOs to 
negotiate tariffs, among other terms, as part of framework agreements with user groups, 
or non-exclusive license with individual users as the case may be. Tariffs serve as the 
basis for determining the amount and manner of payment of royalty for particular use 
of a work.152  Tariffs negotiated between needletime CMOs and any user group is 
expected to be jointly submitted to the Registrar for publication in the gazette and the 
South African Intellectual Property Journal (SAIPJ).153 Needletime CMOs are 
obligated to grant a license to individual users, within a user group, who assume 
responsibility to pay royalties in terms of the published tariff.154 However, appropriate 
application may be made to the Copyright Tribunal, by the user group or individual 
user who disputes the applicability of a tariff proposed by a needletime CMO. Another 
option is for the matter to be referred to arbitration by both parties.155 Pending 
determination of such application or referral, the user group or individual user has the 
option of paying the royalty amount proposed by the needletime CMO into an escrow 
account and furnish the CMO with the usage information for later distribution of the 
funds in the escrow to rights owners. Such a user will then be entitled to use the work 
in issue pending determination of the application.156 This option is enforceable by the 
needletime CMOs through an application to the Copyright Tribunal for a ruling in that 
regard.157  
The CRC expressed its dissatisfaction with the provisions of the CS Regulations 
relating to escrow accounts because moneys paid into the escrow accounts by users 
cannot be distributed until after resolution of the tariff in dispute and that users may be 
obliged to pay unreasonably large sums into the account even when the matter is 
																																								 																				
151 Regulation 1. 
152 Regulation 7(3). 
153 Regulation 7(4) 
154 Ibid. 
155 Regulation 7(5). 
156 Ibid. 




subjudiced.158 But, this writer believes that the provisions are based on pragmatic 
considerations. It in tune with the realities of the manner in which sound recordings are 
broadcasted. According to Karjiker and Jooste, the ‘reality is that broadcasters would, 
almost invariably, broadcast sound recordings of copyright owners whose works are 
managed by a CMO’.159 Thus, the provision on the use of escrow accounts is a win-
win situation for both the CMOs and the user. The user is allowed to use the work 
pending resolution of the dispute, while the CMOs are assured of getting their royalties 
at the end. In any case, the royalties proposed by the CMO, which is paid into the 
escrow account by the user, may be reduced by the Copyright Tribunal or the arbitrator 
at the end. One observable flaw in the CS Regulations, however, is its silence on 
treatment of the interest accruing to the money in the escrow account.  
The SCA recently considered tariff setting by needletime CMOs in two cases. 
The first case – NAB v SAMPRA,160 was an appeal (by NAB) and cross appeal (by 
SAMPRA) from the Copyright Tribunal. Apart from determining a reasonable royalty 
rate, the SCA had to consider issues relating to the Copyright Tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
the procedure to be adopted by the Copyright Tribunal in such cases and whether the 
Copyright Tribunal is empowered to determine the date from which royalty became 
due. In focus now is the issue of reasonable royalty and how it was determined by the 
SCA.  
The fact of the case is that SAMPRA referred a royalty dispute in terms of s9A 
SA Copyright Act to the Copyright Tribunal on the bases of its proposed formula which 
was disputed by NAB. In summary, SAMPRA’s formula would lead to a needletime 
royalty of a maximum of 10% of a radio station’s revenue, with the percentage 
decreasing depending on the extent of usage of sound recording by the radio station. 
On its part, NAB proposed a formula which will lead to a needletime royalty of a little 
over 1% of a broadcaster’s revenue. The Copyright Tribunal, per Sapire AJ, found the 
expert evidence from both parties unhelpful and instead decided the matter based on 
value judgment. The Copyright Tribunal based its assessment ‘on the limited 
information available’,161 but which will ‘result in an equitable reward to the referrer’s 
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clients, while not imposing an unaffordable burden on the broadcasters.’162 The 
Copyright Tribunal then slightly adjusted SAMPRA’s proposed formula and developed 
a formula that will result in a needletime royalty of a maximum of 7% of a broadcaster’s 
revenue, with the percentage decreasing depending on the extent of usage of sound 
recording by the radio station.     
The SCA dismissed SAMPRA’s cross appeal, set aside the formula developed by 
the Copyright Tribunal and substituted it with a formula, which brought needletime 
royalty to a maximum of 3% of a broadcaster’s revenue. In so doing, the SCA preferred 
a simple formula to a formula that is ‘complex and susceptible to disputes’ (NAB’s 
formula).163 Thus, it rejected audience reach, as well as profitability of a broadcaster as 
factors to consider when determining royalty rates. The SCA took the view that 
although broadcasters’ audience is desirable as a factor to be considered, the difficulty 
of valuing an audience in terms of money should be kept in mind.164 An attempt by 
SAMPRA to appeal against the SCA judgement failed as its application for leave to 
appeal was dismissed by the Constitutional Court (CC).165 
The SCA held that the Copyright Tribunal’s determination of reasonable royalty 
was done without reference to crucial evidence and relevant factors. Hence, the 
discretion conferred on the Copyright Tribunal to determine royalty disputes and fix a 
royalty that is reasonable in the circumstance is not unfettered. It must be exercised on 
the bases of relevant factors determined by evidence.166 The SCA stipulated several 
factors that should be considered when determining needletime royalty rates for 
broadcasters. 
According to the SCA, the revenue of the broadcaster as contained in the 
broadcaster’s financial statement and the extensive regulation of the broadcasting 
industry are important factors to be considered.167 Further, the editorial content 
including programme promotions and other contents such as charity drives or 
competition, but excluding advertisement should be considered.168 Another factor that 
should be considered is the royalty rate for music composers. The SCA was of the view 
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that needletime royalty rate should be lower than that of music composers because they 
are arguably the key component in music production. The SCA took cognisance of 
SAMRO’s royalty rate, which stood at 3.25% of broadcasters’ revenue.169 
Furthermore, the SCA regarded the financial implication of needletime royalty 
rates in South Africa as an important factor to be considered. In considering this factor, 
the Copyright Tribunal is expected to bear in mind the need not to drive broadcasters 
into using alternative music of session musicians to the detriment of the record industry 
and that most of the royalty collected by SAMPRA are exported to the US.170 
Moreover, according to the SCA, it is important to consider the royalty rates in 
countries at similar developmental level as South Africa, without losing sight of local 
circumstances. The SCA considered the rate of needletime royalties in some countries 
that qualified as both developed and developing. It found that six developed countries 
have a rate of more than 5% while two others have a rate of more than 6%. Particularly, 
the SCA found that ‘India, which is probably the more closely comparable country, 
charges between one and two per cent of total revenue’.171 
Finally, the SCA did not rule on the issue of when royalty becomes payable. It 
only noted that the Copyright Tribunal does not have the power to determine such 
issues. In this regard, the SCA stated that ‘[...] there are a number of issues that impact 
on the question of the date from which royalties become due including, but not limited 
to, prescription and claims for unlawful breach of copyright. Questions concerning the 
application and enforceability of the provisions of the [SA Copyright Act] also come 
into play’.172  
The second case – SAMPRA v Foschini,173 was also an appeal from the Copyright 
Tribunal.174 The case before the Copyright Tribunal was based on a referral by 
Foschini, a South African clothing retail company, owing to its disagreement with the 
needletime tariff proposed by SAMPRA in respect of broadcast of sound recordings 
through diffusion service in its retail stores. SAMPRA proposed a royalty on a tariff of 
R500 per annum for every 50square meter (sqm) of audible area, with audible areas 
defined as the total area in which the ‘publicly performed sound recording’ can be heard 
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in Foschini’s premises.175 Through its expert witness, Foschini compared SAMPRA’s 
proposed tariff with that of the Phonographic Performance Company of Australia 
(PPCA) using the purchasing power parity (PPP) between the South African Rands and 
the Australian Dollar.  It then proposed the Rand equivalent of the PPCA’s tariff stating 
that ‘it is closer to the efficient market rate’ than SAMPRA’s tariff.176 Accordingly, 
Foschini proposed a tariff R279.46 for every 50sqm. In its ruling, the Copyright 
Tribunal – per Phatudi J – ‘determined that in the circumstances a reasonable tariff lay 
somewhere between the respective’ proposed tariffs.177 It, therefore, ordered a tariff 
that was above Foschini’s but less than SAMPRA’s.178  
The SCA set aside the Copyright Tribunal’s tariff and ordered a tariff set at R150 
per annum of every 50sqm of audible area.179 The issues for determination by the SCA 
related to the Copyright Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the onus of proof on the party referring 
a royalty dispute to the Copyright Tribunal, the amount of evidence required at the 
Copyright Tribunal and a reasonable tariff in the circumstance.180  On the issue of 
reasonable tariff, which is in focus here, the SCA deduced three possible methods of 
determining royalty tariffs from the parties’ expert evidence.  
First is the determination of the Rand value that playing the sound recording adds 
to Foschini’s revenue. The SCA rejected this method since a study of the value of music 
to retail stores has never been undertaken because of the difficulties that it would pose. 
Apart from confidentiality implication on Foschini’s business, such ‘study would be 
prohibitively expensive and impractical as it would take too long to complete. In 
addition, it cannot be said that the conclusion reached could be applied to all the 
retailers’.181 The other method is the ‘market-based solution’ which means leaving 
tariff to be determined by the forces of demand and supply that would eventually push 
the tariff to an optimum rate. This method was also rejected because the SA Copyright 
Act and Performers Protection Act preclude market forces from determining tariff 
rates, but empowers the Copyright Tribunal to determine such issues.182  
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The last method is the comparison of proposed tariff with those from foreign 
jurisdictions. The SCA had no difficulty in accepting this method because this method 
prevents economic arbitrariness in tariff setting and because it had earlier accepted such 
method in NAB v SAMPRA.183 Further, the SCA accepted Foschini’s unchallenged 
expert opinion that in carrying out such comparison, the PPP comparison is more 
appropriate as it accords more with local income levels, it is fair and would better 
maximise the welfare of local consumers.184 The SCA’s position in this regard cannot 
be faulted. And it finds support in a recent decision of the CJEU.185  
The CJEU’s decision was based on a referral from the administrative division of 
the Supreme Court of Latvia flowing from a decision of its Competition Council 
(LCC), which imposed a fine on the Consulting Agency on Copyright and 
Communications/Latvian Authors’ Association, Latvia (AKKA/LAA)186 for abuse of 
dominant position. AKKA/LAA is the only CMO administering rights in musical, 
dramatic, literary, artistic and audio-visual works in Latvia.187 The fine relates to the 
royalty rate being collected by AKKA/LAA for public performance of music in shops 
and other service areas among others. The LCC regarded the rate as excessively high. 
The referral was based on art.102 of TFEU. One of the issues determined by the CJEU 
was how to determine fairness of price under art.102 TFEU and whether it is 
appropriate to make comparison with foreign countries for this purpose. Although the 
case was decided on principles of competition law applicable to CMOs, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the CJEU’s decision on the issue is relevant here since it 
gives some insights on how royalty rates in circumstances similar to the SAMPRA v 
Foschini case may be determined.  According to the CJEU,  
‘for the purposes of examining whether a [CMO] applies unfair prices [...] it is 
appropriate to compare its rates with those applicable in neighbouring [countries] as well 
as with those applicable in other [countries] adjusted in accordance with the PPP index, 
provided that the reference [countries] have been selected in accordance with objective, 
appropriate and verifiable criteria and that the comparisons are made on a consistent 
basis. It is permissible to compare the rates charged in one or several specific user 
segments if there are indications that the excessive nature of the fees affects those 
segments’.188  
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In the CJEU’s view, ‘objective, appropriate and verifiable criteria’ may include 
‘consumption habits and other economic and sociocultural factors, such as gross 
domestic product per capita and cultural and historical heritage’.189 That being said, the 
SCA, in SAMPRA v Foschini also took cognisance of the benefit to users in having to 
deal with one CMO and not several; and the promotional benefit to music producers of 
having their music played in retailers’ stores. Even so, the SCA seemed to regard these 
factors as insignificant in determining reasonable needletime tariff.190	
4.5.2 Regulation of non-needletime CMOs 
This sub-heading, examines the regulation of non-needletime collecting societies, 
which include SAMRO, DALRO, CAPASSO, MPLC, CCLA and RAV. As is apparent 
from discussions so far, non-needletime CMOs are not within the ambit of the CS 
Regulations. However, the CIPC can supervise them under relevant provisions of the 
SA Copyright Act, the Performers Protection Act and the Companies Act. That being 
said, unlike needletime CMOs, non-needletime CMOs do not require accreditation 
from the CIPC to operate. Also, the SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act 
do not expressly prescribe the number of non-needletime CMOs that may operate for 
any given class of right or any particular right. In effect, the number of non-needletime 
CMOs administering any given class of non-needletime rights is unlimited. 
As non-profit and private companies, the relationship between non-needletime 
CMOs and their members are defined by their MOI and other company rules,191 in 
accordance with the Companies Act. SAMRO and CAPASSO are non-profit 
companies, while DALRO, MPLC and CCLI are private companies. Non-profit 
companies have already been defined in 4.5.1.3(a) above. Like members of needletime 
CMOs, the members of non-needletime CMOs that are non-profit companies can also 
enjoy the rights contained in sch.1, paras.1 and 4 of the Companies Act already 
examined in 4.5.1.3(a) above. Generally, non-needletime CMOs are required to have a 
membership register. They are prohibited from regulating their membership unfairly or 
in a manner that amounts to discrimination on grounds stated in 4.5.1.3(a) above. Also, 
they may allow membership to be held by juristic persons, including profit companies, 
which should represent the class of right holders falling within the repertoire of the 
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non-needletime CMOs.  Further, non-needletime CMOs’ MOI may provide for voting 
and non-voting members, and must stipulate the qualification for membership; the 
grounds on which membership may cease or be suspended; and the rights and 
obligations of their members, among others. Each voting members of non-needletime 
CMOs are entitled to one vote, and except otherwise provided by the MOI, the vote of 
every member is equal in value on any matter to be determined by vote in the CMO. 
Moreover, non-needletime CMOs are restrained from presuming the membership of 
any person; regarding any person as their member; or providing automatic membership 
of any person on any basis other than life-time membership awarded to a person for 
service to the CMO and with the consent of the person. On the other hand, a private 
company is a profit company, which is not state-owned and whose MOI restricts the 
transferability of its securities and prohibits it from offering its securities to the 
public.192 Generally, a private company is allowed to have one or a number of 
shareholder(s). A discussion of shareholders’ rights is beyond the scope of this work.193 
It suffices to state now that where a private company has only one shareholder, as in 
DALRO’s case, ‘that shareholder may exercise any or all of the voting rights pertaining 
to that company on any matter without notice or compliance with any other internal 
formalities’ except as otherwise stipulated by the company’s MOI.194 Such CMOs, as 
private companies, are required to maintain securities registers.195 
Further, it appears the royalty distribution of non-needletime CMOs will be 
subject to the relevant provisions of the Companies Act along with the rules stipulated 
in their constitutive documents, as approved by their members.196 Indeed, non-
needletime CMOs that are non-profit companies have similar duties like needletime 
CMOs under sch.1 para.3 of the Companies Act as discussed in 4.5.1.3(b) above. They 
are required to apply all their assets and income to advancing their objectives. Also, 
they are prohibited from directly or indirectly paying any portion of their income to 
their members except as payment of royalty in respect of the rights of that person 
administered by the CMO, among others. Like needletime CMOs, also, these duties 
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form the bases for the distribution rules of non-needletime CMOs that are non-profit 
companies. Examination of the distribution rules is beyond the scope of this thesis.197	
Regarding the relationship between non-needletime CMOs and users of 
copyright works, it is submitted that the licensing practice and tariff setting of non-
needletime CMOs are not without some form of regulation. Like needletime CMOs, 
they may also enter into licensing contracts with users.198 Such contracts are governed 
by s22 SA Copyright Act and s13 Performers Protection Act. In terms of s13 
Performance Protection Act, a performer may contract with any user interested in using 
his performance.  It appears such contract will be valid if executed through a CMO 
mandated by the performer. Similarly, s22 SA Copyright Act allows the transfer of 
copyright, either wholly or in part, by way of assignment, exclusive license, non-
exclusive license, among others. To be valid, assignments and exclusive licenses must 
be in writing and signed by the assignor or exclusive licensor, while non-exclusive 
licenses may be written, oral or implied. Specifically, exploitation of the copyright in 
a work by a user pursuant to a license issued by a CMO that has been mandated by 
owners of rights in the work would not be an infringement of copyright.199 Further, the 
licensing practice and tariff setting of non-needletime CMOs come under the 
supervision of the Copyright Tribunal in chapter 3 of the SA Copyright Act, as 
discussed in 4.5.5 below.	
4.5.3 Relationship among CMOs   
The point has been made in 4.5.1.3(b) above that South Africa cannot seek to regulate 
reciprocal agreements between local and foreign CMOs. However, the relationship 
among local CMOs may be regulated. Indeed, the need to regulate the relationship 
among CMOs is stronger in situations where two or more CMOs operate in the same 
field and market, as is the case with IMPRA and the new SAMPRA. In such 
circumstances, the aim of regulation will be to prevent collusion by such CMOs geared 
towards fixing high royalty rates. 
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Apart from the provisions requiring performers’ shares of needletime royalties to 
be determined by agreement between performers and music producers or between their 
respective CMOs, the relationship among CMOs seems unregulated under the SA 
Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act. The flaw in the provisions requiring 
sharing of royalty relating to needletime rights between CMOs representing performers 
and music producers respectively, and the problem it caused have been identified in 
section 4.5.1 above. As noted in section 4.5.3.2 above, the CS Regulation 8(5)(b), 
which proposes an equal share of needletime royalties between performers and music 
producers only applies when they are represented by a single CMO such as the new 
SAMPRA. Even so, it appears the Companies Act provides some form of blanket 
regulation relating to merger. Here, CMOs that are non-profit companies may not 
amalgamate or merge with a for-profit CMO. They may also not dispose of any part of 
their assets, undertaking or business to a for-profit CMO, except for fair value and to 
the extent that such disposition occurred in the ordinary course of the collective 
management activities.200  
 
4.5.4 Internal management, transparency and Accountability  
The demise of SARRAL, as already discussed earlier, is evidence of the need for 
regulation of CMOs in accordance with good governance principles. The findings of 
the CRC are further evidence: the CRC found issues relating to significant weakness 
in internal control, outdated constitutive documents, lack of internal audit, lack of 
independent directors, lack of issuance of audited financial statements and lack of 
publication of annual reports, among others being perpetrated by SAMRO, SAMPRA 
and the defunct SARRAL.201 
 As gleaned from the CRC report, the challenge is not total absence of 
regulation. It is largely a problem of compliance by CMOs and the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanisms under the regulatory framework. These informed the CRC’s 
recommendation that the CS Regulations be extended to all CMOs and that the CIPC 
be empowered to take-over the administration of a CMO conducting its affairs in a 
manner detrimental to the interests of copyright owners.202  
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The CS Regulations provisions aimed at ensuring good governance only applies 
to needletime CMOs. Specifically, needletime CMOs are required to always inform the 
Registrar in writing of their organisational structure, operational features, and changes 
in their legal representatives within 30 days of such change. In particular, they are 
obligated to furnish the Registrar with copies of their constitutive documents; any 
reciprocal agreements with foreign CMOs; changes to such documents and report 
stating the reason for such changes; and particulars of their auditors. Such CMOs are 
also bound to furnish the Registrar with their tariffs and any amendments thereto; 
annual and updated list of members and agreements with foreign CMOs; annual audited 
financial statements; and any document or report the Registrar may reasonably 
require.203  
The Registrar is empowered to grant a grace period of 30 to 90 days to a 
defaulting needletime CMO to comply with these obligations. However, in case of 
persistent failure, despite such grace period, the Registrar is empowered to withdraw 
the needletime CMO’s accreditation or apply for an appropriate relief including an 
order placing the CMO under judicial administration, winding-up or dissolution of the 
collecting society.204   
The foregoing does not preclude needletime CMOs from complying with 
relevant provisions of the Companies Act relating to internal management, 
transparency and accountability, especially where the CS Regulations is silent. In the 
same vein, non-needletime CMOs are subject to the principles of good governance 
under the Companies Act.205  
Overall, as private companies and non-profit companies, needletime and non-
needletime CMOs are bound by the good governance codes contained in the King IV 
Report.206 Although the codes are a ‘set of voluntary principles and leading practice’, 
a court will usually consider ‘all relevant circumstances in determining the appropriate 
standard of conducts for those charged with governance duties, including what the 
generally accepted practices for a particular setting and situation are’.207 Importantly, 
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besides taking cognisance of local and international best practices on corporate 
governance,208 the King IV Report elaborates on the corporate governance principles 
enshrined in the Companies Act. Thus, although the King IV Report (like King II and 
III Reports) is not law, ‘failure to comply with [it] may be an indication that the 
directors [of a CMO] are not acting in the best interest of the’209 CMO and in 
compliance with the Companies Act. Indeed, the corporate governance principle of 
social responsibility contained in the King II Report (built upon by King IV Report) 
has been applied by the courts.210  Moreover, the earlier King II and III Reports, which 
the King IV Report built upon, informed the CRC’s recommendations on corporate 
governance for CMOs.211  
Essentially, the King IV Report aims at promoting ‘ethical and effective 
leadership’ by governing boards of corporations with the objective to entrench ethical 
culture, good performance, effective control and legitimacy in corporate governance in 
South Africa.212 To this end, the King IV Report identifies four main governance roles 
and responsibilities of governing boards of corporations such as CMOs. Specifically, 
the governing boards are to steer and set strategic directions for CMOs regarding their 
strategy and the ‘way in which specific governance areas are to be approached, 
addressed and conducted’. Also, CMOs’ governing boards are to approve the policies 
and planning that give effect to their ‘strategy and the set directions’. Further, CMOs’ 
governing boards are to ensure accountability through adequate ‘reporting and 
disclosures’. The governing boards are to monitor and oversee the implementation by 
management of the CMOs’ policies and plans.213 The foregoing forms the basis for the 
specific principles and leading practices of corporate governance highlighted by King 
IV Report, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis.214 For now, 
it should be noted that, apart from the general corporate governance code, the King IV 
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Report contains specific sector supplements for non-profit organisations, among 
others.215  
To ensure compliance with these principles, the CRC made some 
recommendations, including amendment of the SA Copyright Act and Performers 
Protection Act to bring all ‘music-rights’ CMOs under the Registrar’s supervision; 
empowerment of the Registrar to take over the management of any CMO being 
mismanaged; and compulsory adherence of good governance principles by CMOs, 
among others.216 The CRC’s recommendation influenced the proposed ss22E and 22F 
of the CAB examined in section 4.6 below.  
   
4.5.5 Dispute Resolution  
The Copyright Tribunal is established under s29 of the SA Copyright Act. The 
Commissioner of patent under s8 of the Patent Acts, 1978 also sits as the Copyright 
Tribunal. The Copyright Tribunal is involved in the regulation of CMOs in South 
Africa. But its role in this regard is limited to dispute resolution in four circumstances. 
The first two circumstances are applicable to CMOs generally, while the other two 
apply to needletime CMOs only.  
The first situation relates to the reference of a license scheme to the Copyright 
Tribunal for confirmation or variation as the Copyright Tribunal may determine to be 
reasonable in the circumstance.217 A license scheme  is a scheme or tariff prepared by 
a licensing body setting out the classes of cases, the charges, and terms and conditions 
upon which it is, or the persons on whose behalf it acts are, willing to grant licenses.218 
According to Dean, license schemes  are typically operated by CMOs.219 For the 
Copyright Tribunal to exercise its role under a reference, the reference may be made 
by a person or group representing persons falling within the class of users to which the 
license scheme  relates or the CMO operating the license scheme. Upon application, 
the Copyright Tribunal may join another person or group as a party to the reference if 
it is satisfied that the person or group has substantial interest in the reference. The 
Copyright Tribunal may make its variation or confirmation order to be in force 
indefinitely or for a particular period. But before making an order under the reference, 
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the Copyright Tribunal is enjoined to give the parties an opportunity to make their 
case.220  
The second circumstance relates to an application to the Copyright Tribunal by 
a person or group requiring a license under, or in a case not covered by, a license 
scheme.221 Two scenarios are possible here. Under the first, a license scheme  must be 
in operation already and the CMO operating the license scheme  must have failed or 
refused to grant or procure the grant of a license to the person or group under the license 
scheme.222 The second concerns cases not covered by a license scheme  and the 
collecting society has unreasonably refused or failed to grant, or procure the grant of a 
license to the person or group requiring it; or the CMO proposes to grant the license 
subject to unreasonable terms and conditions.223 In such situations, the Copyright 
Tribunal is required to give the parties opportunity of presenting their cases. If satisfied 
that the applicant’s case is well-founded, the Copyright Tribunal is obligated to grant 
compulsory license to the applicant subject to such terms, conditions and payment of 
charges applicable under the license scheme or as the Copyright Tribunal may 
determine to be reasonable in cases not covered by a license scheme. Further, upon 
application, the Copyright Tribunal is empowered to join as a party any person or group 
it considered to have substantial interest in the dispute before it.224  
The third circumstance concerns cases where there is no agreement on the 
amount of needletime royalty between users and CMOs representing music producers 
and performers jointly or severally. Here, the user or the CMO may refer the matter to 
the Copyright Tribunal.225 The last circumstance relates to cases where there is no 
agreement between the respective CMOs of performers and music producers 
concerning their percentage share in a needletime royalty. Here, any of the CMOs may 
refer the matter to the Copyright Tribunal.226 In such situations, the Copyright Tribunal 
is empowered to determine ‘the dispute in terms of s30, read with ss33(3) and 33(5)’ 
of the SA Copyright Act.227  
																																								 																				
220 SA Copyright Act, ss31(1)-(7). 
221 SA Copyright Act, s30(b). 
222 SA Copyright Act, s33(2). 
223 SA Copyright Act, s33(3). 
224 SA Copyright Act, s33(4)-(5). 
225 SA Copyright Act, s9A(1); Performers Protection Act, s5(3). 
226 SA Copyright Act, s9A(2); Performers Protection Act, s5(4). 




 Chapter 4 of the Copyright Regulations regulates procedural matters relating to 
the exercise of the Copyright Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The regulations relate to forms, 
commencement of proceedings, preliminary questions, costs, fees, hearing, right of 
audience, evidence, among others.228 The procedural rules in the Copyright 
Regulations were originally enacted to regulate cases falling under the first two 
circumstances identified above. However, it is settled that the procedural rules apply 
mutatis mutandis to cases falling under the last two situations discussed above.229 
Further, it has been held that the procedure before the Copyright Tribunal is informal. 
As such, evidence may be given orally, or by affidavit if the parties agree or the 
Copyright Tribunal so orders. But if given by affidavit, the Copyright Tribunal may 
require personal attendance of the deponent at any stage for examination or cross-
examination.230 In order to be satisfied that an applicant’s case is well-founded ‘all that 
is required of [an applicant] is to place evidence before the [Copyright Tribunal] on the 
issue [...]. In other words, an evidentiary burden rather than a legal burden of proof. 
[...] for the [applicant] to succeed the [Copyright Tribunal] is required to be satisfied, 
on all the evidence placed before it’.231 Finally, in the exercise of its role under the SA 
Copyright Act, the Copyright Tribunal has coordinate jurisdiction with the High Court. 
Thus, at first instance, only the Copyright Tribunal can resolve questions relating to its 
jurisdiction. Appeals against its decisions are directed to the SCA, not the High 
Court.232  
4.6 Proposed regulatory framework for CMOs 
As is apparent from the discussion in the preceding sections above, most of the CRC’s 
recommendations, based on identified gaps in the current copyright legal regimes, 
informed the proposed amendments in the CAB. In relation to CMOs, the CRC 
recommendations include creating a regulatory framework that brings all CMOs under 
the control of the CIPC. The regulatory frameworks, according to the CRC, should 
address specific concerns relating to CMOs’ membership, royalty distribution, 
licensing practices, and corporate governance, among others. The aim in this section is 
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to examine the proposed regulatory framework for CMOs in the CAB to determine if 
it addresses the existing gaps in the current regulatory mechanism. The proposed 
regulatory framework is contained in clause 25 in the latest draft of the CAB. Where 
appropriate, reference will be made to the clause 23, which contained the proposed 
regulatory framework in the original draft of the CAB.233 Clause 25 of the latest draft 
of the CAB contains proposed ss22B to 22F.  
In terms of the proposed s22B, all persons intending to function as CMOs in 
South Africa will be required to obtain accreditation from the CIPC. The CIPC will be 
empowered to grant accreditation only when it is satisfied that the applicant is able to 
adequately, effectively and efficiently administer royalty collection; comply with any 
conditions for accreditation, provisions of the Companies Act, the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act 46 of 2013 and other applicable legislation; and has 
adopted a constitution that meets the prescribed requirements. Also, the CIPC will be 
enabled to provide necessary assistance for the formation of CMOs in respect of rights 
for which no CMO exists. Further, the proposed s22B stipulates a five-year life span 
for accreditation granted by the CIPC, subject to renewal every five years. The 
proposed s22B prescribes a transition period for CMOs existing at the time the CAB is 
enacted and comes into force. Such collecting societies will be obligated to apply for 
accreditation within 18 months from the coming into force of the Act enacted from the 
CAB. Pending the outcome of such application and subject to such conditions as the 
CIPC may indicate in writing, the CMOs will be allowed to continue to operate.  
One major gap in the latest draft of the CAB relating to accreditation is the 
absence of a prescribed number of CMOs for a particular right, contrary to the one-
society-one-right recommendation of the CRC. It is important to note that the 
recommendation was captured in the s22B(6) initially proposed in the original draft of 
the CAB. According to the proposal, the CIPC ‘shall only register one [CMO] for each 
right or related right [...]’. The proposal would have transformed South Africa’s 
collective management to right-based as opposed to the work-based approach. The 
difference between the two approaches has been discussed in the previous chapter. It 
appears the administration of non-needletime rights is already adhering to the ‘one 
society one right’ principle as shown in 4.5.2 above.  
																																								 																				




The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), a major user group in South 
Africa, vehemently opposed the proposal on the ground that it will further entrench 
CMOs’ dominance and lead to inefficiencies in royalty payment, especially with 
regards to CMOs’ relationship with NAB members.234 It appears the drafters of the 
CAB heeded NAB’s opposition because the initially proposed s22B(6) is absent from 
the latest draft of the CAB, with the effect that if passed into law, the CIPC would not 
be able to restrict the number of CMOs per right.  
NAB’s fears seem to be based on the perception that having more than one 
smaller CMOs over a right would better serve NAB’s member’s business interest since 
the CMOs would not be able to ‘dictate the terms of royalty tariffs’. First, it is not clear 
how one-society-one-right will lead to unnecessary bottleneck in the licensing market. 
On the contrary, it will have a streamlining effect and save users the trouble of 
obtaining licenses from different CMOs managing the same right. Further, although 
the proposal will entrench CMOs’ monopoly in the licensing market, there is no 
guarantee that collective management will not be monopolised in the market without 
such provision. This is because, as argued in 2.4.3 above, the existence of more than 
one CMO per right does not indicate competition on the licensing market as the 
repertoire of the CMOs would be complementary from the user perspective. Moreover, 
there are legal provision in the existing copyright sector-specific legal framework (as 
shown in the discussion below) preventing CMOs from dictating or unilaterally setting 
royalty tariffs.  
As stated in 4.5.1 above, another gap in the CAB is its silence about the 
implication of refusal of a CMO to apply for accreditation and, where an application is 
made, refusal by the CIPC to grant such application. When/if enacted, such silence in 
the CAB would create a situation where CMOs may continue to operate without 
accreditation and the CIPC would be incapable of taking necessary actions against the 
CMO.  
What is certain, however, is that the CIPC will be empowered, in terms of the 
proposed s22E-F, to suspend/and or cancel an accreditation. The proposed s22E will 
require all CMOs to submit returns and reports as prescribed by the CIPC. Also, it will 
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empower the CIPC to demand any report or record from CMOs to ensure that the 
CMOs are administered according to the conditions of their registration and that the 
royalties are being utilised and distributed in accordance with the SA Copyright Act. 
In terms of the proposed s22F, the CIPC will be able to issue compliance notices to 
CMOs or apply to the Copyright Tribunal for an inquiry into their affairs if it is satisfied 
that they are being mismanaged. Pending such inquiry, the CIPC will be empowered 
to apply to the Copyright Tribunal for an order suspending the registration of the 
CMOs. Based on the outcome of the inquiry, the CIPC will be able to apply to the 
Copyright Tribunal for an order cancelling the registration of the CMO. Where a CMOs 
registration is suspended or cancelled, the CIPC will be able to take-over the affairs of 
the CMO. To this end, it may apply to the Copyright Tribunal to appoint any suitable 
person to assist it. 
This being said, the proposed s22C of the CAB speaks to the administration of 
rights by CMOs for which they will be enabled to accept exclusive authorisation from 
copyright owners, subject to the copyright owners’ right to withdraw such 
authorisation. The proposed s22C also itemised the major functions of CMOs, which 
are already discussed in 2.2 above. Further, in terms of the proposed section, CMOs 
will be able to deduct a prescribed amount to defray administrative cost from royalties 
collected, but the drafters of the CAB failed to propose the maximum amount to be 
deducted. From its tenor, it appears the task of prescribing the maximum amount will 
be left to the CIPC. As stated in chapter three, depending on the level of development 
of collective management, the ideal situation is to retain not more than 30% of royalties 
collected. This percentage may either be fixed by law, or by members’ mandate. 
However, the percentage is expected to reduce as the CMOs develop and become more 
efficient. Indeed, as gleaned from the discussion in 4.5.3.2 above, the CS Regulations 
already prescribed a maximum amount of 20% for administrative cost from collected 
royalties by needletime CMOs. Thus, the lacunae in the CAB in this regard may be 
filled by simply incorporating such provisions in the CAB or increasing the maximum 
amount to 30%. 	
The proposed s22D seeks to bring CMOs entirely under control of copyright 
owners, subject of course to the overall supervision of the CIPC. Specifically, it seeks 
to subject the collection and distribution of royalty, and the use of collected royalties 




full and detailed information of their activities. Also, the proposed section will require 
CMOs, as far as may be possible, to distribute collected royalties to copyright owners 
in proportion to the actual use of their works and as soon as possible but not later than 
three years from when the royalties were collected. In terms of subsection (3) of the 
proposed s22D, where a CMO,  
‘for whatever reason, is unable to distribute the royalties within three years from 
the date on which the royalties were collected, that [CMO] shall— (a) invest 
the royalties in an interest-bearing account with a financial institution, the rate 
of which may not be less than the rate applicable to a savings account with that 
financial institution; and (b) upon demand by the performer or copyright owner, 
or their authorised representatives, pay over the royalties together with the 
interest earned on the investment contemplated in paragraph (a).’ 
 It is not clear why a three-year period for royalty distribution is proposed. The general 
practice, which was confirmed by the CRC,235 is that royalties are distributed at the end 
of each financial year. The fact that CMOs, as corporate entities, are obligated to file 
annual returns with the CIPC also lays credence to this position. Thus, it is important 
for the lawmakers to take cognisance of this practice when considering the CAB. 
Nonetheless, the proposals on how to deal with undistributed royalties are 
commendable.   
One major flaw in the proposed s22D is the failure to make specific proposal 
on how CMOs are to handle royalties belonging to non-members. However, the 
proposed section may be interpreted broadly to apply to all royalties collected whether 
belonging to members or non-members of the CMOs with the implication that the 
three-year rule and the proposal in subsection (3) applies to royalties belonging to non-
members. This is so because the proposed section keeps referring to ‘performers’ and 
‘copyright owners’ and not members of CMOs. Another possible interpretation of the 
proposed section, a narrow one, is that since the opening paragraph of the section refers 
to ‘performers and copyright owners whose rights [the CMOs] administers’, then the 
presumption is that the provision is meant to apply only to royalties belonging to 
members of the CMOs. Such conflicting interpretation can be avoided by an insertion 
of a specific proposal on how CMOs should deal with royalties belonging to non-
members copyright owners.    
																																								 																				




Interestingly, the DTI believes that the conflict can be addressed by reference 
to the proposed s22B(5) CAB which prescribes a five-year accreditation lifespan for 
CMOs with the effect that CMOs cannot retain royalties of non-member copyright 
owners beyond five years. The DTI reasoned that it may be ‘practically challenging to 
legislate on maximum period that [CMOs] may retain royalties before distribution’.236 
This position needs to be properly scrutinised because as the Nigerian regulatory 
framework shows, there is no practical challenge in this regard. Moreover, the DTI’s 
position insufficiently considers that at the expiration of the five-year accreditation 
lifespan the CMOs’ life typically does not end, and that, according to the proposed 
s22B(5), that the accreditation is not renewable. Further, the DTI’s approach seems to 
conflate the issue of accreditation lifespan with the dealing of non-member copyright 
owner’s royalty. Both issues are separate and equally important and the provision for 
one cannot simply displace the need to provide for another. Indeed, the importance of 
CMOs’ dealing with royalty of non-member copyright owners may have influenced 
the specific discussion and recommendation of the CRC in this regard as noted in 
section 4.5.3.2 above. Leaving this aspect unregulated will simply give CMOs enough 
room to reap where they did not sow by dealing with copyright in works belonging to 
non-member copyright owners. It would also be contrary to the counsel of leading 
authorities on the collective management subject.237 The regulation in Nigeria, as 
shown in the previous chapter, can help in crafting the regulation recommended by the 
CRC. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Although CMOs are generally under the supervision of the CIPC, only needletime 
CMOs require accreditation to operate. Even so, the rules are silent on the 
consequences of non-accreditation. Further, the rules do not prescribe any particular 
type of legal form for CMOs. Depending on the type of legal form chosen, CMOs are 
subject to relevant provisions of the Companies Act. Thus, the CIPC’s supervision of 
CMOs is not limited to the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and CS 
Regulation. It extends to relevant provisions of the Companies Act. 
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 CMOs are required to open their membership to both individuals and juristic 
persons falling within the class of rights owners forming part of their repertoires. This 
duty is clear with regards to needletime CMOs. It is not too clear whether such positive 
duty is imposed on non-needletime CMOs. But all CMOs are prohibited from 
discriminating against their members in the running of their affairs and in rights 
management. Further, CMOs are generally required to distribute royalties among their 
members whose rights they manage. Specifically, needletime CMOs are required to 
retain not more than 20% of collected royalties. The regulatory framework is silent in 
the case of non-needletime CMOs. However, depending on the developmental stage of 
the CMO, a maximum of 30% is considered allowable in practice. Further, unlike non-
needletime CMOs, needletime CMOs are expressly required to have a distribution plan 
that must be approved by the Registrar. Nonetheless, for non-needletime CMOs, the 
approval of their members suffices. Generally, there is no express provision on the 
handling of non-member royalties collected by CMOs.  
 Needletime CMOs are specifically restrained from fixing royalties unilaterally 
and arbitrarily under s9A SA Copyright Act and s5 Performers Protection Act and the 
CS Regulation. They are required to conclude framework agreements with users which 
are to be submitted to the Registrar for publication. Although not expressly restrained 
from arbitrary and unilateral fixing of royalties, non-needletime CMOs are bound by 
the general provisions of the SA Copyright Act and Performers Protection Act relating 
to licensing contracts. In essence, CMOs are required to fix their royalties on the basis 
of agreements with users of works. Generally, all CMOs are subject to the supervisory 
role of the Copyright Tribunal under chapter 3 SA Copyright Act. The framework 
afforded by chapter 3 SA Copyright Act is meant to prevent any form of arbitrariness 
and unreasonableness on the part of CMOs in the fixing of royalty. Further, needletime 
CMOs are specifically prohibited from discriminating among the same class of users. 
 Apart from requiring the performers’ and music producers’ share of royalty to 
be determined by agreement between them or their respective CMOs, the SA Copyright 
Act, Performers Protection Act and CS regulation do not specifically govern the 
relationship among CMOs. However, CMOs, which are non-profit companies, are 
restrained from merging with CMOs, which are profit companies, under the Companies 
Act. The issue of number of CMOs is generally not provided for, except in the case of 
needletime CMOs. Here, the issue is left to the discretion of the Registrar if he/she is 




smooth administration of the class of right considered. However, it observed that there 
is a conscious shift, as a matter of practice and proposed legislation, towards ‘one 
society one right’ as recommended by the CRC. 
 The forgoing discussion is meant as foundation for resolving the specific 
questions as to whether the South African regulatory framework contains legal 
provisions that the CIPC can rely upon to address CMOs’ competition concerns 





CHAPTER FIVE: REGULATING COLLECTIVE 




This chapter discusses CMOs’ competition concerns, which include abuse of market 
dominance, fixing of excessive royalty tariffs, refusal to license, refusal to accept 
copyright owners as members, discrimination between copyright owners and 
discrimination between users by CMOs. The chapter also considers if the copyright 
sector-specific regulatory frameworks in Nigeria and South Africa empower the 
Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) and the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (CIPC) respectively to address CMOs’ competition concerns in the 
collective management and licensing markets in both countries. 
The chapter discusses these issues on the premise the main issue for competition 
law in relation to CMOs is not whether they should exist as monopolies in the collective 
management and licensing markets. Indeed, as discussed in 2.4.3 above, competition 
courts in the US and the EU have accepted the monopolistic nature of CMOs as 
necessary for fostering efficiency in the collective management and licensing markets. 
The approach of the courts, as gleaned from established jurisdictions such as the US 
and EU, has been to preserve CMOs as monopolies while applying competition law to 
curtail their abusive tendencies as dominant organisations in the collective 
management and licensing markets.1 In fact, sector-specific regulations, such as s39 of 
the Nigerian Copyright Act and s22B(6) contained in the initial draft of the South 
African Copyright Amendment Bill (but expunged from the latest draft of the bill), 
which promote such monopoly have been regarded by competition courts to be suitable 
insofar as the law ensures effective collective management and supervision of the 
CMOs.2 
As mentioned in chapter one, Nigeria recently passed by the Federal 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2018 (Nigerian Competition Act), which 
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applies in principle to CMOs. In the case of South Africa, the South African 
Competition Act (SA Competition Act) has so far not been applied to South African 
CMOs. Relevant provisions of the Nigerian Competition Act and SA Competition Act 
are examined in this chapter to extent that they are relevant in achieving the goal of the 
chapter and overall objective of the thesis. Thus, the chapter does not focus on the very 
wide field of competition law. It is limited to the aspects that touch on copyright and 
CMOs. 
South African jurisprudence on the copyright and competition law interface is 
still at infancy,3 whilst Nigerian jurisprudence is far from beginning.4 Thus, as stated 
in chapter one, reliance will be placed on relevant cases from Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), the US and India. Where necessary, reliance will also be 
place on relevant provisions of the EU Collective Rights Management Directives 
(CRM Directive). Importantly, the findings in the Max Planck Report – Copyright, 
Competition and Development (Max Planck Report) – regarding the law and practice 
on the application of competition law to CMOs will be echoed and relied upon in this 
chapter. The Max Planck Report examined important case law from the CJEU and 
national competition law jurisdictions from around the world, including the US and 
India. It is the most extensive and authoritative literature in this regard. 
This approach finds support in s1(3) of the SA Competition Act, which enables 
reliance on appropriate foreign and international law when interpreting or applying the 
Competition Act in South Africa, especially where the provision of the Competition 
Act being interpreted has similar language as the provisions of arts.101 and 102 of the 
TFEU,5 which govern competition within the EU single market. Further, the Nigerian 
Competition Act does not contain a section similar to s1(3) of the SA Competition Act. 
Nonetheless, reliance can still be placed on foreign jurisprudence as guide in 
interpreting relevant provisions of the Nigerian Competition Act. This is so because 
																																								 																				
3 DTI Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1 (2018) 30 (IP Policy).  
4 See EMTS Ltd v MTN Nigeria & Anor., Suit No.: FHC/L/CS/130/2016 (decided 25 February 2016). 
The case was based on a merger and acquisition under the Nigerian Communication Act, 2003 and 
Nigerian Communication Act-Competition Practice Regulation, 2007. The first respondent had 
obtained approval from the Nigerian Communications Commission for its acquisition of 100% equity 
in the 2nd respondent, after which it sought to carry out certain acts while the acquisition’s approval 
was being challenged at the commission. Plaintiff therefore sought, among others, injunctive reliefs 
against the respondent. The court did not consider the merit of the case as it was struck out for want of 
jurisdiction. 
5 OECD Competition Law and Policy in South Africa (2003) 9-10 available at 





Nigerian courts usually refer to foreign case law, as persuasive authorities, especially 
where the foreign case law interpreted a statutory provision similar to the one being 
applied by the Nigerian court.6 
5.2 Copyright and competition law7  
The general IP and competition law interface has been examined in a preponderance of 
literature.8 The focus here is specifically on the nexus between copyright and 
competition law. Nonetheless, a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The prevailing view about the intersection follows the complementarity approach, 
according to which both fields of law are regarded as adopting different methodology 
but with a similar goal: the enhancement of consumer welfare through the promotion 
of creativity.9 This will be explained further in 5.2.1 below. However, the history of 
modern competition law shows that both fields were regarded at some point as 
inherently conflicting fields that should be kept separate within the bounds of their 
respective legal territory.10  
Although described as a ‘complex interface’ by the South African Competition 
Tribunal,11 the complementarity approach is reflected in the SA Competition Act.12 In 
this regard and as gleaned from most of the few South African cases examined in 5.2.3 
below, the IP-competition law connection in South Africa has been more manifest in 
the area of patent law specifically with regards to access to health technologies. 
However, the Competition Act initially excluded, in its s3(1), ‘acts subject to or 
																																								 																				
6 Foreign case law is relied upon by Nigerian courts, when interpreting local statutes, as persuasive 
authorities. That is, they are relied as guide and not binding authorities. See Basinco Motors Ltd v 
Woermann-Line (2009) LPELR S.C. 24/2003 
7 Discussion under this head builds upon an earlier article by the present writer: D Oriakhogba 
‘Balancing the copyright regime in South Africa: thinking outside the copyright box’ available at 
https://ip-unit.org/2018/balancing-the-copyright-regime-in-south-africa-thinking-outside-the-
copyright-box/, accessed 9 May 2018. 
8For instance, see G Gustavo Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The Innovation Nexus 
(2006); J Drexl (ed.) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2008); H 
Hovenkamp, et al IP and Antitrust: An analysis of antitrust principles applied to intellectual property 
law (2010); A Pham Competition law and intellectual property rights: Controlling abuse or abusing 
control? (2008); A van der Merwe, et al Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 2nd ed. (2016) 
529-544;  
9 J Drexl Copyright, Competition and Development (2013) 37. 
10 WS Bowman Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (1973); WK Tom and JA 
Newberg ‘Antitrust and intellectual property: from separate spheres to unified fields’ (1997) 66(1) ALJ 
167-229; A Katz ‘Making sense out of nonsense: intellectual property, antitrust, and market power’ 
(2007) 49 ALR 837-909. 
11 DW Integrators CC v SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd [1999–2000] CPLR 191. 




authorised by public regulation’13 from the operation of its chapter 2 and 3 relating to 
restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance and merger control. In other words, the 
inherent conflict approach used to be the position in South Africa. A case based on the 
challenge of a restrictive term – meant to protect trade secrets – in a licensing contract 
further confirms this.14 In that case the plaintiff relied on the SA Competition Act and 
called on the South African High Court to nullify the restrictive term as being anti-
competitive. The High Court rejected this plea and declared that ‘sad would be the day 
when any statute would completely destroy the need to or the process of balancing the 
interests and principles at stake in freedom of trade, sanctity of contract, the protection 
of trade secrets, patent monopoly and the encouragement of constructive 
competition.’15 
According to the Competition Tribunal, there were conflicting interpretations 
of the said s3(1). There was the broad interpretation to the effect that persons subject 
to sector-specific regulations, such as the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection 
Act, CS Regulations and Companies Act, were excluded from the ambit of the 
Competition Act regardless of whether or not the regulation addressed competition law 
concerns; and the narrow construction according to which firms were ‘to avoid a 
situation of double jeopardy so that [they were] not faced with having to defend 
[themselves] twice under different regulations for the same conduct’.16 This led to an 
amendment of the SA Competition Act in 2000, which introduced s3(1A) that removed 
the previous exclusion.17 The amendment conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the 
Competition Tribunal and any sector-specific regulator, such as the CIPC, having 
jurisdiction over the alleged anti-competitive act.18  
Even so, a firm19 may apply to the Competition Commission to exempt ‘any 
agreement, or practice, or category of agreements or practices’ under the SA Copyright 
																																								 																				
13 Competition Act, s3 before the Competition Second Amendment Act 39 of 2000, s2, which deleted 
paragraphs (c) and (d) from section 3(1) and introduced section 3(1A). 
14 Mossgas (Pty) Ltd v Sasol Technology (Pty) Ltd [1999] 3 All SA 321. 
15 Ibid at 336. 
16 See Competition Tribunal Annual Report 2000/2001 (2001) 7 available at 
https://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Reports/Annual-Reports/Annual-report-2000-1.pdf, 
accessed on 28 April 2018. Specifically, see Standard Bank Investment Corporation v CompCom SA 
(2000) 2 SA 810 (SCA). 
17 Supra note 12. 
18 See CompCom SA v Telkom [2009] ZASCA 122. 




Act and Performers Protection Act from the operation of chapter 2 of the SA 
Competition Act.20 Also, sector-specific regulators, such as the CIPC, are required to 
negotiate agreements with the Competition Commission in terms of which they will 
exercise jurisdiction over matters falling under chapters 2 and 3 of the SA Competition 
Act if such matters are also covered by the relevant sector-specific regulation.21 The 
effect of this provision is, among others, to take care of any form of regulatory conflict 
that may arise as a result of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Competition Commission 
mentioned above. Thus, where such agreement is made, the jurisdiction of the 
Competition Commission and the sector-specific regulator would be determined by the 
agreement.22 Otherwise, the provisions of the SA Competition Act would prevail.23 
Furthermore, such agreement will have the effect of excluding copyright from the 
ambit of the SA Competition Act. There is no such agreement, however, currently 
between the CIPC and the Competition Commission relating to CMOs in South Africa. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that, apart from envisioning the challenges that 
competition law enforcers may face in enforcing competition rules in industries subject 
to sector-specific regulations, such as the copyright industry (discussed in 2.5 above), 
the provision can serve as bastion for making the sector-specific regulation defence to 
competition law oversight. Simply put, the sector-specific defence is an argument 
relied upon by firms facing competition law scrutiny to the effect that their conduct 
being investigated is sanctioned by or falls under the oversight of sector specific 
regulations.24 Such agreement between a sector-specific regulator and the Competition 
Commission, as envisaged by ss3(1A); 21(1)(h) and 82 of the SA Competition Act, can 
be called in aid to preclude the Competition Commission’s oversight of the impugned 
conduct. 
																																								 																				
20 Competition Act, s10(4). 
21 Competition Act, ss3(1A); 21(1)(h) and 82.  
22 Generally, see P Sutherland and K Kemp Competition law of South Africa (2000) 4-46 – 52. 
23 OECD op cit note 5 at 31. 
24 A de Streel ‘The Relationship between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: The case 
of electronic communications’ (2008) available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2d16/db27d8d021ff051e653cfd039549664b8453.pdf, accessed on 1 
March 2019; P Congedo ‘The “regulatory authority dixit” defence in European competition law 
enforcement’ (2014) MPRA Paper No. 60239 available at https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/60239/1/MPRA_paper_60239.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2019; RD Nair et al ‘The inter-
relationships between regulation and competition enforcement in the South African liquid fuels 
industry’ (2015) 26(1) Journal of Energy in Southern Africa 11-19; M Hellwig ‘Competition Policy 
and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries’ (2008) available at 





The complementarity approach has also found roots in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
competition policy recognises the existence of copyright but states that in 
implementing the Nigerian Competition Act, ‘measures would be taken to ensure that 
the rights conferred by [copyright] laws, though treasured, are not exercised in a 
manner that will undermine the principles’ of competition law.25 The policy recognises 
the existence of sector-specific regulators saddled with competition-related concerns 
within their enabling regulations. Hence, it proposes an arrangement wherein sector-
specific regulators will continue to address the competition-related concerns within 
their specific sectors while creating a synergy with the proposed competition authority 
in addressing competition-related issues beyond, but including, their specific sectors.26  
  While being shaped by the foregoing, the Nigerian Competition Act adopts an 
approach that is not easy to pigeon-hole. It provides exception from the prohibitions 
relating to restrictive agreements for certain undertakings. Copyright firms are not 
included on the list.27 However, it contains a special exemption in respect of patent 
licenses as follows:  
‘Nothing contained in this Act [...] shall affect the validity, as between parties to an 
agreement and their successors, of any term or condition of – (a) a license granted by 
the proprietor of a patent or a licensee under any such license; or (b) any assignment 
of a patent so far as it regulates the price at which goods or services processed by the 
licensee or assignee may be sold by him’.28   
 
Even so, the Nigerian Competition Act seeks to make its provisions supreme 
over other laws, except the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, in 
relation to competition issues in Nigeria. For this purpose, it stipulates that the Federal 
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC), established under s3 of 
the Nigerian Competition Act, will have precedence over sector-specific regulators in 
competition matters.29 Yet, it confers concurrent jurisdiction on the FCCPC with 
sector-specific regulators in competition related matters.30 To create harmony and 
synergy in exercise of this concurrent jurisdiction, the Nigerian Competition Act 
provides for an agreement as that provided in the SA Competition Act.31  The aim of 
this agreement is to give effect to the general exemption provided for in s106 of the 
																																								 																				
25 Federal Government of Nigeria Draft Competition and Consumer Protection Policy (2014) 34. 
26 Ibid at 45-7. 
27 Nigerian Competition Act, s68. 
28 Nigerian Competition Act, s64(3). 
29 Nigerian Competition Act, s104.	
30 Nigerian Competition Act, s105. 




Nigerian Competition Act. In terms of the section, an undertaking against which a 
complaint is made may show that the act complained against was authorised under a 
sector-specific regulation. In such situations, subject to the existence of an agreement 
between the FCCPC and the sector-specific regulator, the FCCPC may issue a cease-
and-desist order.  
The foregoing provisions of the Nigerian Competition Act, like those of the SA 
Competition Act has no doubt created a basis for the sector-specific regulation defines 
to competition law intervention. Overall, the implication of the foregoing discussion is 
that the existence of provisions that address CMOs’ competition concern in the 
copyright sector-specific regulations in Nigeria and South can act as foundation for the 
agreements proposed in the respective competition legislations, such that there will not 
be need for competition law oversight over CMOs in both countries. This is so because, 
as contended in 2.5 above, copyright regulatory frameworks would be suited to oversee 
the conducts of CMOs. However, it first has to be determined whether the copyright 
regulatory regimes contain rules that can be deployed to address CMOs’ the 
competition concerns already identified in the opening of this chapter. 
 
5.2.1 How copyright and competition law interface 
The justification for copyright protection has been extensively examined elsewhere and 
does not need repeating here.32 It suffices to recall the discussion in chapter two (2.4), 
and restate that there are mainly four theories advanced to justify copyright: the 
utilitarian theory, natural rights theory, economic theory, and social planning theory. 
Two broad goals of copyright law can be gleaned from these theories. There is, firstly, 
the immediate end of enabling creators gain some reward or compensation for their 
creative endeavours.33 In this sense, copyright law bestows on creators some 
“monopoly” over their creation. The monopoly should not be understood in terms of 
competition law. It is an intangible property right: copyright owners’ exclusive rights 
by which they are enabled to exclude third parties from the use of their creation subject 
to conditions, including royalty payments. In basic economic terms, copyright law 
could be regarded as aiming to solve a public goods problem by empowering copyright 
owners to charge a price higher than the marginal cost of producing their works. This 
																																								 																				
32Generally, see W Fisher ‘Theories of intellectual property law’ available at 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf, accessed 28 June 2018.  




serves as an incentive for the production of more works resulting in reduction of the 
cost of access to the works.34 In this regard and from a competition perspective, 
copyright law may be seen as promoting static competition, which ‘manifests itself in 
the form of multiple providers of existing products offered at low prices, offering an 
unchanging menu of unimproved products at very good prices’.35 However, viewed 
from this perspective alone, copyright law may be misrepresented as conferring rights 
on creators of any work whether or not it meets the required threshold for protection, 
including a mere copy of an original work.  
Thus, it is important to approach copyright law broadly to include its long-term 
goal of preserving public interest through the promotion of creativity; and the 
maintenance of the requisite balance in the knowledge economy.36 It does so by 
conferring copyright owners with exclusivity over their works, subject to substantive 
and time-based limitations and exceptions.37 The exclusivity typically enables creators 
to permit, or refuse, uses of their works and request payment from users as condition 
for access to their creations. Copyright limitations and exceptions, however, provide 
opportunities for users to access and re-use copyright works without permission and at 
no cost. As such, they may be regarded as “incentives” against infringing copyright.  
Further, copyright law recognises that ideas fly freely and that the same idea 
may be shared by several persons.38 Hence, it does not confer exclusive right over 
ideas. It is immaterial to copyright law that similar ideas run across each works in so 
																																								 																				
34 WM Landes and RA Posner ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ (1989 (18(2) JLS 325-363 at 
326-8. 
35 JG Sidak and DJ Teece ‘Dynamic competition in anti-trust law’ (2009) 5(4) JCLE 581-631 at 602. 
36 Cross and Yu op cit note 33. 
37 For general discussion of copyright exceptions and limitations, see P Samuelson ‘Justification for 
copyright limitations & exceptions’ available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Justications_for_Copyright_Limitations_and_Exceptions_-
_Pamuela_Samuelson.pdf, accessed on 26 April 2018; LR Patterson and SW Lindberg The Nature of 
Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights (1991); T Schonwetter ‘Safeguarding a fair copyright balance – 
contemporary challenges in a changing world: lessons to be learnt from a developing country’s 
perspective’ (PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2009); LP Loren ‘The nature of copyright: a law 
of users’ rights by L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg’ (1992) 90(6) MLR 1624-1633; S Flynn 
‘Copyright legal and practical reform for the South African film industry’ (2015) 16 The AJIC; D 
Vaver ‘Copyright defences as user rights’ (2013) 60(4) JCSU 661-672; DJ Gervais ‘Making copyright 
whole: A principled approach to copyright exceptions and limitations’ (2008) 5(1&2) UOLTJ 1-41; M 
Geist (ed.) The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of 
Canadian Copyright Law (2013); T Schonwetter ‘The implications of digitizing and the Internet for 
“fair use” in South Africa’ (LLM Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2005).  
38 B Andersen, et al ‘Copyrights, competition and development: the case of the music industry (2000) 




far as they are expressed differently. It only protects the form in which these ideas are 
expressed. In effect, copyright law accepts that several similar and substitutable works 
may be in existence and yet each work will find protection under the law as long as 
each of them is original to the creator and not merely a copy of the other.39 The concept 
of originality under copyright law must be distinguished from novelty. Copyright 
envisages that creators of new works may draw from existing works insofar as the new 
works are original. The test for originality differs among national jurisdictions 
depending on whether the national jurisdiction adopts the civil or common law 
tradition, detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis.40 However, it 
should be noted that there are principally two approaches to the originality question. 
On the one hand, is the objective test of “Sweat of the brow”, which has its roots in the 
common law tradition. Under this approach, for a work to be original, the author must 
have exerted sufficient (and not just trivial) degree of skill and labour in the creation 
of the work. On the other hand, is the subjective or creativity test established in the 
civil law tradition. In determining originality, this test ‘requires searching not for 
evidence of skill and labour but rather for the mark of the author’s personality in the 
work’.41 The test for originality in Nigeria and South Africa follows the common law 
tradition.42 However, the Canadian intermediate approach of ‘skill and judgment’ 
adopted in the celebrated CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada43 case 
seems to be lurking around the South African copyright jurisprudence as recent judicial 
pronouncement in Moneyweb v Media24 shows.44 In that case, the Gauteng High Court 
found that ‘while [South African] law still regards the time and effort spent by the 
author as a material consideration in determining originality […] the time and effort 
spent must involve more than a mechanical, or slavish, copying of existing material. In 
other words, there must be sufficient application of the author’s mind.’45 
This being said, flowing from the utilitarian and social planning justification, 
copyright law ensures the continuity of creativity for consumer (societal) welfare. It 
																																								 																				
39 A Katz ‘Substitution and Schumpeterian effects over the life cycle of copyrighted works’ (2009) 49 
Jurimetrics 113-153. 
40 For a discussion of the concept of originality, DJ Gervais ‘Feist goes global: A comparative analysis 
of the notion of originality in copyright law’ (2002) 49(4) JCSU 949-981. 
41 Gervais Ibid. 
42 Anikulapo-Kuti v Iseli [2003-2007] 5 I.P.L.R. 53-73; Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing 
Intelligence (Pty) Ltd [2006] SCA 39 (RSA). 
43 [2004] 1 SCR 339. 
44 [2016] 3 All SA 193. 




does so by prohibiting competition by imitation, copying or creation of perfect 
substitutable works; while promoting competition by the making of imperfect 
substitutable works.46 It prohibits the making of new works which are mere copies 
(perfect substitutes) of existing works by empowering owners of the existing works to 
sue for infringement against the makers of the mere copies. Also, it allows the creation 
of new works expressing similar ideas in forms different (imperfect substitutes) from 
existing works by preventing owners of the existing works from restricting the creation 
of the new works. Hence, copyright promotes the creative spirit of creators leading to 
the production of equally creative but imperfectly substitutable works allowing users, 
based on their taste, to choose which work to use at every point in time. This way, 
copyright law promotes dynamic competition or ‘Schumpeterian competition’,47 which 
is a ‘style of competition that relies on [creativity] to produce new products and 
processes and concomitant price reductions of substantial magnitude. Such competition 
improves productivity, the availability of new goods and services, and, more generally, 
consumer welfare’.48 In effect, copyright law serves the same goal as modern 
competition law. 
Competition law is generally meant to enhance consumer welfare in a given 
market by promoting competition. It deploys the rules against abuse of dominance, 
restrictive agreements and control of mergers to ensure that competition is not stultified 
in the market. Competition law does not abhor monopoly obtained by innovation or 
creativity.49 This argument forms the justification for the acceptance of CMOs by 
competition courts as not per se illegal monopolies, as stated in 5.1 above. Even so, 
competition law ensures that such monopoly is not exercised to bring about unfair trade 
and prevent free movement of goods and services within the market. In this regard, 
competition law may be seen as preferring the existence of several firms within a 
market competing against each other for consumers while offering similar goods and 
services at lower prices. However, the presence of more than one active firm in a market 
may not ordinarily be evidence of competition.50 This is so because ‘[e]ven without 
restrictive agreements, specific market circumstances may cause firms not to compete. 
																																								 																				
46 Drexl op cit note 9 at 75; Katz op cit note 39. 
47 Katz ibid.  
48 Sidak and Teece op cit note 35 at 600. 
49 Pham op cit note 8; Pioner Hi-Bred International v CompCom SA [2012] ZACAC 3, para 52.  
50 J Drexl ‘Collecting societies and competition law’ (2007) 6 available at 




In an oligopolistic market in particular, the limited number of firms may well behave 
just like a monopolist’.51  Thus, ‘whereas classical economics’ which shaped 
competition law is usually concerned about ‘price and output’, it is possible to ‘develop 
a competition policy that focuses on the dynamic factors of competition’ which will be 
in sync with the goals of copyright law.52 Indeed, modern competition law promotes 
dynamic competition ‘powered by the creation and commercialisation of new products, 
new processes and new business models’.53 The emphasis is not on the availability of 
similar products at reduced price but the existence of ‘new products and the co-creation 
of new markets that allow latent demand to be realised by consumers’;54 and bring 
about dynamic and efficient resource allocation.55   
In this regard, competition law may be likened to copyright limitations and 
exceptions. It helps copyright law to promote the public interest by ensuring that the 
exclusive right which copyright law confers on copyright owners is not exercised to 
prevent dynamic competition in a given copyright market.56 Put differently, 
competition law ensures that copyright is exercised efficiently and to the promotion of 
consumer welfare in a given market.57 Katz observed that competition policy had 
always been at the heart of copyright legislation.58 Copyright law’s internal 
mechanisms like fair dealing and fair use exceptions; the idea/expression dichotomy; 
the first sale doctrine (principle of exhaustion);59 and the concepts of originality may 
be utilised to advance the ends of competition law. These mechanisms may operate to 
alleviate some of the  
‘static losses resulting from exclusive rights in two principal ways: [they] constrain 
copyright owner’s market power by forcing it to compete, at the margin, with 
unauthorised but lawful copies, and [they] may reduce monopoly pricing deadweight 
loss by permitting users whose willingness to pay is higher than marginal cost but still 
lower than the price set by the copyright owner to use the work.’60 
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53 Sidak and Teece op cit note 35 at 602. 
54 Ibid at 600. 
55 Pham op cit note 8 at 2. 
56 Cross and Yu op cit note 33. 
57 Ibid. 
58 A Katz ‘Copyright and competition policy’ in R Towse and C Handke eds. Handbook of the Digital 
Creative Economy (2013) 209-221. 
59 Ibid; Cross and Yu op cit note 33. The first sale doctrine (or principle of exhaustion) is a limitation 
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Also, they may mitigate ‘dynamic losses by ensuring that the exercise of the 
copyright would not hinder downstream creativity and innovation by other authors and 
users’.61 
Nonetheless, there is still some tension between both fields of law in view of 
their different approaches to promoting consumer welfare.62 Competition law usually 
involves ‘fact intensive rule of reason analysis of a particular challenged practice and 
its effects in specifically defined market’. On the other hand, ‘copyright law [...] does 
not require [the] same rigour’.63 Consequently, competition law will not apply where 
the alleged abuse of copyright does not involve market dominance on the part of the 
copyright owner, whereas copyright exceptions will apply under copyright law 
regardless of market definition. Further, competition law is not well suited to curb the 
harm that copyright law principally seeks to tackle.64  It seems to favour a party against 
whom copyright law would ordinarily be deployed: that is, a user of copyright work. 
In this regard, competition law can be regarded as a shield in that the user may rely on 
an order to deal, issued against the copyright owner under competition law, as excuse 
for using the work without the copyright owner’s authorisation. However, it is better 
regarded as a sword because a user intending to rely on competition law to compel the 
copyright owner to license works, for example in cases of refusal to license, would 
have to initiate a different procedure under the competition legislation.65 Although such 
a person may obtain some remedy under competition law, the person cannot escape 
liability under copyright law merely by reason of success under competition law,66 
since competition law cannot annul or suspend copyright.67 This scenario may arise, 
for example, in complaints of excessive royalty rates against a copyright owner. 
Whereas the royalty rate may be declared as excessive under competition law, the user 
may still be liable to pay a rate determined as more reasonable and less excessive for 
the use of the work. Such liability of the user is hinged on the copyright exclusivity, 
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5.2.2 Application of competition law to the exercise of copyright  
The Max Planck Report finds that competition law prevents anticompetitive exercise 
of copyright in two ways. First, the ‘restrictive approach’ reflects competition law’s 
ability to limit the exercise of copyright exclusivity. Such role exists under the rules 
against ‘abuse of market dominance’ which ‘may specifically be applied to the effect 
of imposing a duty to license’ on the copyright owner.68 Competition law’s ‘proactive 
approach’ forms ‘part of a more holistic government policy that does not purely rely 
on the prosecution of copyright infringement’ to curb piracy.69 It is more apparent in 
the rules against market sharing, market foreclosures and price-fixing agreements by 
copyright owners. Such agreements have the tendency to act as barriers to market entry 
and may lead to copyright infringement if not tackled. The agreements may cause users 
to deploy any means, which may amount to copyright infringement, to get around the 
entry barriers. Competition law steps in by tackling such restraints with the effect of 
preventing copyright infringement.  
Overall, competition law’s application to the exercise of copyright may 
generally come under any of the sub-areas of restrictive agreements, abuse of market 
dominance and merger control.70  Specifically, it may  
‘appear in three kinds of more specific rules that define anticompetitive conduct, 
namely: (1) in the framework of essential-facilities provision, (2) in more specific 
provisions on compulsory licensing systems and (3) in provisions that address 
[copyright] as factors for market entry barriers in the framework defining the concept 
of market dominance or in the framework of merger control provisions’.71  
 
However, within competition law’s context, copyright is ordinarily viewed as not 
capable of conferring market power on its owner.72 Thus, for competition law to apply, 
it has to be established that the copyright owner has market power in a given copyright 
market, which has been or is being exercised anti-competitively in the market. While 
this may be possible – albeit rarely – in the case of original copyright owners acting 
individually because of the existence of imperfect substitutable works,73 it would easily 
be manifested in cases where the copyright owner acquired his rights from various 
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copyright owners, thus controlling a large repertoire. CMOs stand as ready examples 
in this regard. CMOs’ competition issues are discussed in 5.3 below.  
 
5.2.2.1 Restrictive agreements 
Restrictive agreements may be horizontal or vertical.74 A copyright-related agreement 
is horizontal when it involves, for instance, agreement between creators (authors and 
performers), book publishers or between film producers; and vertical where, for 
instance, it is between a film producer and a distributor or a multiplex, as the case may 
be. Restrictive agreements in a copyright market have been identified to include price-
fixing agreements; market sharing agreements; resale-price maintenance agreements; 
and bid-rigging agreements or collusive tendering. Other forms of restrictive 
agreements identified are bundled marketing of copyright works; exclusive vertical 
distribution agreements especially where one or more of the parties occupies a 
dominant position in the copyright market; and market-foreclosure agreements.75 
Although, it appears market-foreclosure agreements may also fall under abuse of 
dominance prohibition.76    
The SA Competition Act, as well as the Nigerian Competition Act, generally 
prohibits restrictive agreements. Specific prohibitions relate to price-fixing 
agreements; market sharing agreements; market-foreclosure agreements; resale-price 
maintenance agreements; bid-rigging agreements or collusive tendering.77 However, it 
appears from the provisions that these prohibitions would be examined by a court under 
the ‘rule of reason’, and not the ‘per se rule’, approach.78  Under the ‘rule of reason’ 
approach, courts would have to ‘balance the anti-competitive effects of the challenged 
practice against any pro-competitive effects of the practice, as well as any economic 
reasons justifying the practice. If the procompetitive effects outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects, the practice does not violate [competition] law’. But under the 
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‘per se rule’, competition law liability exists even if evidence of anticompetitive effect 
of the challenged act is lacking.79  
That being said, the Max Planck Report found that the case law and practice on 
competition law’s regulation of restrictive agreements on ‘copyright-related markets 
can hardly be fully captured by the category of licensing agreements’. Nonetheless, 
competition law’s regulation of restrictive agreements in copyright markets ‘has the 
potential of promoting access to works for consumers by keeping prices low and 
guaranteeing open markets’.80 This will become obvious through the cases considered 
below touching mainly on price fixing, market sharing and market-foreclosure 
agreements. The cases are also significant in that they show the how absence of 
competition rules in a sector-specific industry regulatory framework can necessitate 
competition law intervention in such industry. 
The Indian case of M/s HT Media Ltd v M/s Super Cassettes Industries Ltd (HT 
Media)81 involved a complaint by HT Media against Super Cassettes alleging abuse of 
dominance (excessive pricing) and restrictive agreements under ss4 and 3 respectively 
of the Indian Competition Act. HT Media operates a FM radio channel with strong 
listenership, which largely airs Bollywood music. Super Cassettes is a dominant firm 
in the ‘market for licensing of Bollywood music to private FM radio stations for 
broadcast in India’,82 which is the relevant market in this case. HT Media obtained a 
broadcast licensing agreement from Super Cassettes over Super Cassettes’ Bollywood 
music. The licensing agreement contains certain conditions including the requirement 
of minimum commitment charges (MCC) from HT Media. The MCC has the effect of 
restricting around 30-50% of HT Media music broadcast to Super Cassette’s music 
content. The Competition Commission of India distinguished between exploitative and 
exclusionary pricing abuse that may come under abuse of market dominance. 
Although, it noted that the setting of excessive prices forms a classic case of 
exploitative pricing abuse,83 the Competition Commission of India did not find a case 
of excessive pricing against Super Cassettes.84 However, it concluded that the 
agreement amounted to imposition of unfair conditions under s4(2)(a)(i) Indian 
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Competition Act.85 In so doing, the Competition Commission of India observed that 
the MCC condition has the effect of foreclosing the relevant market against other 
competitors. According to the Competition Commission of India, the  
‘MCC [...] is exploitative and exclusionary in nature. It is exploitative as it forces the 
customers to pay for music that it may not play. Exclusionary conduct is characterised 
by improper strengthening of market power by the dominant enterprise. [...] the 
imposition of MCC [...] has an anti-competitive effect on the market as it forecloses 
other competitors from a substantial share of the market. Since [MT Media] is 
contractually bound to pay [Super Cassettes] a minimum guarantee, they are likely to 
broadcast the amount of music that they have already paid for. Therefore, a certain 
amount of music playout on private FM radio stations is already fixed for [Super 
Cassettes]. This results in [Super Cassettes’] competitors not being able to compete for 
and being foreclosed from broadcasting their music on this prefixed playout of 30-50% 
reserved for [Super Cassettes]’.86   
 
Interestingly, Super Cassettes sought to escape liability under the Indian 
Competition Act by recourse to copyright by raising the sector-specific industry 
regulation defence. It argued, among others, that the case comes under copyright 
licensing for which the Indian Competition Act had no jurisdiction since the Indian 
Copyright Act empowered its Copyright Board to determine the reasonableness of 
licensing fees; and that the case involves copyright which cannot be classified as a 
‘good’ or ‘service’ under the Indian Competition Act. While noting the Copyright 
Board’s powers under the Indian Copyright Act, the Competition Commission of India 
noted that a copyright licensing agreement may amount to abuse if it contains one 
sided, discriminatory or unfair terms; and that such abuse of dominance cases are 
outside the purview of the Indian Copyright Act.87 However, the CCI did not pronounce 
on whether copyright qualifies as a good or service under the Indian Competition Act. 
Another Indian case, FICCI-Multiplex Association of India v UPDF, 
demonstrates how competition law regulates price fixing agreements by copyright 
owners.88 FICCI-Multiplex is an association of multiplex owners, while UPDF is an 
association of Hindi films producers and distributors. UPDF members control 100% of 
the relevant market, which is the market for the production and distribution of Hindi 
films in multiplexes in India. UPDF’s members collectively agreed not to release films 
to FICCI-Multiplex members for a given period until they could extract a more 
favourable revenue sharing formula from FICCI-Multiplex members. The collective 
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agreement also resulted in obtaining higher prices from FICCI-Multiplex members. 
The case was considered by the Competition Commission of India under s3(3) Indian 
Competition Act (restrictive agreement). The UPDF raised the sector-specific industry 
regulation defence and argued that the agreement amounts to exercise of its members’ 
copyright in cinematograph works under the Indian Copyright Act; and that exercise 
of copyright, which is within its members’ discretion, is beyond the purview of the 
Indian Competition Act.89 In this regard, the UPDF sought to rely on s3(5) of the Indian 
Copyright Act, which excludes from competition law’s oversight, a copyright owners’ 
right to restrain infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions necessary to 
protect their copyright. The Competition Commission of India rejected this argument 
because copyright infringement or protection does not arise in cases falling squarely 
within the realms of price-fixing agreement. In any event, held the Competition 
Commission of India, FICCI-Multiplex members are only facilitating the copyright of 
UPDF members by seeking to release their films in multiplexes.90 Specifically, the 
Competition Commission of India stated that  
‘[copyright] laws do not have any absolute overriding effect on competition law. The 
extent of [the exclusion] clause in section [3(5) Indian Competition Act] is not absolute 
[...] and it exempts [copyright owners] from the rigours of competition law only to 
protect [their copyright] from infringement. It further enables [copyright owners] to 
impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting such rights’.91 
 
The Competition Commission of India declared the agreement as being in 
contravention of s3(3) Indian Copyright Act. In so doing, it also took cognisance of the 
fact that the agreement resulted in price hike of tickets in multiplexes to the detriment 
of consumers; and that the agreement does not in any way ‘increase efficiency in 
production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision 
of services’.92  
The facts of the recent South African (SA) Competition Tribunal judgment in 
Competition Commission v Primedia Ltd & Anor manifests market sharing agreements 
in a copyright market.93 The case was a referral by the SA Competition Commission. 
The SA Competition Commission’s case was that Ster-Kinekor Theatres (a division of 
the first respondent) and Nu Metro Cinemas (owned by Nu Metro Entertainment, a 
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division of the second respondent) had entered into and were executing a market 
sharing agreement in contravention of s4(1)(b)(ii) of the SA Competition Act. In May 
1998 Ster-Kinekor and Nu Metro agreed on the genre of films they would both exhibit 
in their cinemas in different parts of the V&A Waterfront in Cape Town. The 
agreement was the product of settlement between both parties based on a dispute that 
arose between Nu Metro and the landlord of V&A Waterfront about who had the right 
of first offer of a lease agreement on the premises. Nu Metro was the original lessee. 
At the expiration of its lease, it got wind that the landlord was going to lease the 
premises to Ster-Kinekor, hence the dispute that led to the agreement. The agreement 
was entered as judgment of the High Court in September 1998 before s4(1)(b)(ii) of 
the SA Competition Act came into force.  
The effect of the exercise of copyright was not in issue in the case. Nevertheless, 
the case is relevant because it raises the issue of whether the agreement entered into by 
firms at the distribution chain of the copyright market amounted to market sharing 
agreement. Sadly, the opportunity was lost as the SA Competition Tribunal did not 
determine the issue because it found that the agreement predated s4(1)(b)(ii) of SA 
Competition Act; and that the parties did not implement the agreement after the coming 
into force of s4(1)(b)(ii) of the SA Competition Act.94  
The complaint against Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Limited, Mylan 
Laboratories Limited, Mylan South Africa Incorporated and Mylan Incorporated 
(Aspen and Mylan case) is also important in this regard.95 Although not related to 
copyright, it demonstrates how the provisions of the SA Competition Act relating to 
horizontal and vertical agreements (market sharing agreements) may be applied in 
cases involving exclusive licenses over an IP right. The complaint was brought by 
Doctors Without Borders (Complainant) before the SA Competition Commission in 
2012. Aspen and Mylan are two global companies, with presence in South Africa, 
involved in the production and supply of generic pharmaceutical products. Apart from 
its fixed dose combination antiretroviral drugs (ARD), Mylan’s business includes the 
production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) used in the production of ARTs. 
Aspen and Mylan entered into exclusive supply agreements in 2008 which was to 
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endure till 2016 and which involved the supply of Mylan’s API and fixed dose 
combination ARD in South Africa. In terms of the agreements, Mylan was to 
exclusively license its API to Aspen and refrain from bringing its fixed dose 
combination ARD to the South African market. The agreement also prevented Mylan 
from supplying its API to any other South African companies. Essentially, the 
agreements made Aspen the exclusive supplier of Mylan’s API and fixed dose 
combination ARV in the South African market. The Complainant’s case is that apart 
from lessening competition in the South African market for API and fixed dose 
combination ARD, the negotiations between Aspen and Mylan amounts to price fixing 
agreement which would effectively affect the price of fixed dose combination ARD in 
the market. On receiving the complaint, the SA Competition Commission included 
another complaint of market allocation on the belief that the agreements possible 
amounted to market sharing agreement between competitors. Both complaints were 
investigated together.  
In the course of investigation, the SA Competition Commission identified two 
markets: the upstream market for the production and supply of APIs and the 
downstream market for the production and supply of ARD ‘to the public sector through 
a tender process’. The SA Competition Commission dismissed the price-fixing 
allegation as it found no supporting evidence. On the prevention/lessening of 
competition allegation, the SA Competition Commission found that although the 
agreements prevent Mylan from entering the upstream and downstream markets, it 
does not lessen competition since Aspen has other competitors who could purchase 
API and the fixed dose combination ARD from other manufacturers apart from Mylan. 
Further, the SA Competition Commission’s interpretation of the ‘no-compete clause’ 
in the agreement between Aspen and Mylan was not sufficient to ground its allegation 
of market allocation under the SA Competition Act. Overall, the SA Competition 
Commission found that the agreements could lead to efficiencies which would 
outweigh its anticompetitive effects in the market. For example, it found that Aspen 
was ‘awarded a large portion of the 2008 ARV tender and needed to ensure that it had 
guaranteed access to the ARV-APIs in order to meet its obligations in terms of the 
tender’. Importantly, the SA Competition Commission found that Aspen and Mylan 




SA Competition Commission did not refer the complaint to the SA Competition 
Tribunal.96 
 
5.2.3.2 Abuse of market dominance 
As noted in HT Media, a dominant firm may abuse its position by engaging in 
exclusionary or exploitative conduct. Whereas refusal to deal (refusal to supply scarce 
goods or refusal to license), predatory pricing, loyalty rebates and pricing squeeze form 
examples of exclusionary conducts, excessive pricing forms classic case of exploitative 
conducts. In relation to copyright, abuse of dominance may also take other forms, such 
as false assertion of copyright and sham litigation (monopolisation without 
dominance); control of dominant customers, and price discrimination by dominant 
copyright holders.97 
Most competition statutes do not differentiate between exclusionary and 
exploitative conduct. Nonetheless, the distinction is necessary because there are 
different approaches to abuse of dominance in different major competition law 
jurisdictions. For instance, abuse of dominance falls under the rules on monopolisation 
in the US, which focus only on exclusionary conducts. EU law, in terms of art.102 of 
the TFEU, encompasses both types of conduct.98 The SA Competition Act and the 
Nigerian Competition Act, which are similarly worded, adopt the EU approach. They 
address both exclusionary and exploitative conducts as abuse of dominance.99 Overall, 
from a copyright point of view, abuse of dominance rules do not only  
‘play a role with regard to dominant [copyright owners] but also with regard to 
dominant distributors who, in particular, control bottleneck technologies and therefore 
may make it more difficult and more expensive for works to reach consumers. Hence, 
[in this regard], competition law enforcement can contribute to the distribution of 
works and thereby support the goals of copyright [law].’100  
 
The SA Competition Tribunal had an opportunity to apply the abuse of 
dominance rule (refusal to grant access to essential facility) to a copyright related mater 
																																								 																				
96 Ibid. 
97F ten Have and S de Jong ‘Orange Polska v Commission: Abuse of Dominance, Fines & Effects’ 
(2018) 9(10) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 647; M Gianino ‘Regulated 
Industries: Abuse of Dominant Position in the Market for Block Train Services (France)’ (2013) 4(6) 
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 498. 
98 L Hou ‘Excessive Prices Within EU Competition Law’ (2011) 7(1) European Competition Journal 
47-70. 
99 SA Competition Act, s8-9; Nigerian Competition Act, ss70-73.  




in DW Integrators v SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd.101 The respondent was a distributor of 
information delivery software in South Africa, while the complainant provided 
consulting services to licensed users of the respondent’s software. The complainant and 
the respondent entered into a partnership agreement whereby the respondent undertook, 
among others, to recommend the complainant to its customers. The agreement was 
based on the complainant obtaining a license to the respondent’s software in terms of 
the respondent’s standard licensing agreement. The partnership along with the software 
license was later terminated by the respondent. The complainant filed a complaint with 
the SA Competition Commission on the ground that the respondent contravened s8(b) 
and (c) of the SA Competition Act.  
Section 8(b) of the SA Competition Act prohibits refusal to ‘give a competitor 
access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so.’ And ‘essential 
facility’ is defined as ‘an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonably be 
duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods 
and services to their customers’.102 Section 8(c) is a general prohibition of exclusionary 
acts shown to have anticompetitive effects which outweigh their technological, 
efficiency or other procompetitive gains.  
The complainant alleged that the respondent terminated the licensing agreement 
and therefore deprived it of an essential facility (the software), among others, because 
the respondent intended to enter the consultancy market. The complainant also alleged 
that the respondent held a dominant position in the information delivery software 
market. Based on the complaint filed before the SA Competition Commission, the 
complainant brought an application for interim relief before the SA Competition 
Tribunal under s59 of the SA Competition Act. To grant such relief, it has to be 
established that the respondent occupied a dominant position which is being abused by 
the alleged exclusionary conduct; that absent the relief, the complainant will incur 
irreparable loss and the purpose of the SA Competition Act will be defeated; and that 
the balance of convenience favours the grant of the relief.103 However, the SA 
Competition Tribunal could not examine the allegation of abuse of dominance because 
it found, contrary to the complainant’s claim, that the respondent’s dominance was not 
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‘established in the market for information delivery software, and [...] in the relationship 
between the parties’.104 
Although focusing on patent law, two interesting cases are worth referencing 
because of their relevance to the present discussion. There is the very widely reported 
case of Hazel Tau v Glaxo and Boehringer,105 which was a complaint to the SA 
Competition Commission on the ground that the respondents were charging excessive 
prices for their anti-retroviral therapy needed for the management of HIV. The 
complainants also alleged that the respondents failed to grant reasonable royalties over 
their patents covering medicines making up anti-retroviral therapy for free and non-
discriminate access to the anti-retroviral therapy. Upon investigation, the SA 
Competition Commission confirmed the alleged excessive pricing and found a case of 
denial of access to essential facilities against competitors by the respondents in 
contravention of s8 of the SA Competition Act. Thus, the SA Competition Commission 
announced its intention to refer the matter to the SA Competition Tribunal for an order 
compelling the respondents to issue licenses for the production of generic medicine 
making up the anti-retroviral therapy at reasonable royalties. However, the matter never 
went to the SA Competition Tribunal as the parties settled it without admission of guilt 
by the respondents. Nonetheless, the SA Competition Commission’s findings seemed 
to have influenced the settlement, which included the granting of licenses by the 
respondents to more local pharmaceutical companies at a royalty rate of not more than 
5% of the net sales of the relevant antiretroviral medications. According to the SA 
Competition Commission, the agreement resulted in price reduction of antiretroviral 
medications.106 However, compulsory licenses issued against anticompetitive firms 
under competition law regimes have been regarded as generally attracting zero 
royalty.107 By implication, the licenses in this case would have been obtained at a lesser 
or zero royalty, with the effect of drastic reduction in the price of antiretroviral 
medication, if the complaint was referred to the SA Competition Tribunal. 
																																								 																				
104 Ibid, para. 31. 
105 Unreported, but discussed in Competition Commission Years of Competition Enforcement – A 
People’s Account (2014) 13-15 available at http://compcom.co.za.www15.cpt4.host-h.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/15-Years-of-Competition-Enforcement.pdf, accessed on 28 March 2018. 
106 Ibid; Competition Commission ‘South Africa’s Experience in the Pharmaceuticals Industry’ (2015) 
UNCTAD  5 available at 
http://unctad.org/meetings/es/Presentation/CCPB_7RC2015_RTPharma_SouthAfrica_en.pdf, 
accessed 10 May 2018.   
107 S Flynn, et al ‘An economic justification for open access to essential medicine patents in 




Interestingly, an attempt by GlaxoSmithKline to enter the settlement agreement as 
consent order of the SA Competition Tribunal was rejected because, among other 
reasons, there was no ‘agreement as to an appropriate order - as envisaged in s49D(1)’ 
of the SA Competition Act ‘before the period for the referral of the complaint had 
expired’.108  
The other case is Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd v NAPW,109 which is an appeal 
from the SA Competition Tribunal to the SA Competition Appeal Court. Seven of the 
appellants were major pharmaceutical companies, while the eighth appellant was a 
distributor. The respondents were wholesale distributors of the first to seventh 
appellants’ products. The respondents were getting products from the first to seventh 
appellant at some discount. However, the first to seventh appellants later appointed the 
eighth appellant as their agent, upon which they stopped giving products to the 
respondents on discount. Consequently, the respondents lodged a complaint before the 
SA Competition Commission alleging abuse of dominance. The Competition 
Commission failed to refer the matter before the SA Competition Tribunal within the 
time required by the SA Competition Act,110 thus, paving the way for the respondents 
to refer the matter to the SA Competition Tribunal directly. In their referral, the 
respondents made allegations, among others, of denial of access to an essential facility, 
the charging of excessive prices, and predatory pricing against the appellants (s8(a) - 
(c)).  
Before filing their answering affidavit to the respondent’s referral, the 
appellants filed a notice of motion urging the SA Competition Tribunal to strike out 
some of the paragraphs in the referral as they did not form part of the earlier complaint 
to the SA Competition Commission. In its ruling, the SA Competition Tribunal struck 
out the allegations relating to excessive and predatory pricing. It, however, upheld the 
paragraphs relating to denial of access to an essential facility. The SA Competition 
Tribunal reasoned that denial of access to essential facility (s8(b)) and refusal to supply 
scarce goods to a competitor (s8(d)(ii)) are the same thing. It held that, although the 
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conduct complained of is made in the context of refusal to supply scarce goods to a 
competitor, it is to be regarded as denial of access to an essential facility.  
The foregoing formed the basis for the appeal. Although the SA Competition 
Appeal Court did not rule directly on the copyright and competition laws interface, the 
judgment is important as it gives an insight on how the SA Competition Appeal Court 
would construe s8(b) and (d)(ii) concerning copyright-related matters.  
In its judgment, the SA Competition Appeal Court rejected the position of the 
Competition Tribunal. It held that under the SA Competition Act denial of access to an 
essential facility in s8(b) is different from a refusal to supply scarce goods in s8(d)(ii). 
It further held that the denial of access to an essential facility is not a specie of the 
refusal to deal.111 The SA Competition Appeal Court further stressed that like the 
prohibition of excessive pricing in s8(a), the prohibition of the denial of access to an 
essential facility in s8(b) falls under the per se rule. Conversely, the prohibition of the 
refusal to supply scarce goods in s8(d)(ii) falls under the rule of reason because ‘it is 
intended that a firm accused of this conduct be allowed to raise a defence’.112 It is hard 
to agree with the SA Competition Appeal Court that the s8(b) prohibition falls under 
the per se rule. A look at s8(b) shows that it contains a similar phrase as that of s8(d)(ii): 
that is, ‘when it is economically feasible to do so’. Clearly, the law makers envisaged 
that just like under s8(d)(ii), a firm accused of contravening s8(b) may put up the 
defence that it is not economically feasible to allow access to essential facility which it 
has control over. The SA Competition Appeal Court seems to have unconsciously 
supported this argument in paragraph 57 of the judgement wherein it rightly highlighted 
the conditions for application of s8(b) as follows:   
‘(1)the dominant firm concerned refuses to give the complainant access to an 
infrastructure or a resource; (2) the complainant and the dominant firm are competitors; 
(3) the infrastructure or resource concerned cannot reasonably be duplicated; (4) the 
complainant cannot reasonably provide goods or services to its competitors without 
access to the infrastructure or resource; and (5) it is economically feasible for the 
dominant firm to provide its competitors with access to the infrastructure or 
resource’.113 
 
The point being made is that while the prohibitions under both subsections may 
be different, they would both be construed under the rule of reason and not the per se 
rule. The effect of this argument is that cases based on the copyright and competition 
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law interface and falling under the s8(b) prohibition may be considered under the rule 
of reason. Nonetheless, the general prohibition of exclusionary acts in s8(c) would 
more readily accommodate copyright related cases. 
This being said, the SA Competition Appeal Court gave an insight, albeit 
indirectly, as to how it would treat copyright under s8(b). The respondents had argued 
that the appellant’s products were essential facilities since they constituted resources 
that cannot reasonably be duplicated because of the protection afforded by patent and 
licenses. The SA Competition Appeal Court rejected the submission because it would 
lead to a broad definition of the essential facility doctrine under s8(b) as follows:  
‘the clear provisions of the [Competition Act] do not support such an interpretation. 
For reasons already stated “resource” was not meant to be interpreted as products, 
goods or services. I cannot agree with the complainants that pharmaceutical products 
qualify as essential facilities and resources for antitrust purposes. The interpretation 
relied upon by the [respondents] effectively gives section 8(b) a wide meaning. In my 
opinion, this broadens the scope of section 8(b) well beyond what was intended by the 
legislature. [...] The widening of the application and scope of the essential facilities 
doctrine can have harmful economic effects such as discouraging investment in 
infrastructure. An investor might be reluctant to invest for fear of a third party 
demanding a “free ride” on the fruits of such investment’.114  
 
In effect, it appears unlikely that the SA Competition Appeal Court would 
accept a wide definition of the essential facilities doctrine to include copyright.115 
Indeed, copyright in itself may not be regarded as an essential facility. However, 
information may be contained in a work that is protected by copyright and access to 
such information would not be possible except the owner of copyright in the work 
grants access. In such a situation, insistence on copyright exclusivity would prevent 
access to essential facility (information contained in the protected work), thus bringing 
the act within s8(b), especially where the copyright owner is in a dominant position 
within the given market.  
 The foregoing argument aligns with the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the essential 
facility doctrine applied in copyright-related cases. Notable cases in this regard include 
Volvo v Veng;116 RTE and ITP v Commission (Magill case):117 IMS Health;118 and 
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Microsoft v Commission.119 The facts of these cases have been extensively discussed 
elsewhere.120 However, the effect of the cases is that mere ownership of copyright does 
not amount to market dominance. As such, refusal to license by the copyright owner 
cannot be regarded as abuse of dominant position, except in exceptional circumstances. 
A situation will be regarded as an exceptional circumstance where a copyright owner, 
shown to occupy a dominant position in a given market, has refused to license; the 
refusal to license relates to a product or service which is inevitable to the exercise of a 
particular activity on a given market or related market; the refusal to license excludes 
any effective competition in that given market or related market in favour of the 
copyright owner; the refusal to license prevents the appearance of new products for 
which there is a potential consumer demand; and the refusal to license is not objectively 
justifiable. 
 The two South African cases (Hazel Tau v Glaxo and Boehringer and Glaxo 
Wellcome (Pty) Ltd v NAPW) considered above, especially the Hazel Tau case, are very 
important in that they demonstrate the usefulness or otherwise of competition law to 
control excessive pricing by a dominant firm in a given market. Within competition 
law scholarship, two opposing schools of thought have emerged on the question 
whether competition law should intervene in situations of excessive prices.  
There is the non-interventionist school, which holds the view that questions of 
excessive pricing should be determined by market forces and not be the pre-occupation 
of competition law. The rationale for this position is that excessive prices are short term 
in nature and not long term. The argument is that the endurance is constrained by 
entrance of new firms offering attractive prices to customers with the effect that a 
dominant firm can only derive benefit from its excessive pricing in a fleeting period of 
time. The overall effect is that excessive pricing will itself promote competition, which 
will eventually reduce prices, in the given market. Thus, except a particular market is 
protected by high entry barriers, excessive prices are ordinarily self-correcting.121  
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Also, the non-interventionists argue that although ‘cost-price comparison’122 is 
possible in the resolution of excessive pricing disputes, some practical barriers exist in 
the way of competition law enforcers’ successful determination of the excessiveness of 
the price of a dominant undertaking. The barriers include, among others, the fact that 
audited financial statistics regularly reported by the firms in a market are not made for 
the purpose of applying competition law and cannot be relied upon by competition law 
enforcers in the sense that they hardly reveal the economic costs by addressing 
capitalisation of market research and development, inflation and do not properly adjust 
the rate of return for risk, among others, in the given market.123  
Finally, the non-interventionist school believes that price regulation through 
competition law is not the best way to solve the excessive pricing problem since fines 
for excessive pricing, which is the tool deployed by competition law in this regard, 
does not displace the problem permanently. This is so because market conditions 
change regularly and dominant firms are inclined to adjust their prices accordingly, 
thus imposing the burden of regular monitoring of prices by competition law enforcers 
who possibly lack knowledge of the market dynamics of sector-specific industries. In 
view of the foregoing, the non-interventionist scholars believe that sector-specific 
regulators are best equipped to regulate prices in specific industries.124 In support of 
their position, the non-interventionist scholars often cite the fact that the US 
competition law does not concern itself with excessive pricing issues.125  
On the other hand, the interventionist scholars contend that excessive pricing 
issues should form part of the focus of competition law and enforcement. Citing EU 
competition jurisprudence, the interventionist school believes that there is a good 
match between the law against excessive pricing and competition policy, which 
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ultimately is the promotion of consumer welfare. Thus, these scholars hold the view 
that since excessive prices are harmful to consumer welfare, there is need to resort to 
competition law for consumer protection against excessive pricing.126  
Also, contrary to the non-interventionist scholars’ argument that excessive 
pricing attracts competition, the interventionist proponents believe that it is efficiency, 
and not excessive pricing, that promotes competition in a market.127 According to Hou, 
the argument is that if ‘potential competitors were aware that dominant undertakings 
would decrease prices after their entry, they may not enter that market even if the 
current prices were high. Potential competitors would enter the market only when they 
knew that they were more efficient than the dominant undertaking.’128 Moreover, as 
manifested in most network markets, such as telecommunication and electronic 
communication markets, possible new entrants would be prevented from entering a 
market with high entry barriers whether are not prices are excessive.129  
Furthermore, the interventionist scholars are of the view that the problems 
associated with excessive pricing assessment cannot be so exaggerated because even 
though circumstances exist wherein the distinction between excessive and legal prices 
is not so clear, there are nonetheless situations where the excessiveness of a price can 
be shown with ease.130 Finally, the interventionist school concurs that excessive pricing 
regulation through fines may be unpleasant and onerous for competition law enforcers. 
Yet, they believe that there are other channels and remedies within competition legal 
framework through which excessive prices can be dealt with. For instance, consumers 
can be encouraged to resort to less prices being offered by new entrants. For this 
purpose, competition law will have to focus on removing other strategic and structural 
barriers by regulating the conducts of the dominant firm constituting such barriers.131 
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 The aim of the foregoing review is not to take side with the non-interventionist 
or interventionist school. Indeed, while the interventionist school has not succeeded in 
displacing the non-interventionist school, both schools meet themselves at some point. 
For instance, both schools recognise that excessive prices would endure in a market 
with high entry barriers. Also, the interventionist school does not shy away from the 
challenges of competition law intervention in excessive pricing situation but believes 
in the existence of cases where such intervention would not be problematic.  The goal 
of this review is to acknowledge the difficulty inherent in resorting to competition law 
to regulate excessive prices, especially in sector-specific industry just as manifested in 
the Hazel Tau case above. Further, from a competition law perspective, the issue of 
excessive pricing is not clear cut especially in very peculiar markets, such as the 
collective management and licensing markets dealing with goods of a special nature 
(copyright). The review also highlights the challenges of competition law intervention 
in sector-specific industries, such as the copyright industry. The challenges include the 
fact that competition law enforcers may not be well equipped to deal with sector-
specific issues and the fact that important factors to be considered when determining 
excessive pricing issues may not often be available to competition law enforces. 
However, where competition concerns, such as excessive pricing, are often raised in 
sector-specific industries (as is the case with the collective management and licensing 
markets as shown from the discussion at 5.3 below), it is important for sector-specific 
regulators to be empowered to address the competition concerns.  
 
 
5.2.3.3 Merger Control  
Merger control is one of the major aims of competition law. Mergers may take the form 
of several firms combining to form a single entity; or a firm taking control of another 
firm by acquiring the assets of that firm.132 Merger control provisions are contained in 
chapter three of the SA Competition Act and Part XII of the Nigerian Competition Act. 
Copyright issues may not ordinarily be at the core of merger control 
proceedings when considering questions of concentration. But acquisition of copyright 
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may lead to concentration if the copyright forms the whole or part of a firm’s 
undertaking. Such acquisition is usually executed in the form of exclusive licenses over 
the copyright. The exclusive license would lead to control of the licensor’s business if 
the copyright forms the ‘foundation of the existing market position of the licensor in 
the relevant market’.133 From a copyright perspective, the major concern of competition 
law is whether the merger leads to concentration in the market. If it does, competition 
law will further be concerned about whether the concentration results in market entry 
barriers (does it prevent access of copyright works to the market and access of users to 
copyright works?); and whether it negatively affects creativity, dynamic efficiency and 
consumer welfare.  
A few South African cases may help to shed some light on the copyright-merger 
related discourse, even though they do not relate directly to the acquisition of copyright. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International v Competition Commission manifests innovation 
(creativity) and dynamic efficiency considerations in merger control proceedings under 
the SA Competition Act.134 This case involved a proposed merger in the South African 
hybrid maize seed breeding market between the first and second appellants under 
ss12A and 14 of the SA Competition Act.  
Section 12 requires the SA Competition Commission and SA Competition 
Tribunal, in merger proceedings, to first consider whether the merger is likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition in a given market. In doing so, they are to 
consider the possibility of the merger to cause market entry barriers; dynamic 
characteristics of the market; and whether the merger will lead to removal of an 
effective competitor in the market; among others. In cases where the merger will lessen 
competition, they are required to further determine if the merger will result in any 
technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gains likely to offset the anti-
competitive effects; and whether it can be justified on substantial public interest 
grounds. Section 14 deals with procedural matters concerning intermediate mergers.135 
The second appellant had developed a unique germplasm needed in the market. 
However, its competitive force in the market was declining. To remain in the market, 
it needed to gain access to the first appellant’s breeding technology which was 
compatible with its germplasm. The proposed merger would allow the second appellant 
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access to the first appellant’s technology and prevent the impending exit of the second 
appellant from the market. The second respondent intervened in the application for 
approval of the merger and objected because the merger would have the effect of a 
maize seed price increase to the detriment of local farmers since the number of 
competitors in the market would shrink if the merger were to be allowed. For this 
purpose, the SA Competition Commission was willing to approve a merger between 
the second appellant and any of two identified international maize seed developing 
firms since this would increase the number of competitors in the market. However, it 
disapproved the merger in issue because it would lead to fundamental market entry 
barriers and lessen competition in the market. The SA Competition Tribunal confirmed 
the SA Competition Commission’s ruling, hence the appeal.  
In its judgment, the SA Competition Appeal Court found that the two identified 
international maize seed breeders’ technologies were not compatible with the second 
appellant’s germplasm whereas the first appellant’s was. Further, the SA Competition 
Appeal Court found that, contrary to the legislative intention behind s12 of the SA 
Competition Act, refusing the merger of both appellants would lead to the weakening 
and eventual demise of the second appellant which is an important player in the 
market.136 Most importantly, the SA Competition Appeal Court found that, if allowed, 
the merger would have the propensity to promote innovation in the maize seed breeding 
business because of the unique and promising germplasm of the second appellant which 
could only be effectively commercialised if merged with a bigger player, such as the 
first appellant. Moreover, the long-term effect of the merger would be dynamic 
efficiency and consumer welfare as it would bring about improved maize seed 
hybrids.137 Finally, the SA Competition Appeal Court held that the proposed merger 
would not lessen competition in the market and that the merger would give birth to a 
stronger competitor compared to other players in the market.138 
Nestle SA v Infant Nutrition Business of Pfizer Inc. is a merger which included 
the transfer of trademark of the product covered by the merger.139 The parent body of 
Nestle SA (Nestle) had acquired the global instant baby nutrition business of Pfizer at 
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a public auction resulting in the merger. Through local subsidiaries, Nestle had merged 
with Pfizer’s IBN business in different countries and had been subjecting the mergers 
to merger control procedures in different countries, including South Africa. The goal 
of the mergers was for Nestle to register its footprints in China and other Asian markets 
where Pfizer instant baby nutrition formula is largely consumed. The South African 
merger, like that in other countries, included a transitional re-branding remedy by 
which all stakes of Pfizer in the instant baby nutrition business, including the trademark 
and trade secret, would be sold to a third party. Under the initial transitional re-branding 
remedy, the third party would be allowed to use Pfizer’s trademark for a five-year 
period within which the third party would be expected to have developed its own brand 
name. Afterwards, there would be another five-year black-out period wherein the Pfizer 
trademark will not be used. However, the third party would have access to Pfizer’s 
process technology relating to the instant baby nutrition business. After the black-out 
period, Pfizer trademark would then be licensed unencumbered to Nestle.  
The alternative to the transitional re-branding remedy is a permanent divestiture 
of Pfizer’s trademark to the third party without the re-branding obligation. This would 
amount to a license in perpetuity coupled with the third party’s royalty payments 
obligation with a further risk that Nestle might weaken the third parties position in the 
market by manipulating the licensing agreement.140 Such alternative would also lead to 
split ownership of the trademark or dual branding between the third party and Nestle 
since Nestle had already taken over Pfizer’s instant baby nutrition business in other 
countries. The ultimate effect of this would be free riding on the trademark by the third 
party and Nestle.141  
Although it accepted the transitional re-branding remedy as a better alternative 
to take care of the above risk, the SA Competition Tribunal rejected the 10year 
proposed time frame because of the competition issues raised by the merger. That is, 
whether the merger would lead to market concentration and increase market share in 
Nestle’s favour and lessen competition in the relevant market in the long run. Thus, the 
transitional re-branding remedy was amended to include an initial ten-year period for 
usage of Pfizer trademark by the third party and 10year black-out period, making 20 
years in all. This 20year time-frame was accepted by the SA Competition Tribunal 
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because it would be long enough to allow the third party  to develop its own trademark 
since during the black-out period, the consumer public will not be exposed to Pfizer’s 
trademark; and the third party would have the benefit of using Pfizer’s process 
technology during the period and emerge as a ‘viable, stand-alone competitor, 
independent of Nestle and without any association or link to the Pfizer brands in the 
long run’.142 Thus, the case may be seen as an example of when competition law will 
allow market power obtained from the acquisition of IPRs where it ensures market 
entry and promotes innovation.  
Finally, the SA Competition Tribunal’s opinion in Competition Commission v 
Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd seems to suggest that copyright forming part of the 
book debt of a firm acquired by another firm could, in deserving circumstances, be 
regarded as constituting part of the acquired business for purposes of merger 
notification under s12 of the SA Competition Act. Such circumstances would be when 
the copyright enables the acquiring firm to increase its market share and enhance its 
competitive position in a given market.143  
5.3 Competition law and CMOs 
As already now over-flogged, particularly in 2.4.3 above, competition courts adopt the 
approach of recognising CMOs’ in the copyright management and licensing markets, 
while applying competition rules to prevent them from abusing their monopoly in their 
relationship with copyright owners; users; and among themselves. In pursuit of this 
objective, competition law seeks to address specific competition concerns, such as (a) 
abuse of market dominance, (b) excessive pricing (royalties), (c) refusal to license, (d) 
refusal to accept copyright owners as members, (e) discrimination between copyright 
owners and (f) discrimination between users, among others in the copyright markets. 
To this end, CMOs are scrutinised under the rules against restrictive agreements, abuse 
of market dominance and merger control. On the other hand, copyright-sector specific 
regulation adopts a subjective approach to protect the interest of copyright owners and 
users from the conduct of CMOs within the copyright system by subjecting CMOs to 
defined modes of operation.144  
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It is important to note that, like individual copyright owners, CMOs are subject 
to copyright law’s internal mechanisms limiting copyright exclusivity. In other words, 
CMOs are ideally restrained, for instance, by copyright exceptions and limitations in 
their relationship with copyright users. However, the impact of these exceptions and 
limitations on CMOs’ monopoly in collective management is a different matter 
entirely. As is apparent from discussions in chapter two, CMOs’ use of blanket licenses 
is more widespread than transactional licenses. Because of the difficulty of definition, 
it appears users of copyright works are hardly interested in going into the niceties of, 
or indulging in the task of defining, copyright exceptions and limitations during 
negotiations for blanket licenses. This is worsened by the fact that blanket licensing 
agreements usually originate from CMOs with the effect that the terms therein tend to 
be favourable to the copyright owners represented by the CMOs. To play safe, users 
are mostly interested in securing blanket licenses with broad indemnity against any 
copyright infringement claims.145 
The foregoing forms the reason for legislators in Nigeria and South Africa to 
craft specific regulations within the copyright regimes of both countries to govern 
CMOs. However, to be effective from a competition law perspectives, such copyright 
sector-specific regulation regimes should incorporate competition rules that address 
CMOs competition concerns. The rest part of this chapter examines the specific CMOs’ 
competition concerns, discusses the relevant competition rules that have been 
developed overtime to address CMOs’ competition concerns, and determines whether 
the Nigerian and South Africa copyright regulatory frameworks contain rules that can 
be deployed to address CMOs’ competition concerns.  
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5.3.1 Corporate status of CMOs  
The prescription of the corporate structures for CMOs is one way of ensuring 
efficiency, transparency and accountability. While CMOs’ are generally non-profit 
companies, it is possible to find CMOs established as for-profit companies, or 
partnerships, among others. Related to their corporate structure is the issue of CMOs’ 
internal management. On the face of it, competition law appears not well suited to 
handle issues of the corporate structure of CMOs, which is a matter for corporate law. 
As noted elsewhere, competition law and corporate governance generally focus on 
unrelated and exclusive considerations.146 Corporate law primarily relates to the 
internal affairs of a company and the company as agency to achieve defined business 
objectives. On the other hand, competition law, as is apparent from the discussion so 
far, is concerned with the promotion of competition, among others, in a given 
market.147 The focus of competition law is primarily on corporate entities interactions 
in a defined market. However, according to Lim and Min, corporate law and 
competition law are not completely exclusive. The authors contend that corporate 
entities act ‘within the boundaries’ of a defined market, ‘and the market environment 
informs the structure and behaviour’ of the corporate entity.148   
Thus, within the context of collective management, competition law may step 
in where, for instance, merger issues are raised with regards to formation of a CMOs.149 
Here, the concern of competition law would be to ensure, through merger control rules 
and rules against restrictive agreements, that competition is not weakened in the given 
market. Although, merger control rules have seldom, if at all, been applied to CMOs, 
the rules may bear some relevance since CMOs may be considered as joint ventures of 
copyright owners. Joint ventures constitute one of several forms of concentration.150 
This is so especially when the formation of the CMOs involves some form of 
combination or acquisition of control. Even so, merger control decisions on CMOs 
‘may [...] take account of the existence of [copyright] sector-specific regulation’ that 
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requires CMOs to open their membership to all copyright owners of works falling 
within their repertoires.151 
 As gleaned from chapter three, the provisions of the Nigerian Copyright Act, 
CMO Regulations and CAMA provides for the corporate structure and internal affairs 
of CMOs in Nigeria.152 The provisions are geared towards ensuring accountability, 
transparency and efficiency in the affairs of CMOs in Nigeria.  
For South Africa, it was observed in chapter four that the SA Copyright Act, 
Performers Protection Act, CS Regulations and the Companies Act are silent on CMOs 
corporate structure. And that while most of the CMOs are non-profit companies, 
DALRO for instance is a private company. Nonetheless, an organisation intending to 
operate as CMO, regardless of the structure chosen, must comply with the provision of 
the Companies Act related to formation of companies.153 Further, it was observed that 
the accountability provisions in the CS Regulations only apply to needletime CMOs.154 
However, by virtue of their formation as non-profit companies and private companies, 
all CMOs are subject to the Companies Act’s provisions relating to internal 
management,155 and are to be guided by the corporate governance codes in the King IV 
Report. 
Finally, based on the discussions in chapters three and four, to ensure that 
copyright owners form part of the decision-making process in their respective CMOs, 
the Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO Regulations in Nigeria, as well as the CS 
Regulations and Companies Act in South Africa, entitles each member of a CMO to 
one vote during general meetings. The regulatory frameworks also ensure that the 
governing boards/boards of directors of CMOs are selected from the members.156    
 
5.3.2 Relationship between CMOs and copyright owners 
The relationship between CMOs and copyright owners is one area where CMOs’ 
competition concerns usually arise. Hence, competition law has often been applied to 
regulate this relationship. Indeed, the CRM Directive shaped by over four decades 
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competition jurisprudence developed by the CJEU, obligates EU member states to 
ensure that CMOs act in the best interests of the copyright owners and that CMOs do 
not impose on copyright owners any obligations, which are not objectively necessary 
for the protection of, and the effective management of copyright.157 In this regard, 
competition law has framed rules relating to CMOs’ duty to accept copyright owners 
within the category of works forming their repertoire; restriction of copyright owner’s 
ability to withdraw from collective management; and CMOs power to demand 
exclusive licenses from copyright owners.  
 
5.3.2.1 CMOs duty to accept members  
From an economic perspective, CMOs would not have any real motivation to refuse a 
copyright owner within the category of works forming their repertoire because higher 
numbers of members create economics of scale in their favour. However, CMOs may 
reject copyright owners whose works are considered as economically less viable, the 
management of which will lead to higher costs over benefits. Also, CMOs may want 
to specialise in a specific genre of a work (for instance academic literature) and 
copyright owners of works outside such genre would be rejected. Further, CMOs would 
ordinarily reject foreign copyright owners because of limitations in this regard 
contained in reciprocal agreements. 
 From a competition law perspective, the Max Planck Report found law and 
practice, especially from the CJEU, to the effect that a refusal of CMOs to accept any 
copyright owner of the class forming their repertoire as member constitutes abuse of 
dominance by the CMO.158 This rule is now codified in the CRM Directive, which 
places a duty on CMOs to accept and manage copyright for the copyright owners falling 
within the scope of the activities of the CMOs, unless has objectively justified reasons 
to refuse management of the copyright. The CRM Directives also requires that CMOs 
membership conditions are based on objective, transparent and non- discriminatory 
criteria.159  
As highlighted in chapter three above, the CMO Regulations in Nigeria places 
a duty on CMOs to accept all copyright owners of works within the category for which 
the CMOs are applying for approval. Such membership may be either directly or 
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through copyright owners’ association.160 Similarly, as found in chapter four, the CS 
Regulations mandate needletime CMOs in South Africa to open their membership to 
all copyright owners falling within the category of works forming their repertoire. Such 
membership may be direct or indirect, through a copyright owners’ association.161 
While the CS Regulations only apply to needletime CMOs, non-needletime CMOs in 
South Africa, by virtue of their being either non-profit companies or private companies, 
are subject to the Companies Act which, unlike the CS Regulations, does not confer an 
express duty on CMOs to accept copyright owners. In terms of the Companies Act, 
CMOs that are non-profit companies are generally not required to have members, 
except their Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) provides otherwise. However, 
where their MOI requires them to have members, membership shall not be restricted 
or regulated in such a way as to amount to unfair discrimination on grounds of sex, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, religion, among others. Indeed, all 
the members must be treated equally in terms of rights administration.162 It is doubtful 
whether this provision can be interpreted in terms of competition law as a specific duty 
on CMOs that are non-profit companies to accept all copyright owners within the 
category of works forming their repertoire. Nor whether it can be interpreted to 
preclude CMOs from rejecting copyright owners of economically less viable works. 
What is certain is that the provision was made to further the constitutional right to 
equality in s9 of the South African Constitution and it applies to all non-profit 
companies (CMOs or not). An express duty as contained in the CS Regulations would 
have sufficed. On the other hand, apart from requiring private company CMOs to have 
a minimum of one shareholder, there is no express duty on them to open their 
membership to all copyright owners within the category of works forming their 
repertoire.163 At best, their practice of opening membership to all such copyright 
owners is informed by the economic consideration stated above.  
Further, under the EU framework, the rule placing a duty on CMOs to accept 
copyright owners also extends to foreign copyright owners.164 From a country-specific 
perspective, this rule should be looked at carefully especially since reciprocal 
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owners. Reciprocal agreements align with the principles of territoriality and national 
treatment in copyright law. They allow foreign copyright owners to enjoy similar 
protection afforded to local copyright owners, in terms of monitoring and rights 
enforcement, by local CMOs within the bounds of the host country’s copyright law. 
However, the rule relating to foreign copyright owners was hinged on the basis that 
reciprocal agreements will subject foreign copyright owners to more administrative 
cost since the local and foreign CMOs who are parties to the reciprocal agreement will 
both take out different percentages as administrative costs from the royalties collected 
on behalf of the foreign copyright owners. Even so, as gleaned from the Max Planck 
Report, the rule emanated from the CJEU and it applies to nationals of EU member 
states and the European Economic Area (EEA),165 which may be regarded for purpose 
of this discussion as a single jurisdiction because of the way EU competition law under 
the TFEU is applied. That being so, it is submitted that refusal to accept a foreign 
copyright owner by a CMO in Nigeria and South Africa would not be interpreted under 
the SA Competition Act and Nigerian Copyright Act as abuse of dominance position. 
In effect, the duty placed on Nigerian and South African CMOs to accept copyright 
owners under their respective copyright sector-specific regulation cannot be interpreted 
to extend to foreign copyright owners. 
 
5.3.2.2 Restriction on copyright owner’s exclusive rights 
Restrictions on copyright owners’ exclusive rights by CMOs may manifest in three 
ways. First, CMOs may require copyright owners to assign their copyright in both 
current and future works for the whole world and for all uses. Secondly, CMOs may 
restrict copyright owners’ ability to withdraw their copyright and confer it on another 
CMO. Finally, CMOs may claim exclusive licenses from copyright owners such that 
the copyright owners cannot grant direct licenses.  
From a competition law perspective, these restrictions have been considered 
based on the rules against abuse of dominance on a case by case basis. Although the 
competition courts did not clearly resolve the legality or otherwise of the restrictions, 
they direct that the restrictions should be ‘determined in the light of their individual 
and combined effect’. In this regard, a ‘two-step approach’ is adopted: that is, the 
definition of the ‘objectives that justify restrictions on the economic freedom of 
																																								 																				




[copyright owners] against powerful exploiters and distributors of their works’; and a 
‘proportionality test’ by which CMOs may only ‘impose restrictions on [copyright 
owners] that are absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of a position required for the 
[CMO] to carry out its objectives’.166 
Regarding the restrictions identified above, the Max Planck Report found 
competition case law to the effect that CMOs would be abusing their dominance if they 
required copyright owners to transfer their copyright for the whole world and for all 
uses. This is because such requirement would restrict copyright owners from 
mandating other CMOs to administer some of their rights or issuing licenses directly 
to users.  But CMOs would not be abusing their dominance if they required transfer of 
current and future works because this will allow a CMO to ‘build up attractive 
repertoires [...] that they may then license for mass use in particular. The creation of 
larger repertoires also serves the interest of [copyright owners] who will benefit from 
the increased economic value of this repertoire’.167  
Competition law also prohibits CMOs from requiring copyright owners to grant 
them exclusive licenses for the purpose of collective management.168 The case law 
regards such terms as restrictive. The rationale for this is that the terms will prevent 
copyright owners from contracting individually with users. From a competition law 
perspective, the question should be whether such term is necessary for effective 
collective management.169 Thus, CMOs ‘should be allowed to claim exclusivity by 
excluding the transfer of the same rights to any other [CMO]. At the same time 
[copyright owners] should be allowed to grant a licence for use to any other person’.170   
Further, from a competition law perspective, restrictions on copyright owners’ 
ability to terminate and withdraw their relationship with CMOs constitutes an abuse of 
dominance by CMOs. Such restrictions included clauses requiring transfer of copyright 
to CMOs for a mandatory period of three and six years, and allowing CMOs to continue 
managing a right for an extended period of five years after the copyright owner has 
withdrawn membership. This rule is enshrined in the CRM Directive, which empowers 
copyright owners to terminate or withdraw their mandates given to CMOs. Upon 
serving reasonable notice, not exceeding 6 months, to the CMOs. However, the CMOs 
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may decide that such termination or withdrawal would be effective at the end of the 
financial year. Nonetheless, the CMOs cannot restrict the power of copyright owners 
to terminate or withdraw by requiring the copyright owners to transfer the mandate to 
another CMO.171 
 Based on the discussion in chapter three, the Nigerian Copyright Act and CMO 
Regulations allow copyright owners in Nigeria to transfer their copyright in existing or 
future works. However, CMOs are prohibited from requiring copyright owners to 
appoint them sole collecting agents. In order words, CMOs cannot require exclusive 
license of all rights in a work by copyright owners as a compulsory requirement for 
membership.  However, in terms of section 11 of the Nigerian Copyright Act, a 
copyright owner may elect to transfer his/her copyright to a CMO through assignment 
or exclusive license. As stated in 3.5.1.2 above, in the absence of any clear limitation 
on the assignment or exclusive license, the legal implication is that the CMO can 
administer all the bundle of rights contained in the work in question. The same cannot 
be said for situations where the assignment or exclusive license expressly limits the 
CMO to certain rights in the bundle of copyright. Nonetheless, as pointed out in chapter 
three, the issue of what specific rights are subject to collective management, especially 
where the assignment or license does not contain any express limitation, is still being 
debated in Nigeria. This is so because of the practice in the music industry where artists 
assume that in assigning their rights to CMOs they are merely giving away that right 
that is best suited for collective management.172 That being said, CMOs are also 
prohibited from requiring copyright owners to make them agents for any other purposes 
outside collective management. The prohibition extends to mandatorily requiring 
copyright owners to assign to them the right to collect royalties from equivalent foreign 
CMOs. A copyright owner has the right to withdraw his membership from, or the 
copyrights assigned to, the CMO. But reasonable notice of the intention to withdraw 
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membership must be given to the CMOs. The question of reasonable notice is left for 
the CMO and the copyright owner to determine by contract.173  
 Generally, the SA Copyright Act empowers copyright owners in South Africa 
to transfer their copyright in existing and further works.174 However, from the 
discussion in chapter four, the CS Regulations is not express on copyright owners’ 
ability to withdraw their needletime rights from needletime CMOs. It confers on them 
the rights and remedies under, among others, any applicable legislation governing such 
CMOs.175 In effect, the provisions of the Companies Act applicable to CMOs that are 
non-profit companies (needletime or non-needletime) would be of relevance in this 
regard. The Companies Act mandates CMOs that are non-profit companies to stipulate 
in their MOI the grounds upon which membership may cease or be suspended. It also 
prohibits such CMOs from presuming the membership of any person; regarding any 
person as their member; or providing automatic membership of any person on any basis 
other than life-time membership awarded to a person for service to the CMO and with 
the consent of the person.176 Obviously, such prohibitions cannot directly take care of 
specific competition law concern relating to withdrawal of membership from CMOs.  
Worse still, the Companies Act did not make provisions in this regard for private 
company CMOs. It appears this lacuna will be filled when/if the Copyright Amendment 
Bill is enacted. The Copyright Amendment Bill proposes a new s22C(1)(b), which 
seeks to empower copyright owners to withdraw authorisation granted to CMOs. 
Further, there is no express prohibition on CMOs capacity to require copyright owners 
to assign their copyright for the whole world and for specific uses. Neither are they 
restricted from requiring exclusive licenses from copyright owners. Unfortunately, the 
proposed s22C(1)(a) of the Copyright Amendment Bill seeks to achieve the opposite: 
if enacted, it will enable CMOs to require exclusive authorisation from copyright 
owners in South Africa. A somewhat indirect restriction can be found in the case of 
needletime CMOs since they are approved under the CS Regulations to manage 
needletime rights. Regulation 6(2) stated that such CMOs’ aim shall be to ‘administer 
public playing [needletime] rights [...]’.  
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5.3.3 Relationship between CMOs and users 
As already now over-flogged, while competition among CMOs is highly possible in 
the copyright management market, this may not be so in the copyright licensing market 
because of the complementary nature of CMOs repertoires from the users’ perspective. 
According to the Max Planck Report, the concern of competition law relating to the 
copyright licensing market is to protect users by ensuring that CMOs do not fix 
‘excessive royalty rates’ or excessive prices. This is achieved through the rules against 
abuse of dominance. In this regard, competition law’s application is ‘mostly about 
exploitative and not exclusionary abuse’.177 The debate about whether competition law 
should regulate excessive prices, and the implications of apply competition law to 
excessive pricing in industries subject to sector-specific regulations, have been 
highlighted above. the discussion that follows shows how competition law has 
intervened to regulate excessive prices (royalties) by CMOs and how the issue is 
addressed under the CMO regulatory frameworks in Nigeria and South Africa.  
From competition law perspectives, there are three possible tests in determining 
excessiveness of royalty rates.178 First is the cost-price margin test, according to which 
the cost of production and distribution of copyright works should be considered when 
deciding the excessiveness of a collecting society’s royalty rates. However, applying 
this test will lead to difficulty especially given the nature of copyright management and 
licensing markets where other factors like consumer tastes and preferences play major 
roles. Secondly, there is the market-comparison test which seems more widely used 
especially by the CJEU and it appears more in sync with the realities of collective 
management. According to the test, the excessiveness of a CMO’s royalty rates should 
be determined by comparing the rates charged by similar CMOs in countries with 
similar systems as the country in question and by comparing the royalty rates charged 
on different classes of uses by the collecting society in question. The third test is the 
reasonable-proportionality test, which relates to the question of whether flat royalty 
rates for blanket license may be regarded as abusive. According to this test, flat rates 
are accepted if they are necessary to protect copyright effectively while keeping the 
costs of collective management low.179 Further, as found by the Max Planck Report, 
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the test has been applied to royalty rates differentials among users, for instance private 
and public broadcasters. The fixing of different royalty rates for different classes of 
users has been found not to be ordinarily illegal in terms of competition law insofar as 
such differential is objectively justifiable.180 The differential would be illegal when it 
places one user in a competitively disadvantaged position as against another user 
especially where both users operate in a market.181  
As found in chapter three, the CMO Regulations makes provision to prevent 
excessive royalty rates by Nigerian CMOs.182 It empowers CMOs to fix royalty tariffs. 
In this regard, they are enjoined to take into consideration the monetary advantage 
obtained from the exploitation of the work by the user and the value of the work. Other 
factors to be considered are the purpose for which, and the context in which, the work 
is used; the manner or kind of use of the work; the proportion of the use of a work in 
the context of exploitation; any relevant decision of the Federal High Court or the 
Dispute Resolution Panel; among others. The CMO Regulations, however, prohibits 
CMOs from concluding the tariffs unilaterally. Thus, CMOs are prohibited from 
concluding royalty tariffs without subjecting it to negotiation between users 
individually or through user groups. Agreement reached from such negotiation must be 
notified to the NCC by the CMO. When agreement cannot be reached the parties are 
required to refer the matter to the NCC to constitute the Dispute Resolution Panel with 
the power to arbitrate or mediate over the royalty dispute. CMOs are also obligated to 
inform users of any planned change to agreed royalty tariff. The CMO Regulations also 
prohibits CMOs from granting different royalty rates to different users except the 
peculiar circumstance of a particular user justifies such differential in royalty rates.183  
As gleaned from chapter four, the South African regulatory framework based 
on the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act and CS Regulations requires 
royalty rates to be negotiated between CMOs (needletime and non-needletime) and 
copyright users.184 Although not expressly stated with regards to non-needletime 
CMOs, the CS Regulations obligates needletime CMOs not to discriminate against 
users of the same class in terms of royalties. However, needletime CMOs may agree 
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upon different royalty rates with different classes of users. As further assurance against 
abuse of dominance by CMOs in fixing royalties, the regulatory framework requires 
CMOs and/or users to refer a matter to the Copyright Tribunal when they cannot reach 
an agreement on royalty tariffs.185 Indeed, as is apparent from chapter four, there is 
some jurisprudential activity in this regard which aligns with the practice of the CJEU 
on determination of excessiveness of royalty. In this regard, the SCA has applied the 
market-comparison test and indicated unwillingness to apply the cost-price margin test 
as shown in NAB v SAMPRA and SAMPRA v Foschini examined in chapter four.  
Finally, the rules against refusal to deal may be applied to CMOs where such 
CMOs refused to license with the objective of increasing their bargaining power against 
users or achieve some advantage to the detriment of competition in a given copyright 
market. An example may be where such license relates to an essential facility and 
refusal to license would enable the CMO to control the given market. However, as 
observed by the Max Planck Report, competition courts are hesitant to impose a duty 
to license on CMOs.186 This may be because imposing such duty would weaken CMOs 
bargaining powers as dominant undertakings quite considerably and thereby reduce 
their capacity to effectively represent copyright owners. On the other hand, imposing 
such duty has the effect of ensuring access to copyright works – another important 
objective of CMOs. The CMO Regulations impose a duty to license on CMOs in 
Nigeria. It enjoins them to make their complete repertoire available to users on non-
discriminatory terms.187 Similarly, the SA Copyright Act also limits CMOs’ capacity 
to refuse a licensing request in South Africa. It empowers the Copyright Tribunal to 
order compulsory license on reasonable terms including payment of royalties in cases 
where a CMO has refused or failed to grant a license.188  
 
5.3.4 Relationship among CMOs  
Competition concerns relating to the relationship among CMOs arose around 
reciprocal agreements between cross-border sister CMOs.189 Although, regarded as 
ordinarily not restrictive of competition because of the efficiency they create in 
collective management, reciprocal agreements were found to be capable of preventing 
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competition among CMOs from different countries in the copyright management 
market.190 In the copyright licensing market, reciprocal agreements weaken 
competition by preventing CMOs from granting cross-border licenses.191 Nonetheless, 
it is noted from the Max Planck Report, that the CJEU and EU have been active in 
considering competition concerns thrown up by reciprocal agreements.192 The rational 
for this is not far-fetched. The CJEU and European Commission are empowered to 
apply competition rules under the TFEU within the EU.193 Pursuant to this, they have 
applied the competition rules to the reciprocal agreements between CMOs from EU 
and to the model reciprocal agreements framed by international organisations of 
CMOs, such as CISAC.194  
 In this regard, the adequacy of copyright-sector specific regulations in Nigeria 
and South Africa may not be called in question because, as confirmed by the SA 
Copyright Review Commission, national legislators cannot validly legislate over 
reciprocal agreements which are akin to bilateral or multi-lateral agreements between 
corporate entities.195 As observed in chapter three, this may be why the Nigerian 
Copyright Act and CMO Regulations did not provide for reciprocal agreements in 
Nigeria. The CMO Regulations obligate CMOs to provide relevant information that 
will enable each of them perform their task. It also prevents them from doing anything 
that will prevent each other from carrying out its main objectives.196 Regulation 6(3) 
of the CS Regulations (and the proposed s22C(3) of the Copyright Amendment Bill) 
which seeks to regulate reciprocal agreements in South Africa was criticised in chapter 
four on the strength of the CRC’s position stated above. The Companies Act only 
provides some form of blanket regulation relating to mergers. Here, non-profit CMOs 
may not amalgamate or merge with a for-profit CMO. They may also not dispose of 
any part of their assets, undertaking or business to a for-profit CMO, except for fair 
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CMOs’ activities.197 However, it is arguable that to the extent that reciprocal 
agreements may weaken or restrain competition in the respective copyright 
management and licensing markets in both countries, the agreements may come under 
judicial scrutiny locally. A reciprocal agreement may weaken competition in a given 
market, for instance, if it amounted to concerted efforts between the parties to the 
agreement and has the effect of limiting copyright owners’ ability to become members 
of any CMO of their choice or of more than one CMO at the same time in Nigeria or 
South Africa, as the case may be.198  
The foregoing finds support in the South African cases of Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International v Competition Commission and Nestle SA v Infant Nutrition Business of 
Pfizer Inc. examined in 5.2.3.3 above. Although the cases related to proposed merger 
between local firms and international firms through their local subsidiaries, the 
approach adopted by the SA Competition Appeal Court and the SA Competition 
Tribunal respectively are relevant here.  Specifically, the Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International case involved the transfer of trademark as part of the proposed merger. 
In both cases, the courts were concerned about the effect of the proposed mergers on 
competition in the respective markets. The courts upheld the mergers because their 
implementation would promote competition in the markets. In effect, the mergers 
would have been rejected by the courts if their effect was to weaken or restrain 
competition in the respective markets.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Copyright and competition law, although adopting different methodologies, are 
complementary in the goal they seek to achieve. Both fields of law aim to enhance 
consumer welfare by ensuring continuity of creativity through the promotion of 
dynamic competition. Although copyright law confers some exclusive right on 
																																								 																				
197 Companies Act, Schedule 1 para 2(1). 
198 See Commission Decision COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC of 16 July 2008 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. This decision was in respect 
of the CISAC model agreement devised to allow CISAC members to offer multi-repertoire licenses 
with multi-territorial effect. The European Commission ruled against the agreement because it raised 
vital competition law concerns, such as concerted actions on the part of the collecting societies 
concerned, and membership and territorial restrictions under Article 101 TFEU. However, the CJEU 
later upturned the ruling on the ground that the EC proved concerted practice on the part of the 
collecting societies. See CISAC v European Commission Case T-442/08 (decided 12 April 2013), para 




copyright owners, it limits these rights through some substantive and time-based 
limitations and exceptions. Even so, such exclusive rights are not regarded as 
conferring market power in terms of competition law. However, the copyright owners 
may exercise their exclusive rights in a manner that weakens or stultifies competition 
in a given market to their advantage. Thus, the exercise of copyright has been subjected 
to competition scrutiny under the rules against restrictive agreements, abuse of 
dominance and under merger control.   
 CMOs, as repositories of copyright works from several owners, are classic 
examples of market power conferred by copyright. In fact, they are generally 
monopolistic in nature. As such, they are subjected to different forms of regulations to 
ensure efficiency, transparency and accountability standards. In pursuit of these 
standards, competition law seeks to address specific competition concerns about 
CMOs, including abuse of market dominance, excessive royalties, refusal to accept 
copyright owners as members, discrimination between copyright owners, unreasonable 
restraint on copyright owner’s exclusive rights, and discrimination between users, 
among others in the collective management and licensing markets. To address these 
concerns, some scholars believe that competition among CMOs for the same class of 
copyright should be promoted by regulation. Such regulations, according to the 
scholars, would displace CMOs’ natural monopolies. Others are of the view that any 
overbroad regulation contributes to entrenching CMOs’ natural monopolies. To these 
scholars, competition among CMOs should be facilitated, chiefly, by market forces 
with regulation playing a minimal oversight role. Still, some other scholars contend, 
and this thesis aligns with this view, that the efficiency, accountability and transparency 
objectives of regulating CMOs will best be achieved in collective management if 
regulation preserves CMOs’ natural monopoly while creating room for some form of 
competition among copyright owners within the CMOs’ fold. These scholars believe 
that this will effectively promote cultural creativity and dynamic competition, hence 
serving the collective goal of copyright and competition law. In essence, the efficiency, 
accountability and transparency objectives in regulating collective management will 
best be achieved if the regulatory framework preserves CMOs’ natural monopoly while 
addressing the specific competition concerns   
 The application of competition law to CMOs developed along the third 
approach above. While recognising CMOs’ market dominance, competition courts 




approach, while addressing the specific competition concerns highlighted above. 
Essentially, the courts have engaged in balancing exercise by weighing CMOs’ objects 
against the copyright owners’ freedom to dispose of their works, the need for effective 
collective management and the need to foster competition in the copyright market. In 
this regard, competition courts have fashioned out rules to prevent CMOs from being 
anti-competitive. These rules are manifest in CMOs’ relationship with copyright 
owners, users, and among themselves.  
 In this chapter, it was found, first, that competition law is not well suited to 
prescribe the corporate structure for CMOs. Rather, that is a matter for copyright-sector 
specific regulation. However, it was found that merger control rules may be relevant in 
this regard, especially as they relate to the formation of CMOs. Even so, merger 
decisions may even take account of the existence of copyright sector-specific 
regulation that requires CMOs to open their membership to all copyright owners of 
works falling within their repertoires. In summary, CMOs’ corporate form and internal 
management are not competition concerns. They are within the realms of copyright-
sector specific regulation and as apparent from the discussion in 5.3.1 above, they are 
provided for of by both the Nigerian and South African CMO regulation regimes.   
 Secondly, on the relationship between CMOs and copyright owners, 
competition rules relate to the duty of CMOs to accept all copyright owners of works 
forming their repertoire, failure of which may be regarded as abuse of dominance. 
Further, competition law rules prohibit CMOs from requiring copyright owners to grant 
them exclusive license to administer copyright for the whole world and for all uses; 
and placing unreasonable restriction on copyright owners’ capacity to terminate or 
withdraw their mandates. As gleaned from the discussion in 5.3.2 above, whereas the 
Nigerian regulatory framework adequately addresses this concern, the South African 
regulatory framework does not. In particular, the Nigerian regime places a duty on 
CMOs in Nigeria to accept all copyright owners of works forming their repertoire. It 
also prohibits such CMOs from requiring exclusive licenses from copyright owners 
and empowers copyright owners to withdraw their mandates from CMOs subject to 
reasonable notice. On the other hand, the South African framework places an express 
duty only on needletime CMOs to accept all owners of needletime rights. There is no 
such duty on non-needletime CMOs. The framework does not expressly prohibit all 
CMOs in South Africa from requiring exclusive licenses from copyright owners, 




CMOs. The proposed s22C(1) of the CAB does not completely address this gap. 
Although it will empower copyright owners to withdraw their mandate from CMOs, it 
will also enable CMOs to demand exclusive licenses from copyright owners. The better 
approach, from a competition law perspective, is to expressly prohibit CMOs from 
requiring exclusive authorisations from copyright owners. 
Thirdly, competition law has been applied to control the royalty rates fixed by 
CMOs. The rules against excessive pricing were applied to control the fixing of 
excessive royalty rates by CMOs. Connected to this is the prohibition of the fixing of 
differential rates for different users except on justifiable grounds. Competition law 
rules relating to the ‘refusal to deal’ also have relevance in the area of refusal to license. 
However, competition courts have been hesitant to apply these rules to CMOs. Flowing 
from the discussion in 5.3.3, both the Nigerian and South African regulatory 
frameworks adequately address these competition concerns. Specifically, the Nigerian 
regulatory regime makes provision to prevent excessive royalty rates by Nigerian 
CMOs. It requires CMOs to fix and/or change royalty tariffs, subject to negotiations 
with users or user groups. The CMOs are also obligated to notify the NCC of any 
agreement reached based on such negotiations. In the event that no agreement is 
reached, the parties are required to refer the matter to the NCC to constitute the Dispute 
Resolution Panel with the power to arbitrate or mediate over the royalty dispute. 
Further, CMOs are prohibited from granting different royalty rates to different users 
except the peculiar circumstance of a particular user justifies such differential in royalty 
rates. In the same vein, the South African regulatory framework requires royalty rates 
to be negotiated between all CMOs and copyright users. It should be stressed, however, 
that the rule against differential rates is only expressly stated in relation to needletime 
CMOs. Nonetheless, from the decisions in the NAB v SAMPRA and SAMPRA v 
Foschini cases examined in chapter four, it is obvious that the courts will regard a 
royalty rate fixed for a user as excessive and discriminatory if it is higher than those 
fixed for other users in same class by both needletime and non-needletime CMOs.  
Indeed, as further assurances against abuse of dominance by CMOs in fixing royalties, 
the South African regulatory framework requires CMOs and/or users to refer a matter 
to the Copyright Tribunal when they cannot reach an agreement on royalty tariffs. In 
this regard, and as is apparent from the NAB v SAMPRA and SAMPRA v Foschini cases, 




determination of excessiveness of royalty. Essentially, the SCA applied the market-
comparison test and indicated unwillingness to apply the cost-price margin test.  
	 Finally, competition law has been applied to regulate the relationship among 
CMOs by controlling reciprocal agreements. This has been done mainly by the CJEU 
which applied the TFEU on CMOs from EU member states in this regard and CISAC 
model agreements. Although, seen as ordinarily not restrictive of competition because 
of the efficiency they create in collective management, reciprocal agreements may 
weaken competition in the copyright management and licensing markets. However, 
national legislators cannot validly regulate reciprocal agreements which are more like 
bilateral or multi-lateral agreements between corporations. In this regard, the 
regulatory frameworks in Nigeria and South Africa cannot be regarded as inadequate 
for omitting to regulate such reciprocal agreements because, as confirmed by the SA 
Copyright Review Commission, national legislators cannot validly legislate over 
reciprocal agreements. 
The discussion in this penultimate chapter so far was meant to highlight and 
examine specific CMOs’ competition law related concerns and to lay the foundation 
for answering the specific research questions set out in chapter one of the thesis. The 
next and last chapter shall form the summary of the discussion in the thesis and specific 








This thesis is purely doctrinal and was undertaken as a desk and library based research. 
It aimed to resolve the overarching research questions of whether the current regulation 
regime for CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa empower the relevant copyright sector-
specific regulatory bodies to address the CMOs competition concerns in the copyright 
management and licensing markets in both countries; and if not, whether there is a need 
to apply competition law in regulating CMOs in both countries. To this end, the thesis 
addressed the following specific questions:  
a. How and why has collective management of copyright and related rights, and 
the regulation thereof, developed into its current forms? 
b. What, if any, are the key competition concerns that arise out of the dominant 
position that CMOs hold in the copyright management and licensing markets? 
c. Does the Nigerian copyright sector-specific regulatory framework for CMOs 
empower the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory body to address the 
CMO’s competition concerns in the copyright management and licensing 
markets in Nigeria? 
d. Does the South African copyright sector-specific regulatory framework for 
CMOs empower the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory body to 
address the CMO’s competition concerns in the copyright management and 
licensing markets in South Africa? 
e. How does competition law address the key CMOs’ competition concerns in the 
copyright management and licensing markets? 
Whereas chapter one set out the research objective and relevance, research questions, 
methodology, summary of research context and structure; chapter two focused on 
collective management and its competition related issues. More specifically, chapter 
two highlighted and discussed the meaning, classification, role of CMOs. It also 
identified and examined the related issues of the justification for collective 
management, the impact of digitisation on collective management and the competition 




issues on the regulation of collective management. In this regard, the chapter addressed 
the relationship between copyright sector-specific regulation and competition law 
against the backdrop of the sector-specific industry regulation defence to competition 
law oversight. Chapters three and four were specifically devoted to discussing the 
regulation of CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa respectively. The chapters highlighted 
the history of collective management and its regulatory history, the types of CMOs, the 
regulatory agencies and the specific issues addressed by the regulatory framework in 
both countries. Chapter five then explained the interface between copyright and 
competition law and situated it within the context of collective management. 
Essentially, it discussed how competition law has been applied to CMOs and the 
specific issues the competition courts were concerned about. For this purpose, it echoed 
and relied on the findings of the Max Planck Report which is the most extensive and 
authoritative work so far in this regard. The Max Planck Report considered the law and 
practice of the European, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and other 
competition jurisdictions from around the globe, including USA and India. It also relied 
on the EU Collective Rights Management Directive (CRM Directive) which was 
shaped by the CMO-competition related jurisprudence developed by the CJEU over a 
long period of time on the basis of art2.101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Founding of 
the EU (TFEU). This final chapter summarises the key findings of the preceding 
chapters, resolve the thesis’ research questions based on these findings, draw some 
overarching conclusions and provide some recommendations. 
 
6.2 Summary 
6.2.1 Regulation of CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa 
Although predominantly non-profit organisations, CMOs can take on the corporate 
structure of liability companies, partnerships, or cooperatives. In Nigeria, they are 
statutorily required to operate as non-profit companies limited by guarantee. No such 
statutory requirement exists in South Africa. Nevertheless, CMOs in South Africa are 
mostly non-profit organisations and private companies. CMOs are generally 
organisations of copyright owners, but they may sometimes be private companies 
acting as agents of copyright owners depending on the circumstances. 
CMOs operate in the copyright management and licensing markets in Nigeria 




licenses, they bridge the gap between copyright owners and users by enhancing access 
to copyright works by users while ensuring that copyright owners gain 
reward/compensation for their creative endeavours. Specifically, CMOs carry out the 
task of monitoring uses of copyright works, negotiating licenses with users, collecting 
royalties from the users and distributing the royalties among copyright owners on 
whose behalf the monitoring, licensing and collection was done. CMOs also engage in 
enforcement of copyright on copyright owners’ behalf. CMOs also carry out certain 
socio-cultural functions through which they promote creativity and social welfare and 
hence ensure the realisation of copyright’s ultimate goal. To perform these functions, 
CMOs obtain authorisation from copyright owners in Nigerian and South Africa. They 
also execute reciprocal agreements with foreign sister CMOs which enables them to 
represent the interest of foreign copyright owners locally, while the sister foreign 
CMOs represent the interest of Nigerian and South African copyright owners abroad. 
Thus, CMOs possess world repertoire which puts economies of scale and scope in their 
favour with which they solve the transaction cost problems in the copyright 
management and licensing markets: that is, the problems associated with the cost of 
searching, negotiating and obtaining licenses, collecting royalties, monitoring uses, 
among others on the part of copyright owners and users. Moreover, CMOs offer a 
platform of solidarity, aggregation and syndication which enables them to serve the 
interest of both small and large copyright owners, and thus preserving the public 
interest in the promotion of cultural creativity through the promise of equitable reward. 
In this regard, CMOs have a cross subsidisation effect for copyright owners: they help 
to reduce the administrative cost per copyright owner, increase the bargaining power 
per copyright owner as against large copyright users, afford risk-sharing platform for 
copyright owners, and provide specific support for copyright owners through special 
funds and promotional activities such as scholarship for up and coming creators. 
CMOs’ capacity to solve the transaction cost problem and afford copyright 
owners the platform of solidarity, aggregation and syndication, and ensure the 
promotion of creativity and social welfare are good arguments to justify CMOs’ natural 
monopoly. As a result of their natural monopoly, CMOs occupy a dominant position 
in the copyright management and licensing markets. Their natural monopoly and their 
market dominance are not displaced by digitisation. This is so even though digitisation 




performed by CMOs (such as negotiation, collection and distribution of royalties) and 
made it possible for large copyright owners to manage their copyright individually.  
In fact, some countries go a step forward to legally recognise CMOs’ natural 
monopoly. Nigeria is an example of such country. The Nigerian regulatory framework 
promotes CMOs’ monopoly through a concession system, subject to the discretion of 
the NCC. Section 39 of Nigerian Copyright Act empowers the NCC to not approve 
another CMO in respect of any class of copyright owners if it is satisfied that an existing 
approved CMO adequately protects the interest of that class of copyright owners. 
CMOs still maintain their natural monopoly stature in South Africa. The legal 
monopoly proposed for CMOs under the initially proposed s22B(6) of the original draft 
of the Copyright Amendment Bill has now been expunged from the latest draft of the 
Bill. Even so, legal provisions maintaining CMOs’ natural monopolies have been 
regarded by competition courts to be suitable insofar as the law ensures effective 
collective management through regulation of the CMOs.  
To prevent abuse of dominance by CMOs in the copyright management and 
licensing markets and preserve the public interest in the promotion of cultural 
creativity, regulations taking the form of copyright sector-specific regulations or dual-
sector regulations interfacing copyright and competition law exist. Regardless of the 
form adopted, the principal objective of regulating CMOs is to prevent them from 
abusing their monopoly by subjecting them to efficiency, transparency and 
accountability standards in their relationship with copyright owners, users, and among 
themselves. Within the context of competition law, this objective is pursued by 
addressing specific competition concerns such as abuse of market dominance, 
excessive pricing (royalties), refusal to license, refusal to accept copyright owners as 
members, discrimination between copyright owners and discrimination between users, 
among others in the copyright markets. In this regard, competition courts accept CMOs 
monopoly because of the efficiencies they bring to the collective management and 
licensing markets. Thus, for the perspective of competition law, the issue is not whether 
CMOs should be allowed to exist as monopolies. The issue is how best to address 
CMOs competition concerns owing to their dominance in the collective management 
and licensing markets. This thinking shaped the competition rules that are being applied 
to CMOs in USA and under the EU. 
Both the Nigerian and the South African regulatory frameworks are copyright 




pursuant to the Nigerian Copyright Act, CMO Regulations and relevant provisions of 
CAMA in Nigeria, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) 
regulates CMOs under the SA Copyright Act, Performers Protection Act, CS 
Regulations (applicable only to needletime CMOs) and the Companies Act in South 
Africa. Both Nigeria and South Africa have enacted competition legislations which are 
applicable to CMOs in principle, but have so far not been applied to them in practice. 
The competition legislations of both countries envisage the sector-specific industry 
regulation defence that are usually deployed by dominant firms to avoid competition 
oversight. The defence also brings to fore the possible conflicts that will arise between 
sector-specific industry regulators and competition law enforcers especially in 
industries, such as the collective management and licensing markets, requiring 
specialised skills and knowledge for effective supervision. Thus, the competition 
legislation of both countries provides frameworks that will enable competition 
concerns raised in sector-specific industries to be addressed by the regulators of those 
industries. For this purpose, however, it is important for that sector-specific regulation 
to contain rules that can be deployed to address those competition concerns. This thesis 
has so far been pre-occupied with answering the question whether the Nigerian and 
South African regulation regimes for CMOs empower the NCC and CIPC respectively 
to address CMOs’ competition concerns in the collective management and licensing 
markets. The findings in this regard are highlighted in 6.3 below.  
The Nigerian and South African regulatory frameworks both focus, among 
others, on the CMOs’ relationships with copyright owners, with copyright users and 
among themselves. Specifically, the regulations in Nigeria make provisions relating to 
CMOs’ corporate status, internal management, corporate governance, approval of 
CMOs, membership rules, royalty distribution, licensing practices, dispute resolution, 
number of CMOs, and cooperation among CMOs for effective collective management, 
among others. The South African regulatory framework makes provisions relating to 
accreditation of CMOs, membership, royalty distribution, licensing practices dispute 
resolution, internal management, among others. It does not expressly prescribe the 
number of CMOs per right or class of rights, corporate structure, and how CMOs may 





6.2.2 Copyright, CMOs and competition law 
Through different approaches, copyright and competition law pursue similar objective: 
the enhancement of consumer welfare by promoting dynamic competition which 
ensures continuity in creative endeavours. Copyright law vests copyright owners with 
exclusive rights which are limited by some substantive and time-based limitations and 
exceptions. In terms of competition law, such exclusive rights do not ordinarily confer 
market power on the copyright owners. However, the copyright owner may exercise 
the exclusive rights in a manner that weakens or stultifies competition in a given market 
to the advantage of the copyright owner. Thus, the exercise of copyright has been 
subjected to competition scrutiny under the rules against restrictive agreements, abuse 
of dominance and under merger control.   
CMOs, as repositories of copyright from several owners, are classic 
manifestation of market power and dominance in the copyright markets. Thus, they are 
subjected to competition law oversight to address the specific competition concerns 
highlighted in 6.2.1 above. To address these concerns, some scholars believe that 
regulation regimes should promote competition among CMOs for the same class of 
copyright. Such regulations should remove the incentives that make CMOs natural 
monopolies. Others are of the view that regulation contributes to entrenching CMOs 
natural monopoly. To these scholars, competition among CMOs should be left to 
market forces with regulation playing a minimal oversight role. Still, some other 
scholars contend, and this thesis aligns with this view, that efficiency, accountability 
and transparency will be better achieved in collective management if regulation 
preserves CMOs’ natural monopoly while creating room for some form of competition 
among copyright owners within the CMOs’ fold. These scholars rightly suggest that 
this will effectively promote cultural creativity and dynamic competition, hence 
serving the collective goal of copyright and competition law. 
The application of competition law to CMOs developed along these lines in 
major competition law jurisdictions such as the US and EU. While recognising CMOs’ 
market power, competition courts have subjected them to scrutiny under competition 
law through the rule of reason approach. Essentially, the courts have engaged in a 
balancing exercise by weighing CMOs’ functions against copyright owners’ freedom 
to exploit the copyright in their works, the need for effective collective management 
and the need to foster competition in the copyright market. In this regard, competition 




dominance and merger control to address the competition concerns stated in 6.2.1 
above. These rules are manifest in CMOs’ relationship with copyright owners, users, 
and among themselves. 
In addressing the competition concerns, focus was mainly on CMOs’ capacity 
to refuse copyright owners falling within their repertoire and the extent to which CMOs 
can restrict copyright owners’ exclusive rights: that is, whether CMOs can insist on 
exclusive licenses for all uses and for the whole world of both current and future works 
of copyright owners; and whether CMOs can unreasonably restrict copyright owner’s 
right to withdraw or terminate their license. Competition law oversight also extends to 
CMOs licensing practices. The focus here was about the capacity of CMOs to fix 
royalty rates and the extent to which they can discriminate against users when granting 
licenses. On the relationship among CMOs, the focus was on reciprocal agreements. 
 
6.3 Resolving the main research questions   
This part seeks to resolve the first limb of the main research questions: that is, (a) 
whether the current regulation regimes for CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa empower 
the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory bodies to address the CMO’s 
competition concerns in the copyright management and licensing markets in both 
countries? The question is addressed in three parts: the relationship between CMOs and 
copyright owners, CMOs and users, and between different CMOs. the second limb of 
the research question is addressed in 6.4 below. 
 
6.3.1 Relationship between CMOs and copyright owners 
In this context, competition law relates to the duty of CMOs to accept all copyright 
owners of works forming their repertoire, failure of which may be regarded as abuse 
of dominance. It also relates to the prohibition of CMOs from requiring copyright 
owners to grant them exclusive license to administer copyright for the whole world and 
for all uses; and placing unreasonable restriction on copyright owners’ capacity to 
terminate or withdraw their mandates.  
 As gleaned from the discussion in 5.3.2 above, whereas the Nigerian regulatory 
framework adequately addresses this concern, the South African regulatory framework 
does not. In particular, the Nigerian regime places a duty on CMOs in Nigeria to accept 




from requiring exclusive licenses from copyright owners and empowers copyright 
owners to withdraw their mandates from CMOs subject to reasonable notice. On the 
other hand, the South African framework places an express duty only on needletime 
CMOs to accept all owners of needletime rights. There is no such duty on non-
needletime CMOs. The framework does not expressly prohibit all CMOs in South 
Africa from requiring exclusive licenses from copyright owners, neither does it 
expressly empower copyright owners to withdraw their mandates from CMOs. The 
proposed s22C(1) of the CAB does not completely address this gap. Although it will 
empower copyright owners to withdraw their mandate from CMOs, it will also enable 
CMOs to demand exclusive licenses from copyright owners. The better approach, from 
a competition law perspective, is to expressly prohibit CMOs from requiring exclusive 
authorisations from copyright owners. 
  
6.3.2 Relationship between CMOs and users 
Competition law has been applied under the TFEU by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union to control the royalty rates fixed by CMOs. The rules against excessive 
pricing were applied to control the fixing of excessive royalty rates by CMOs. 
Connected to this is the prohibition of the fixing of differential rates for users except 
on justifiable grounds. Competition law rules relating to the refusal to deal are relevant 
to the refusal to license by CMOs. However, competition courts, have been hesitant to 
apply the rules to CMOs.  
Based on the discussion in chapter 5.3.3, both the Nigerian and South African 
copyright regulatory frameworks adequately address these competition law concerns. 
Specifically, the Nigerian regulatory regime makes provisions to check excessive 
royalty rates by Nigerian CMOs. It requires the CMOs to fix and/or change royalty 
tariffs, subject to negotiations with users or user groups. The CMOs are also obligated 
to notify the NCC of any agreement reached based on such negotiations. In the event 
that no agreement is reached, the parties are required to refer the matter to the NCC to 
constitute the Dispute Resolution Panel with the power to arbitrate or mediate over the 
royalty dispute. Further, CMOs are prohibited from granting different royalty rates to 
different users except the peculiar circumstance of a particular user justifies such 
differential in royalty rates. In the same vein, the South African regulatory framework 
requires royalty rates to be negotiated between all CMOs and copyright users. It should 




relation to needletime CMOs. Nonetheless, from the decisions in the NAB v SAMPRA 
and SAMPRA v Foschini cases examined in chapter four, it is obvious that the courts 
will regard a royalty rate fixed for a user as excessive and discriminatory if it is 
unreasonably higher than those fixed for other users in the same class by both 
needletime and non-needletime CMOs.  Indeed, as further assurances against the abuse 
of dominance by CMOs in fixing royalties, the South African regulatory framework 
requires CMOs and/or users to refer a matter to the Copyright Tribunal when they 
cannot reach an agreement on royalty tariffs. In this regard, and as is apparent from the 
NAB v SAMPRA and SAMPRA v Foschini cases, there is some jurisprudential activity 
which aligns with the practice of the CJEU on determination of excessiveness of 
royalty. Essentially, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) applied the market-
comparison test and indicated unwillingness to apply the cost-price margin test.  
 
6.3.3 Relationship among CMOs 
Competition law has been applied to regulate the relationship among CMOs by 
controlling reciprocal agreements. This has been done mainly by the CJEU which 
applied the TFEU on CMOs from EU member states and on CISAC model agreements. 
Although, seen as ordinarily not restrictive of competition because of the efficiency 
they create in collective management, reciprocal agreements may weaken competition 
in the copyright management and licensing markets.  
As argued in chapter 5.3.4, national legislators cannot validly regulate 
reciprocal agreements as these are akin to bilateral or multi-lateral agreements between 
corporations. Therefore, it is submitted that the regulatory framework in Nigeria and 
South Africa cannot be regarded as inadequate for omitting to regulate reciprocal 
agreements. However, it seems arguable that to the extent that reciprocal agreements 
may weaken or restrain competition in the respective copyright management and 
licensing markets in both countries, the agreements may come under judicial scrutiny 
locally. A reciprocal agreement may weaken competition in a given market, for 
instance, if it amounted to concerted efforts between the parties to the agreement and 
has the effect of limiting copyright owners’ ability to become members of any CMO 
of their choice or of more than one CMO at the same time in Nigeria or South Africa, 
as the case may be. The argument finds support in the South African cases of Pioneer 
Hi-Bred International v Competition Commission and Nestle SA v Infant Nutrition 




merger between local firms and international firms through their local subsidiaries, the 
approach adopted by the SA Competition Appeal Court and the SA Competition 
Tribunal respectively are relevant here.  Specifically, the Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International case involved the transfer of trademark as part of the proposed merger. 
In both cases, the courts were concerned about the effect of the proposed mergers on 
competition in the respective markets. The courts upheld the mergers because their 
implementation would promote competition in the markets. In effect, the mergers 
would have been rejected by the courts if their effect was to weaken or restrain 
competition in the respective markets. 
6.4 Resolving the second limb of the main research question: recommendations 
As far as the second limb of the research question is concerned – that is, whether there 
is a need for competition law to be applied in regulating CMOs in Nigeria and South 
Africa, it is strongly submitted that there is no such need in Nigeria since the copyright 
sector-specific regulatory framework already stipulate rules that can be deployed by 
the NCC to address the CMO’ competition law concerns. Hence, there will be no need 
to apply the Nigerian Competition Act to CMOs in Nigeria. Indeed, the rules contained 
in the CMO regulation regime can act as a basis for an agreement between the NCC 
and the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission envisaged under 
ss104 to106 of the Nigerian Competition Act for the exemption of CMOs from the 
regulatory oversight under the Nigerian Competition Act.  
 The same cannot be said of the South African copyright sector-specific 
regulatory framework. There is a need to apply the SA Competition Act to CMOs in 
South Africa. As gleaned from the discussions in this thesis, while the regulatory 
framework empowers the CIPC to address the competition law concerns in respect of 
the relationship between CMOs and users, there are identified regulatory gaps with 
regards to the relationship between CMOs and copyright owners. This is because, first, 
the duty to accept copyright owners as members is statutorily expressed only in relation 
to needletime CMOs. There is no such duty on non-needletime CMOs. Secondly, 
although copyright owners are empowered to transfer their copyright in existing and 
further works, there is no express statutory restraint on CMOs from restricting the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners. The CS Regulations only provides some indirect 





The Copyright Amendment Bill will not take care of some of these gaps when/if 
it comes into force. A new s22C(1)(b) is being proposed, which seeks to empower 
copyright owners to withdraw authorisation granted to CMOs. The proposed section 
can also be interpreted to extend to CMOs duty to open their membership to copyright 
owners within the class of the CMOs’ repertoire. Unfortunately, the proposed 
s22C(1)(a) of the Copyright Amendment Bill seeks to enable CMOs to require 
exclusive authorisation from copyright owners in South Africa and hence potentially 
missing the opportunity to address this specific competition law concern. However, the 
tides can still be turned especially since the legislative process of enacting the 
Copyright Amendment Bill is still on-going. The Copyright Amendment Bill will have 
to be further revised before enactment to take care of this and other gaps identified in 
the current copyright sector-specific regulation in South Africa. To sufficiently address 
the CMOs’ competition law concerns, the following provisions should be 
(re)introduced to the Copyright Amendment Bill: 
• The proposed s22B(6) initially proposed in the original draft should be 
reintroduced in the latest draft of the Bill. This will take care of the one-society-
one-right proposed by the Copyright Review Commission. In terms of 
competition law, such provisions have been upheld as necessary for effective 
collective management. Also, contrary to fears elsewhere, it will help 
streamline copyright licenses by taking care of the transaction costs problems 
on the part of users. Further, it will help strengthen the bargaining platform for 
copyright owners vis-à-vis users and the government. Moreover, it will enhance 
the socio-cultural role of CMOs. 
• A clear prohibition should be introduced which will prevent CMOs from 
requiring exclusive licenses/authorisation from copyright owners. This will 
complement the provision relating to copyright owners’ right to withdraw a 
mandate given to a CMO. In terms of competition law, both provisions will 
effectively forestall CMOs powers to unreasonably restrain copyright owners’ 
exclusive rights.   
Overall, the following recommendations may be useful to fill other important gaps in 
the Bill: 
a. It is commendable that the Bill already seeks to bring all CMOs in South Africa 




accreditation certificate to operate as a CMO. To make this proposal effective, 
however, a provision for the consequences of refusal/failure by a CMO to 
obtain accreditation should be introduced. The provision may place an express 
restriction on the right of the CMO to operate without accreditation, the right to 
enforce any claim under the SA Copyright Act, or, in the extreme, make it a 
crime to operate without a license. Similar provisions can be found in ss17 and 
39(4) of the Nigerian Copyright Act.  
b. It is also commendable that the Bill seeks to bring the activities of CMOs in 
South Africa within the control of their members. In this regard, the provision 
in the proposed s22D(3) regarding the three-year period for the distribution of 
royalties should be revised to distribution at the end of each financial year. 
There is no clear justification for such three-year deadline. Moreover, the three-
year deadline is against the established practice by CMOs: distribution at the 
end of each financial year. Further, the proposed s22D(3) does not address the 
specific and important issue of how CMOs should deal with royalties belonging 
to non-members copyright owners. The use of blanket licenses makes it 
inevitable for CMOs to collect royalties belonging to non-members copyright 
owners. However, such royalties must be dealt with appropriately and in the 
absence of a clearly defined mode of dealing with them, CMOs may 
misappropriate such royalties. To this end, the provision in reg11 of the 
Nigerian CMO Regulations is a useful guide. The regulation prescribes that 
CMOs establish a holding account into which such royalties will be deposited 
for a maximum period of 7years, within which the CMOs must make effort to 
trace the non-members copyright owners. Thereafter, amounts in the holding 
account at the end of the 7years falls into the general revenue of the CMOs for 
distribution in the current accounting period.    
6.5 General conclusion 
CMOs are regulated in both Nigeria and South Africa. It is settled that such regulation 
is necessary in both jurisdictions. However, one unresolved major question has been 
whether the existing copyright regulatory frameworks are effective in ensuring 
efficiency, accountability and transparency in collective management, which are the 
major goal of regulation. Existing literature from Nigeria and South Africa has 




and licensing practice and general operation of CMOs, with some alluding to collecting 
societies’ natural monopoly and their regulation under competition law.  
From a competition law perspective, the main goals of efficiency, 
accountability and transparency in collective management are pursued by addressing 
specific CMOs’ competition concerns, such as abuse of market dominance, excessive 
pricing (royalties), refusal to license, refusal to accept copyright owners as members, 
discrimination between copyright owners and discrimination between users in the 
copyright management and licensing markets. This thesis’ main focus has been on 
whether the current regulation regime for CMOs in Nigeria and South Africa stipulate 
rules that can be deployed by the relevant copyright sector-specific regulatory bodies 
to address these CMOs competition concerns in the copyright management and 
licensing markets in both countries; and if not, whether there is a need to apply 
competition law in regulating CMOs in both countries. In resolving these questions, 
the thesis addressed the specific sub-questions highlighted in 6.1 above. 
The thesis’ key contributions are both the approach adopted in addressing the 
questions and the conclusions reached. However, it should be noted that it did not 
consider the level of compliance by CMOs with the current copyright regulatory 
frameworks in Nigeria and South Africa. This is an important question that would 
require further research.  It also did not seek to conclusively resolve the question of 
how competition law may be applied to CMOs especially in South Africa where there 
are observable regulatory gaps, from a competition perspective, in the copyright-sector 
specific regulatory framework for CMOs. This said, it suggested some application 
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